Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2010

Kim Dahl v. Brian C. Harrison, an individual; and
Brian C. Harrison, P.C., a Utah professional
corporation : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Steve S. Christensen; Benjamin K. Lusty; Christensen and Thorton, PLLC; Attorneys for Appellant.
Ben W. Lieberman; Law Office of Ben W. Liberman, PLC.; Attorney for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Dahl v. Harrison, No. 20100553 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2416

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
KIM DAHL,

APPEAL

Appellant,

Appellate Case No. 20100553
District Court No. 070403005

vs.
BRIAN C. HARRISON, an individual;
and BRIAN C. HARRISON, P.C., a Utah
professional corporation,
Appellees.

Brief of Appellant
Appeal from the Fourth District Court, Utah County, Judge Claudia Laycock

Oral Argument Requested

Ben W. Lieberman, (U.S.B. No. 11456)
Law Office of Ben W. Lieberman, PLC
1371 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
Telephone: (801)864-5228
Facsimile: (801) 206-0600
Attorney for Appellee

Steve S. Christensen (U.S.B. No. 6156)
Benjamin K. Lusty (U.S.B. No. 12159)
CHRISTENSEN | THORNTON, PLLC
136 East South Temple, Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 303-5800
Facsimile: (801) 322-0594
Attorneys for Appellant
FILED
^ H A P P U B COURTS

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

JAN 16 2««

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
KIM DAHL,

APPEAL

Appellant,

Appellate Case No. 20100553

vs.

District Court No. 070403005

BRIAN C. HARRISON, an individual;
and BRIAN C. HARRISON, P.C, a Utah
professional corporation,
Appellees.

Brief of Appellant
Appeal from the Fourth District Court, Utah County, Judge Claudia Laycock

Oral Argument Requested

Ben W. Lieberman, (U.S.B. No. 11456)
Law Office of Ben W. Lieberman, PLC
1371 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
Telephone: (801) 864-5228
Facsimile: (801)206-0600
Attorney for Appellee

Steve S. Christensen (U.S.B. No. 6156)
Benjamin K. Lusty (U.S.B. No. 12159)
CHRISTENSEN | THORNTON, PLLC
136 East South Temple, Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 303-5800
Facsimile: (801) 322-0594
Attorneys for Appellant

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

I

STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT

3

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

3

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND
REGULATIONS
6
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

8

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

11

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

17

ARGUMENT

20

I. The trial court abused its discretion by denying Ms Dahl's motion to extend the
deadline for the designation of experts and for the submission of initial expert reports
and by striking Ms. Dahl's expert reports without leave to amend, even though trial had
not been set
20
A.
The trial court abused its discretion when it chose an inappropriate sanction
by striking Ms. DahVs Expert Disclosures and Reports
21
B. The trial court abused its discretion by placing any inconvenience to Mr.
Harrison in extending discovery ahead of the extreme prejudice to Ms. Dahl.

22

C. The trial court abused its discretion when it denied Ms. Dahl's January 23,
2009 Motion to Allow Expert Witnesses at Trial.

24

1. The trial court improperly determined that Ms. Dahl's Motion to Allow
Testimony of Expert Witnesses at Trial was a motion to reconsider the trial court's
previous ruling
24
2. The trial court should have decided the motion on its merits, and under Boice,
the trial court should have granted Ms. Dahl leave to amend her disclosures
25
II.
The Trial Court abused its discretion when it denied Ms. Dahl's Motion to
Extend Factual Discovery and granted Mr. Harrison's Protective Order

27

III.
The Trial Court erred by awarding Mr. Harrison $2,400 in attorneys fees for Ms.
Dahl's filing her Motion to Allow Expert Testimony
32
A.
The trial court erred when it awarded Mr. Harrison attorney fees and costs
under Utah Code Ann. § 78B~ 5-82 5 for amotion
33
1.
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825 pertains to causes of action, not motions
Ms. Dahl's cause of action was brought in good faith

34
36

B. The court abused its discretion by awarding attorneys fees under its inherent
equitable powers
37
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I
CONCLUSION

.......39

ADDENDUM

41

Utah R. Civ. P. 11

42

Scheduling Order

44

Defendant's Consolidated Motion for Protective Order and Supporting Memorandum ..48
Plaintiff s Motion to Amend Scheduling Order

79

Plaintiffs Motion for Further Discovery

81

I

Declaration of Brennan H. Moss in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Further Discovery
83
Plaintiffs Consolidated Memorandum in Support of her Motion for Further Discovery,
Motion to Amend Scheduling Order, and in Opposition to Defendants1 Motion for
Protective Order
89
Defendants' Consolidated: 1) Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for
Protective Order; and 2) Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion for
Further Discovery and to Amend the Scheduling Order
97
Minute Entry - MOTIONS FOR S.J., ET AL

1

'

104

Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Expert Disclosures and Reports Pursuant to Utah
R. Civ. P. 37(F)
106
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Expert
Disclosures and Reports Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 37(F)
109
Affidavit of Steve S. Christensen in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs
Expert Disclosures and Reports
118
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Expert Disclosures and Reports
123
Minute Entry - Oral Arguments

132

Motion to Allow Testimony of Expert Witnesses at Trial (Missing from Record)

134

Minute Entry - Oral Argument

135

1

'

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Court Denying Plaintiffs Motion to
Allow Expert Testimony at Trial and Granting Defendants' Motion for Attorneys' Fees
and Costs
137
TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 03-12-2009, pp 29-30, 33-34, 36-37

143

TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 12-16-2008, pp 18,28,30-31

150

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 830 P.2d 291 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
4, 17, 20
Boice v. Marble, 1999 UT 71, 982 P.2d 565
4, 18, 21, 26, 27
Butterfield v. Okubo, 790P.2d94 (UtahCt. App. 1990)
4
Cannon v. Salt Lake Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 2005 UT App 352, 121 P.3d 74
28
Debryv. Cascade Enters., 879P.2d 1353 (Utah 1994)
4
Doctor's Co. v. Drezga, 2009 UT 60,218 P.3d 598
6,38
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980)
23, 24
Edwards v. Powder Mountain Water and Sewer, 2009 UT App 185, 214 P.3d 120
5, 6
Fisher v. Fisher, 2009 UT App 305, 221 P.3d 845
5
Gallegos v. Lloyd, 2008 UT App 40, 178 P.3d 922
34
Gilbert Dev. Corp. v. Wardley Corp., 2010 UT App 361, —P.3d—
33
Hermes Assocs. v. Park's Sportsman, 813 P.2d 1221 (Utah Ct.App. 1991)
34
Hughes v. Cafferty, 2004 UT 22, 89 P.3d 148
5, 37
In re Olympus Constr., L.C, 2009 UT 29, 215 P.3d 129
6
Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement, Inc., 2008 UT 82, 199 P.3d 957
4
Maoris & Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 60 P.3d 1176 (Utah Ct. App. 2002)
28, 37
Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 150 P.3d 480
28
Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d271 (Utah 1997)
3, 21
Nixdorfv. Hicken, 612 P.2d348 (Utah 1980)
22
Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc., 2007 UT App 382, 174 P.3d 1
4, 27
Olsen v. Lund, 2010 UT App 353, —P.3d—
33
Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d932 (Utah 1998)
5
Posner v. Equity Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 2009 UT App 347, 222 P.3d 775.... 3, 4, 5, 24, 33
Preston & Chambers, P.C v. Roller, 943 P.2d 260 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
4, 21, 22
Rahofy v. Steadman, 2010 UT App 350, —P.3d—
28
Richards v. Brown, 2009 UT App 315, 222 P.3d 69
29
Rohan v. Boseman, 2002 UT App 109, 46 P.3d 753
35
Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, 977 P.2d 1201
34
Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 2005 UT 46, 122 P.3d 556
5, 34
United Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 641 P.2d 158 (Utah 1982)
30
UtahDept. ofTransp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d4 (Utah 1995)
4
Utahns for Better Dental Health-Davis, Inc. v. Rawlings, 2007 UT 97, 175 P.3d 1036.. 33
Welsh v. Hospital Corporation of Utah, 2010 UT App 171, 235 P.3d 791... 3, 4, 5, 17, 18,
20,21,22,24,26,27
Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
22
Youngbloodv. Auto-Owners Ins. Inc., 2005 UT App 154, 111 P.3d 829
30
Statutes
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78B-5-825

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6,19,33,36

i

Other Authorities
Black's Law Dictionary
Utah R. Civ. P. 26 Advisory Committee Notes

34
31

Rules
Utah R. Civ. P. 11
UtahR. Civ. P. 16
Utah R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)
Utah R. Civ. P. 16(d)
Utah R. Civ. P. 26
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)
Utah R. Civ. P. 37
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6, 19,35
4, 5
3, 5, 6,28
3, 6
3, 5
7
3, 15
3, 7
7

STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
Jurisdiction is coi lfen ed i ipoi 1 the 1 Jtal i Coi 11 t of Appeals. 1 11 iclei I Jtah Code
Annotated § 78A-4- i < )3, to hear appeals from the district court involving cases
transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
S I A I EMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue L Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Ms. Dahl's
motion to extend the deadline for designation of expert witnesses and for the submission
of initial expei t \ v itness reports and w hethei the ti ial court erred by striking Ms. Dahl's
expert witness reports without leave to amend, even thougl 1 trial had not bee n set
Standard of review. "Trial courts have broad discretion ii i managing the cases
assigned to their courts." Welsh v Hospital Corp. nfJTtah.
P 3d 791 (qi io1 ii lg Posner v Equity 1 ill "; In s : ige 72<

?A1 n
' "l-

Trr

x

i

\:i

f

"

: - •-+/, «,j 2 3 , III

P.3d 775). As part of that discretion, rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows
the trial court to set dates for the completion o f discovery and expert discovery. See Utah
R Civ P 16(1 >)(3) ai i< 1 1 Ii ; ill. R Cv ' 1 " 26 R 1 lie 16 als< > a.i itl: x irizes 1 1 le 1 1 u tl court to
impose the sanctions listed in Rule 37(b)(2) of the Utah Rules o f Civil Procedure if the
party fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order. Utah R. Civ. T 16(d). Under Rule 37,
excluding evidence .is on* : < ) f the sanctions that m a y be imposed on a. party w h o violates
Rule 16. However, before the trial c< >i 1,1 t c ai 1 imj x >se < lisc :< >vei > sai K :1 i.< ms 1 11 1 k si R 1 ile 37,
the court must find on the part of the noncomplying party "willfulness, bad faith . . . fault,
or persistent dilatory tactics frustrating the judicial process." Welsh, 2010 UT App 171, f
9 (citing A/--'v

Continental Bating Co., 93$ P.2d 2 71, 274 ( I Jtah 1.997)) Once tl lat
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I
finding is made, the choice of an appropriate discovery sanction is primarily the
responsibility of the trial judge. Appellate courts will only disturb a discovery sanction if

*

abuse is clearly shown. Id. (quoting Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement, Inc., 2008 UT 82,
1f23, 199P.3d957).
Supporting Authority. Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Welsh v.
Hospital Corp. of Utah, 2010 UT App 171, If 9, 235 P.3d 791; Posner v. Equity Title Ins.
Agency, Inc., 2009 UT App 347, % 23, 222 P.3d 775; Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement

i

Inc., 2008 UT 82, 199 P.3d 957; Boice v. Marble, 1999 UT 71, 982 P.2d 565;
Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc., 2007 UT App 382, 174 P.3d I; Preston &

^

Chambers, P.C. v. Koller, 943 P.2d 260 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Debry v. Cascade Enters.,
879 P.2d 1353, 1361 (Utah 1994); Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 830 P.2d
291, 293 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Utah Dept. ofTransp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 8 (Utah
1995).
Statement of Preservation. The issue regarding the Motion to Strike Expert
Witnesses and Motion for leave to amend is preserved on the Record at 607, 769, and
1742 18-31.
Issue II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Ms. Dahl's
Motion to Extend Factual Discovery which was filed almost eighteen months prior to
trial and a full year before the pretrial conference in which a trial date was calendared.
Standard of review. Trial courts have broad discretion in managing the cases
assigned to their courts." Welsh v. Hospital Corp. of Utah, 2010 UT App 171, Tf 9, 235
P.3d 791; Butterfield v. Okubo, 790 P.2d 94 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). As part of that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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<

discretion, rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows tin •' *.;

mt to set dates

for the completk »i 1 of discovery. See Utah R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3).
Supporting Authority. Rule 16, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Rule 26, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure; Welsh, 2010 I IT App 171; Posner v. Equity Title Ins. Agency,
Inc., 2009 UT App 347, <{ 23, 222 P.3d 775.
Statement of Preservation. The issue of extending fact discovery is preserved on
the Record at 393, 395, and 554.
Issue III. Whether the trial court improperly awarded attorney fees as a sanction
against Ms. Dahl for filing a motion to extend the deadline for the designation of experts
and for the submission of initial expert reports.
Standard of review. Appellate courts give no deference to the trial court's
determination as to whether attorney fees. Fisher v. Fisher, 2009 UT App 305, \ 8, 221
P.3d 845. However, "[w]hether a claim was brought in bad faith is a question of fact that
appellate courts review under a clearly erroneous standard. Edwards v. Powder
Mountain Water and Sewer, 2009 UT App 185, \ 13, 214 P.3d 120; see also Still
Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 2005 UT 46, \ 8, 122 P.3d 556. The trial court's
determination that an action lacks merit, however, is a question of law that this court
reviews for correctness. Edwards, 2009 UT App 185, % 13; Pennington v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 973 P.2d 932, 939 n. 3 (Utah 1998). To the extent the trial court awarded attorney
fees pursuant to its equitable powers, the appropriate standard for reviewing equitable
awards of attorney fees is abuse of discretion. Fisher, 2009 UT App 305, ^ 8; Hughes v.
Cafferty, 2004 UT 22, ^ 20, 89 P.3d 148.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Supporting Authority. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-825; Doctor's Co. v. Drezga,
2009 UT 60, 218 P.3d 598; In re Olympus Constr., L.C., 2009 UT 29, f 8, 215 P.3d 129;
Edwards v. Powder Mountain Water and Sewer, 2009 UT App 185; 214 P.3d 120.
Statement of Preservation. The issue of improper award of attorneys fees under
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825 is preserved on the Record at 947, 1057 and 1741 29-39.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND
REGULATIONS
UTAH CODE ANN.

78B-5-825. Attorney fees — Award where action or defense in bad faith - Exceptions.
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party
if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not
brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party under
Subsection (1), but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before the court;
or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the provisions
of Subsection (1)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 11
Reproduced verbatim in the addendum.
Rule 16(b)(3)
Scheduling and management conference and orders. In any action, in addition to any
other pretrial conferences that may be scheduled, the court, upon its own motion or upon
the motion of a party, may conduct a scheduling and management conference. The
attorneys and unrepresented parties shall appear at the scheduling and management
conference in person or by remote electronic means. Regardless whether a scheduling
and management conference is held, on motion of a party the court shall enter a
scheduling order that governs the time:
to complete discovery.
Rule 16(d)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Sanctions. If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order, if no
appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or pretrial conference, if a party
or a party's attorney is substantially unprepared to participate in the conference, or if a
party or a party's attorney fails to participate in good faith, the court, upon motion or its
own initiative, may take any action authorized by Rule 37(b)(2).
Rule 26(b)(2)
Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance
with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows:
A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that
the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. The
party shall expressly make any claim that the source is not reasonably accessible,
describing the source, the nature and extent of the burden, the nature of the information
not provided, and any other information that will enable other parties to assess the claim.
On motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom discovery
is sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue
burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court may order discovery from such sources
if the requesting party shows good cause, considering the limitations of subsection (b)(3).
The court may specify conditions for the discovery.
Rule 37(b)(2)
Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party fails to obey an order entered
under Rule 16(b) or if a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a
person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey
an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under Subdivision (a) of
this rule or Rule 35,, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified, the
court in which the action is pending may take such action in regard to the failure as are
just, including the following:
(b)(2)(A) deem the matter or any other designated facts to be established for the purposes
of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(b)(2)(B)prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or
defenses or from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(b)(2)(C) strike pleadings or parts thereof, stay further proceedings until the order is
obeyed, dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or render judgment by
default against the disobedient party;
(b)(2)(D) order the party or the attorney to pay the reasonable expenses, including
attorney fees, caused by the failure;
(b)(2)(E) treat the failure to obey an order, other than an order to submit to a physical or
mental examination, as contempt of court; and
(b)(2)(F) instruct the jury regarding an adverse inference.
Rule 37(f)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
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Failure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material as
required by Rule 26(a) or Rule 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to discovery as
required by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall not be pennitted to use the witness, document
or other material at any hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party
shows good cause for the failure to disclose. In addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the
court on motion may take any action authorized by Subdivision (b)(2).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 24, 2006, Ms. Dahl was served simultaneously with the divorce
complaint and an ex parte temporary restraining order (TRO) that had already been
entered in favor of her husband, Charles Dahl. On October 27, 2006, Ms. Dahl retained
Brian Harrison as an attorney to represent her in the divorce matter. The representation of
Kim Dahl by Brian Harrison in that divorce action was the issue below in this legal
malpractice case.
The hearing on whether to grant the TRO was set for November 2, 2006. Prior to
the hearing Mr. Harrison informed Ms. Dahl that there was insufficient time to prepare
for the hearing and as a result, he wanted to seek a continuance of two weeks. She told
Mr. Harrison she would defer to his recommendation. Mr. Harrison then informed Ms.
Dahl that she need not appear at the divorce hearing set for November 2, 2006.
It was undisputed that Mr. Harrison, outside of Ms. Dahl's presence and without
informing Ms. Dahl ahead of time of proposed terms of the stipulation, entered into a
stipulation at the November 2, 2006 hearing. The terms of the stipulation provided for
the adoption of the restrictions in the TRO for an indefinite time, including the
temporary surrender of custody, even though she had been a stay at home mother all of
the children's lives and even though there was no finding of abuse or neglect. In

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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addition, Mr. Harrison stipulated to additional restrictions thai were not briefed and were
not before the court on thai day. The additional restrictions included that Ms. Dahl would
vacate the marital home which she had sole possession of at that time so that Mr. Dahl be
awarded immediate use of the home and that Ms. Dahl be required to submit to
supervised visitation, the supervisor being Mr. Dahfs brother.
Ms. Dahl was removed from the marital home later on November 2, 2006 and not
permitted to return. Ms. Dahl hired Rodney Parker to replace Mr. Harrison a short time
after November 2, 2006. At a later hearing before Judge I aylor to request an evidentiary
hearing on the matter of temporary custody, Judge Taylor concluded among other things
that the custody order was in place as a result of the stipulation of the parties. He denied
the request for an evidentiary hearing. The stipulation causer ' \ * \w> a;;u her children
significant suffering and displaced Ms. Dahl from stable housing, causing her significant
economic injury.
On October 11, 2007, Ms. Dahl filed a complaint against Mr. Harrison alleging
breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence. On November 21, 2007,
after agreeing to a scheduling order, Mr. Harrison filed a motion to disqualify Ms. Dahfs
counsel which was resolved by stipulation on February 6, 2008. On January 4, 2008, the
court signed a stipulated scheduling order that closed fact discovery on April 7, 2008.
The order set a deadline of May 5, 2008, for Ms. Dahl to disclose any expert witnesses.
Trial was not scheduled at this time. On April 28,2008, Mr. Harrison submitted a
Motion for Summary Judgment, which was later denied. On May 12, 2008, Ms. Dahl
filed motions with the trial court seeking amendment of the scheduling order. The court
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
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held oral argument on the motions to extend discovery on August 7, 2008. The court
denied Ms. DahFs request to reopen fact discovery. The court extended expert discovery
until September 8, 2008 for Ms. Dahl to submit her expert disclosures and reports.
Ms. Dahl submitted her expert disclosures on September 8, 2008 for two legal
experts, Clark Nielsen and Martin Olsen. Mr. Harrison moved to strike the disclosures
pursuant to rule 37(f) because the expert reports did not include adequate description of
the experts' opinions. Ms. Dahl opposed the motion to strike on the grounds that a
discovery sanction was inappropriate where there had been no attempt by Mr. Harrison to
meet and confer, and where there was no showing of prejudice, willfulness or bad faith.
Trial had not been scheduled at this point.
On December 16, 2008, the court held oral argument on the motion to strike. At
that hearing Ms Dahl's counsel orally requested that the court receive an amended expert
report from Martin Olsen and asked alternatively for the court to consider a motion to
extend time to prepare further detailed disclosures and reports. The court declined to
receive the amended report and "strongly hinted" that it would not grant a motion to
extend expert discovery if it were filed.
On, January 23, 2009, Ms. Dahl filed her second motion for extension of time to
file amended expert disclosures and reports, or alternatively, to allow her designated
experts to testify at trial. As of the date of that motion, trial had not yet been set. Ms.
Dahl argued in support of her affirmative motion for an extension of time and that no
prejudice would result as a trial date had yet to be set. The Court denied this motion, and
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awarded costs and fees to Mr. Harrison on the basis that the motion was frivolous. The
court set trial for the first time at a pretrial conference on June 30, 2009.
At the pretrial conference, the court also bifurcated the trial so that issues of
liability would be tried separately from the issue of causation and damages. A two day
bench trial was held on October 26 and 27, 2009, limited solely to the issues of liability.
Following the presentation of evidence, the Court found in favor of Mr. Harrison on each
of Ms. Dahfs causes of action and dismissed the case. The Court entered its conclusions
of law and order of dismissal on June 1, 2010 and a final judgment of court costs on June
21,2010.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

On October 24, 2006, Plaintiff Kim Dahl's husband, Charles Dahl, filed a

Petition for Divorce in the Fourth Judicial District under case number 064402232.
(Record at 11.)
2.

Along with the Petition for Divorce, Mr. Dahl filed a Motion for an Ex

Parte Temporary Restraining Order limiting Ms. Dahl's contact with her children. (Id.)
3.

On October 24, 2006, Ms. Dahl was served with a Complaint for Divorce

and the Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO"). (Record at 10.)
4.

At the time she was served, Ms. Dahl had no notice or inclination that Mr.

Dahl had been planning to file for divorce. (Id.)
5.

Prior to the date she was served with the TRO, Ms. Dahl had never been

reported by anyone for abusing or neglecting her children, or for giving them medication
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not prescribed by their physician and father, Charles Dahl, or by any other licensed
physician. (Record at 9.)
6.

Based upon the unsubstantiated allegations in the affidavits of Charles Dahl

and Rosemond Blakelock, Mr. Dahl's attorney, representing that permanent and
irreparable harm may come to the children if the TRO did not issue, the District Court
entered an Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order without notice to Ms. Dahl. (Id.)
7.

The Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order prohibited Ms. Dahl from

removing the children from the temporary care, custody, and control of the Mr. Dahl, or
removing either child from his or her school. (Id.)
8.

The Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order did not order Ms. Dahl to leave

the marital home. (Record at 9.)
9.

The District Court scheduled an Order to Show Cause on November 2,

2006 before Commissioner Patton to review the TRO. That hearing was Ms. Dahl's first
opportunity to be heard on the court's restraining order. (Record at 10.)
10.

After being served with the Complaint and the Temporary Restraining

Order, Ms. Dahl went to attorney Brain Harrison of Brian C. Harrison, P.C. to discuss the
papers which had been served upon her. (Record at 9.)
11.

After reviewing the documents, Mr. Harrison told Ms. Dahl that he would

represent her, but that she needed to deposit a $5,000 retainer with Brian C. Harrison,
P.C. (Id.)
12.

Ms. Dahl promptly secured the funds for the retainer and delivered them to

Mr. Harrison. (Id.)
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13.

Between the retainer payment and the other money Ms. Dahl was able to

secure, Ms. Dahl deposited $12,146.05 with Brian C. Harrison, P.C. (Record at 8.)
14.

During one of the initial consultations, Mr. Harrison counseled Ms. Dahl to

sign up for parenting classes. (Id.)
15.

Mrs. Dahl took the advice of Mr. Harrison and signed up for the classes.

16.

Of utmost concern to Ms. Dahl was the hearing scheduled for November 2,

(id.)

2006. (Id.)
17.

When Ms. Dahl discussed the hearing with Mr. Harrison, he told her that he

could not be ready for the hearing on November 2, 2006 and that it would be continued.
(Id.)
18.

Mr. Harrison informed Ms. Dahl that because the November 2, 2006

hearing would be continued, she would not need to appear. (Id.)
19.

Despite Mr. Harrison's representation to Ms. Dahl that she did not need to

attend the hearing on November 2, 2006, Mr. Harrison entered into a stipulation on Ms.
Dahl's behalf. Mr. Harrison did so without any further attempt to contact Ms. Dahl
before or during the hearing, without Ms. Dahl's knowledge or consent, and outside of
her presence. The stipulation that Mr. Harrison agreed to on Ms. Dahl's behalf adopted
the restrictions in the TRO pending a new hearing. The stipulation farther adopted
additional restrictions including removing Ms. Dahl from the marital home and restricting
her parent time with the children to supervised visitation, the supervisor being Mr. Dahl's
brother. (Id.)
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20.

On November 7, 2006, the District Court Commissioner and Judge signed

an Order consistent with the terms of the stipulation. (Id.)
21.

After Mr. Harrison entered into a stipulation extending the TRO, removing

Ms. Dahl from the marital home and restricting her parent time with the children to
supervised visitation, Ms. Dahl retained Rodney Parker to represent her in the divorce
action. (Record at 7.)
22.

Mr. Harrison sent portions of Ms. Dahl's file, including privileged

information, to the martial home, even though he knew that Ms. Dahl did not reside there
and that she was then represented by Rodney Parker. (Id.)
23.

On or about November 9, 2006, Mr. Harrison sent a final bill to Ms. Dahl

stating that he had worked on her case for 27 hours between the dates of October 26,
2006 through November 9, 2006. (Id.)
24.

Ms. Dahl filed the current action on October 11, 2007, alleging breach of

contract, breach offiduciaryduty, and negligence. (Record at 12.)
25.

Mr. Harrison filed his Answer and Affirmative Defenses on November 1,

2007. (Record at 24.)
26.

After agreeing to a scheduling order, Mr. Harrison filed a Motion to

Disqualify Ms. Dahl's counsel on November 21, 2007. (Record at 30.) On January 4,
2008, the court signed a stipulated scheduling order that closed fact discovery on April 7,
2008. (Record at 144.) The order set a deadline of May 5, 2008, for Ms. Dahl to disclose
any experts. (Id.) Trial was not scheduled at this time.
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27.

On January 8,2008, oral argument was set for the motion to disqualify to

occur on March 14, 2008. (Record at 147). This motion was later withdrawn on
February 6, 2008 by stipulation of the parties.
28.

Ms. Dahl propounded discovery including interrogatories and a request for

production of documents on April 7, 2008. (See Record at 194). Mr. Harrison then filed
a Motion for Protective Order requesting that because the discovery could not be
responded to within the fact discovery period, the court should order that Mr. Harrison
was not required to respond to the discovery requests. (Id. At 193-94).
29.

On April 28,2008, Mr. Harrison submitted a Motion for Summary

Judgment, which was later denied. (Record at 391, 717.) On May 15, 2008, Ms. Dahl
filed motions with the trial court seeking amendment of the scheduling order. (Record at
393, 395,401,409.) The court held oral argument on August 7, 2008, and the court
denied Ms. DahPs request for further time for fact discovery. (Record at 554.) The court
did extend expert discovery deadlines, giving Ms. Dahl until September 8, 2008, to
submit her expert disclosures. (Id.)
30.

Ms. Dahl submitted her expert disclosures on September 8, 2008. Mr.

Harrison, without any attempt to meet and confer as required under Utah R. Civ. P. 37(a)
moved to strike the expert disclosures pursuant to Rule 37(f) alleging that the disclosures
lacked adequate description of the experts' opinions. (Record at 556, 562, 573.) Ms.
Dahl opposed this motion on the grounds that a discovery sanction was inappropriate
where there had been no attempt by the parties to meet and confer, and where there was
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no showing of prejudice (since the matter was not set for trial), willfulness, or bad faith.
(Record at 607.)
31.

On December 16, 2008, the court held oral argument on the motion to

strike. (Record at 769.) At this hearing, Ms. Dahl's counsel orally requested that the
court receive an amended report from Martin Olsen which the court denied. (Record at
1742 18:9-13; 30:20-31:6.) In addition, Ms. Dahl's counsel asked if the court would
consider a motion for leave to amend. The court "strongly hinted" that it would deny a
motion for leave if it were brought. (Record at 1741 38:17-24). The trial court granted
the motion to strike Ms. Dahl's expert report. (Record at 1742 30:20-31:6).
32.

On January 23, 2009, Ms. Dahl filed a written request for extension of time

to file the expert disclosures and reports. (Record at 947.) As of the date of that motion,
trial had not yet been set. Ms. Dahl argued in her affirmative motion for an extension of
time and that no prejudice would result to Mr. Harrison as trial had yet to be scheduled.
The trial court denied this motion and awarded costs and fees to Mr. Harrison even
though no Rule 11 motion had been served or filed. (Record at 1057.)
33-

On June 30, 2009, the court set the first trial date in this case. (Record at

1162.) The court also bifurcated trial into two parts—liability would be tried first and the
issues of causation and damages would follow at a separate trial date. {Id.) A two day
bench trial on liability issues only was set for October 26 and 27, 2009. (Record at 1400,
1402.)
34.

Even though trial issues were limited for the first time on June 30, 2009, the

court did not reopen fact or expert discovery on the limited issues after bifurcation. No
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fact discovery had been permitted by the court between April 7, 2008 and trial on
October 26, 2009. (Record at 1162.)
35.

Following the presentation of evidence on October 26 and 27, 2009, the

court found in favor of Mr. Harrison on each of Ms. DahPs causes of action and
dismissed the case. (Record at 1718.) The trial court entered its conclusions of law and
order of dismissal on June 1, 2010 and a final judgment of costs on June 21,2010.
(Record at 1718,1722.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Issue I: The trial court abused its discretion in granting Mr. Harrison's Motion to
Strike Expert Witnesses. A trial court's decision to strike expert witnesses is "extreme in
nature and . . . should be employed only with caution and restraint." Welsh v. Hospital
Corporation of Utah, 2010 UT App 171, If 10, 235 P.3d 791 (quoting Berrett v. Denver &
Rio Grande W. R.R., 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)) (omissions in original).
The trial court abused its discretion by choosing an inappropriate remedy. In this case,
Ms. Dahl met the deadline for expert disclosures set by the trial court, a trial date had not
been set, expert designations could have been amended, and there would have been
ample time for deposition of the experts and designation of rebuttal experts if needed.
Before imposing the drastic sanction of limiting evidence, the court should have at the
very least required the moving party to comply with Rule 37(a) and the duty to meet and
confer informally before seeking discovery sanctions. Because this case required expert
testimony, the court's decision to strike the expert witness disclosures was fatal to Ms.
Dahl's case and essentially gutted her legal malpractice claim. When the court finally set
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trial and limited the trial issues, the court should have reconsidered the sanction of
striking expert witnesses and permitted discovery that could have been accomplished in
the four months preceeding trial.
The trial court abused its discretion when it denied Ms. DahPs request for an
extension of time to amend the expert designations and/or permission for expert
testimony even if the extension of time was not granted. The trial court had the
discretion to grant the motion, even after an expiration of a stipulated deadline. Further,
the denial of the motion and exclusion of the expert testimony from the trial was an
"extreme sanction59 that effectively decided the outcome of the case before it ever went to
trial. See Welsh, 2010 UT App 171, % 17. Because the trial date had yet to be set, plenty
of time remained to complete the expert reports, conduct the necessary discovery, and
still allow both sides to be ready for trial.
This motion was not in essence a motion for reconsideration because the prior
request had been granted. Even though the court believes that it "hinted" that it would
deny such a motion, Ms. Dahl had the right to bring the motion in writing and set forth
her argument for relief. Further, the "hint" by the trial court would not have been enough
to preserve the issue for appeal. The trial court should have decided the motion on its
merits, and under Boice, the trial court should have granted Ms. Dahl leave to amend her
disclosures. See Boice v. Marble, 1999 UT 71, 982 P.2d 565.
Issue II: The trial court abused its discretion when it denied Ms. Dahl's motion to
extend fact discovery. While the rules of civil procedure allow the trial court to set the
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dates for completion of discovery, this discretion should be exercised in favor of allowing
the trial court to determine the facts and resolve the issues directly and fairly.
Because a motion to disqualify counsel for Ms. Dahl covered the bulk of the
factual discovery period, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court not to grant an
extension once the motion had been withdrawn by Mr. Harrison. The trial court
improperly imposed a harsh sanction by closing fact discovery over 18 months before
trial and more than 12 months before a trial date was determined. No prejudice would
have resulted to Mr. Harrison if the court had granted the motion for extension of time.
When the court finally set trial and limited the trial issues, the court should have
reconsidered the denial of fact discovery and permitted discovery that could have been
accomplished in the four months preceeding trial.
Issue III: The trial court legally erred when it awarded Mr. Harrison attorneys fees
under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825 because this section applies only to causes of action,
not motions. Even if § 78B-5-825 somehow applied in this circumstance, Mr. Harrison
had not prevailed on the cause of action at that point, the claims asserted by Ms. Dahl had
merit, and her cause of action was not brought in good faith. Applying this statute to
motions would obviate the requirements of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
that a party like Ms. Dahl must receive prior notice and the opportunity for her to
withdraw the motion. Mr. Harrison did not comply with Rule 11; therefore he should be
precluded from seeking sanctions for a motion he deems to be frivolous.
Further, the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees under its
equitable powers. None of the specific equitable exceptions to the general rule that a
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prevailing party is only entitled to attorney fees when authorized by contract or statute
apply in this case.
ARGUMENT
Appellant, Kim Dahl, respectfully requests that this court reverse the
determinations of the trial court below because the lower court improperly denied her
motion to amend designation of expert witnesses, struck her expert reports, denied an
extension of time to conduct fact discovery, and improperly granted an award of
attorneys fees. For these reasons, Ms. Dahl respectfully requests that this case be
remanded to the trial court for additional discovery and a new trial on the bifurcated issue
of liability.
I.

The trial court abused its discretion by denying Ms Pahl's motion to extend the
deadline for the designation of experts and for the submission of initial expert
reports and by striking Ms. Pahl's expert reports without leave to amend, even
though trial had not been set.
This Court reiterated just last year that "a trial court's discretion to exclude expert

witness testimony is not absolute. 'Excluding a witness from testifying is . . . extreme in
nature and . . . should be employed only with caution and restraint.'" Welsh v. Hospital
Corporation of Utah, 2010 UT App 171,110, 235 P.3d 791 (quoting Berrett v. Denver &
Rio Grande W. JUL, 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)) (omissions in original).
Given that trial had not been scheduled, there was ample time for Mr. Harrison to depose
Ms. Dahl's experts and designate rebuttal experts, if needed, the trial court abused its
discretion in this case when it excluded Ms. Dahl's experts. See Welsh, 2010 UT App
171,1f 16 (noting that even though there was a delay in designating experts, the other side
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would have had time to "depose those experts, designate rebuttal experts, and otherwise
prepare for trial) (quoting Boice v. Marble, 1999 UT 71, % 10, 982 P.2d 565).
A. The trial court abused its discretion when it chose an inappropriate sanction
by striking Ms. Dahl 's Expert Disclosures and Reports.
The trial court abused its discretion when it granted Mr. Harrison's Motion to
Strike Ms. Dahl's Expert Disclosures and Reports as a discovery sanction almost 11
months before trial. While it is true that the choice of an appropriate discovery sanction
is primary the responsibility of the trial judge, this court will disturb that discovery
sanction if abuse of discretion is shown. Welsh v. Hospital Corp., 2010 UT App 171, ^| 9,
235 P.3d 791. The recent case of Welsh clearly sets forth the premise that the exclusion
of expert witnesses is an extreme sanction and effectively decides the outcome of a legal
malpractice case before ever beginning trial. See Welsh, 2010 UT App 171, % 17 (finding
that the prejudice to the plaintiffs if their experts were excluded would be "potentially
devastating").1
This Court has previously stated that "expert testimony may be helpful, and in
some cases necessary, in establishing the standard of care required in cases dealing with
the duties owed by a particular profession." Preston & Chambers, P.C. v. Roller, 9A3
P.2d 260, 263 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 826

1

Before the trial court imposed its discovery sanction under Rule 37, the trial court
should have found Ms. Dahl was willful, acted in bad faith, or used persistent dilatory
tactics that frustrated the judicial process. See Welsh, 2010 UT App 171, ^ 9 (citing
Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.3d 271, 274 (Utah 1997)). However, as stated
by this court in Welsh, u[w]e need not resolve the question of willfulness" if "we
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in its 'choice of an appropriate
sanction.'" Id. (quoting Morton, 938 P.2d at 275).
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n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). The Preston Court acknowledged that "[i]n some cases,
expert testimony may be unnecessary where the propriety of the defendant's conduct i s
within the common knowledge and experience of the layman.'" Id. at 263-64 (quoting
Nixdorfv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980)). However, the trial court determined
below that "this is a legal malpractice case which required expert testimony." (Record at
1446.) Further, the trial court determined that the "failure to present any expert testimony
was, indeed, fatal to [Ms. Dahl's] claims in this legal malpractice case." (Record at
1439.) Therefore the failure to present expert testimony on Ms. Dahl's claims of legal
malpractice rendered the second phase of this bifurcated trial as to the issue of damages
"unnecessary." (Record at 1713.)
Knowing that expert testimony in this case would be determinative, the trial court
abused its discretion and effectively gutted Ms. Dahl's legal malpractice case when it
imposed the extreme sanction of disallowing expert testimony. This sanction was not
employed with "caution and restraint" as required by Welsh Id. ^ 10.
B. The trial court abused its discretion by placing any inconvenience to Mr.
Harrison in extending discovery ahead of the extreme prejudice to Ms. Dahl.
This Court in Welsh determined that because the nonmoving party had time to
depose the experts, designate rebuttal experts, and otherwise prepare for trial, any
prejudice would be minimized. Welsh, 2010 UT App 171,^16. Similarly, Mr. Harrison
had ample time to depose the two experts listed by Ms. Dahl, designate any rebuttal
experts, and otherwise prepare for trial. Mr. Harrison would "suffer no prejudice" if the
trial court had permitted Ms. Dahl's two experts to testify at trial. See id. at *§ 17.
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However, comparatively the prejudice to Ms. Dahl was completely "devastating" and this
Court should find, as in the Welsh case, that the trial court abused its discretion by
striking Ms. DahPs experts without leave to amend their reports. Id.
The facts of Dugan v. Jones are analogous, in most respects, to the instant case.
"In determining whether to modify a pretrial order in the interest of justice, the court
should consider the possible prejudicial effects of its enforcement of the order." Dugan
v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239,1244 (Utah 1980). The court in Dugan held that "the trial court
abused its discretion, under the circumstances of this case, in excluding testimony from
defendants' experts." Id. In Dugan, the trial court precluded expert witness testimony
because the defendants had failed to disclose any expert witnesses prior to trial. Id. The
trial court then found at trial that the lack of expert witness testimony relating to damages
prevented the court from finding damages. Id.
The Dugan court reasoned that because the pretrial order to disclose expert
witnesses was not written down, because the case was not being tried in front of a jury,
and because there were alternative sanctions that could have been used, the trial court
abused its discretion in preventing the defendant's expert witnesses from testifying. Id.
Ms. Dahl did comply with the court ordered date to disclose expert witnesses.
Like Dugan, there was no jury to be empanelled in this case and the "inconvenience to
the court... [would] not [have] outweigh[ed] the prejudice to [Ms. Dahl], resulting from
the exclusion of [her] experts." Id. Additionally, there were other sanctions available to
the trial court beyond striking expert testimony which is critical to prove legal
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malpractice. Id; see also Posner v. Equity Title Ins. Agency, 2009 UT App 347, f 23,
222 P.3d 775 (courts have discretion to employ alternative sanctions in lieu of exclusion).
The court's refusal to allow the timely designated expert witnesses to testify or to
allow Ms. DaM leave to amend their reports was an abuse of discretion. See Welsh, 2010
UT App 171,\17. Therefore, this Court should remand this case back to the trial court
for a new trial on the issue of liability.
C. The trial court abused its discretion when it denied Ms. Dahl 's January 23,
2009 Motion to Allow Expert Witnesses at Trial.
1. The trial court improperly determined that Ms. Dahl's Motion to Allow
Testimony of Expert Witnesses at Trial was a motion to reconsider the
trial court's previous ruling.
After the trial court struck her expert witnesses, Ms. Dahl then filed her written
Motion to Allow Testimony of Expert Witnesses at Trial on January 23, 2009 to ask the
court for additional time to designate her expert witnesses for trial in order to amend their
reports. (Record at 947.) This expert testimony was critical to the case. The trial court
had stricken the experts in response to Mr. Harrison's objections to the sufficiency of the
opinions in their reports. (Record at 1742 16:21-17:12.) Ms. Dahl sought not to
designate new witnesses but to amend their designations to more fully comply with Rule
26 regarding the opinions of the same witnesses. (Record at 1057.) Ms. Dahl's motion
to extend time for designation of experts would not have caused further delays in the trial
because the trial date had not been set.
In ruling on this motion the trial court suggested that the January 23, 2009 motion
was really a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's decision on December 16,
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2008, even though the trial court itself admitted in the hearing on the written motion that
"this is not a second motion for plaintiff." (Record at 1741 37:8-10.) Ms. Dahl's
previous motion to extend expert discovery deadlines had been granted by the court on
August 7, 2008. Ms. Dahl had every right to bring a motion to ask for additional relief
when she had not been denied previously.
Further, this January 23, 2009 motion to extend time was asking for different relief
than Mr. Harrison's motion that was decided on December 16, 2008; therefore, it could
not be considered a motion for reconsideration. Mr. Harrison moved to strike what had
previously been designated while Ms. Dahl's subsequent motion asked for leave to
amend. A motion to strike may be followed by a motion for leave to amend. The first
does not preclude the second. Given the gravity of this decision, the court should first
have decided the January 23, 2009 motion to extend expert discovery on its merits not
based on a procedural determination that the form of the motion was a motion for
reconsideration.
2. The trial court should have decided the motion on its merits, and under
Boice, the trial court should have granted Ms. Dahl leave to amend her
disclosures.
Had the court considered the merits of Ms. Dahl's January 23, 2009 motion, the
trial court should have granted the motion. If the court had granted the January 23, 2009
motion, there would have been no prejudice to the Mr. Harrison because trial date had yet
to be set. Plenty of time remained to re-designate expert witnesses, amend the expert
reports, conduct the necessary discovery, and allow counsel to designate rebuttal experts
for trial. On the other hand, the extreme exclusion by the trial court was "devastating"
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and decided the outcome of Ms. DahPs legal malpractice case before ever beginning the
trial. See Welsh, 2010 UT App 171,^19. The prejudice to Ms. Dahl in denying her
motion was not justified by any benefit to the court or opposing party.
The present situation is analogous to the case of Boice v. Marble where the Utah
Supreme Court made a distinction between failing to obey a scheduling order and asking
for leave to designate a new expert. 199 UT 171, % 11. In Boice, the plaintiff had
designated his physiatry expert prior to the court's deadline. Id. After the deadline, the
plaintiff sought leave to substitute a new expert after his previous expert had decided not
to testify. Id. The plaintiff sought leave to substitute two months prior to the trial date.
Id. The Supreme Court held that the substitution of a new expert two months prior to
trial did not unfairly prejudice the defendant as there was ample time to depose the new
expert and prepare rebuttal experts. Id. The Court further stated that even if defendant
would be harmed by the late designation, the rules allow for a continuance and the trial
court could have granted that for good cause. Id.
Under Boice, the Supreme Court found that two months before trial was adequate
time to designate a rebuttal expert after a new designation by the moving party. See
Welsh v. Hospital Corporation of Utah, 2010 UT App 171,110, 235 P.3d 791 (justice
and fairness may require that a trial court allow a party to designate expert witnesses,
conduct discovery, or perfomi tasks covered by the scheduling order after the expiration
of the imposed deadline); see also Boice v. Marble, 1999 UT 71, f 10, 982 P.2d 565. The
court's order denying leave to amend the actual report in this case was over 10 months
before trial. Since the designation in Boice would "not unfairly prejudice the defendant
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as there was ample time to depose the new expert and prepare rebuttal expert", the same
result should have been reached here where the expert was identified more than fourteen
months before trial. Boice v. Marble, 199 UT 171, ^| 11. The trial court concluded that
prejudice would result if Ms. Dahl was permitted to amend her expert witness
disclosures. (Record at 1742 31:11-16.) However, the trial court did not address the fact
below that trial had not been scheduled yet and that "prejudice is minimized where the
opposing party has time to depose those witnesses, designate rebuttal witnesses and
prepare for trial." Welsh, 2010 UT App 171,^16 (citing Normandeau v. Hanson Equip.,
Inc., 2007 UT App 382, ^ 26, 174 P.3d 1). As was the case in Welsh, Mr. Harrison "had
time to depose those experts, designate rebuttal experts and otherwise prepare for trial."
Id. Therefore, this court should reverse and remand for a new trial.
In sum, while the trial court had a "commendable desire to move this case
forward," the forgoing factors, taken as a whole, should constrain this Court to conclude
that the trial court abused its discretion in exluding Ms. DahPs expert witnesses from
trial. See id. ^f 19. This court should reverse the trial court's decision to deny Ms. DahTs
January 23, 2009 motion to extend time to designate an expert witness for trial and
remand this case and direct that further discovery and time for designation of witnesses
be permitted.
II.

The Trial Court abused its discretion when it denied Ms. DahPs Motion to
Extend Factual Discovery and granted Mr. Harrison's Protective Order.
The complaint in this case was filed on October 11, 2007. (Record at 12.) On

January 4, 2008, the court signed a stipulated scheduling order that closed fact discovery
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on April 7, 2008. Ms. Dahl propounded discovery including interrogatories and a request
for production of documents on April 7, 2008. Mr. Harrison filed a Motion for Protective
Order requesting that because the discovery could not be responded to within the fact
discovery period, the court should order that Mr. Harrison was not required to respond to
the discovery requests. On May 12, 2008, Ms. Dahl filed a motion to extend factual
discovery. At a hearing on August 7, 2009, the trial court granted Mr. Harrison's Motion
for Protective Order and denied Ms. Dahl's motion to extend factual discovery.
Discovery which will aid in identifying, narrowing and clarifying the issues should
be liberally permitted. Maoris & Assoc, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2006 UT App 33, f 10, 131
P.3d 263. The purpose of the rules of civil procedure pertaining to discovery "is to make
the procedure as simple and efficient as possible by eliminating any useless ritual, undue
rigidities or technicalities." Rahojy v. Steadman, 2010 UT App 350, f 7, —P.3d—
(quoting Cannon v. Salt Lake Reg I Med. Ctr., Inc., 2005 UT App 352, t 7, 121 P.3d 74).
Additionally, the purpose of the rules pertaining to discovery is to allow the trial court to
determine the facts and resolve the issues directly, fairly, and expeditiously as possible.
Id. (citing Cannon, 2005 UT App 352, | 8.)
This Court reviews a trial court's ruling on discovery issues for abuse of
discretion. Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ^ 59, 150 P.3d 480. As part of that
discretion, rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows the trial court to set dates
for the completion of discovery. See Utah R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3). However, this discretion
should be exercised in favor of allowing the trial court to determine the facts and resolve
the issues directly and fairly. See Cannon, 2005 UT App 352, % 8.
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In this case, the trial court should have exercised its discretion in favor of allowing
factual discovery that would properly allow the trial court to determine the facts of this
case and resolve the issues fairly. Instead, the trial court abused its discretion by denying
the request to extend factual discovery when no trial date had been set and sufficient time
remained for factual discovery to be completed. The trial court abused its discretion in
granting a protective order rather than granting the motion to extend factual discovery.
The cases in which appellate courts have upheld protective orders and denied additional
time for discovery have had extreme factual scenarios, nothing like the one at hand. See
e.g., Richards v. Brown, 2009 UT App 315,ffi[55-56, 222 P.3d 69 (upholding a
protective order and denying additional discovery because party failed to participate in
scheduling order and trial was less than two weeks away);
The trial court abused its discretion by adopting a rigid approach that thwarted the
uncovering of facts relating to this case. For instance, the trial court, in granting the
protective order, found that Mr. Harrison had the right to expect Ms. Dahl to work within
the time frame. (Record 1743 31:20-23.) The trial court also summarily concluded that
there would be prejudice to Mr. Harrison because if the court granted an extension, he
would be required to "delay everything" and to answer the interrogatories. (Record 1743
(Tr: 31:20-23, 32:2-7). However, the court did not mention the extreme prejudice to Ms.
Dahl in denying the extension of fact discovery. Rather, the trial court overstated the
prejudice to Mr. Harrison. No trial had been set. Ample time existed to complete fact
discovery.
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Additionally, this Court should note that a few weeks after the complaint was filed
in this case, Mr. Harrison filed a Motion to Disqualify Ms. Dahfs counsel. (Record at
30.) Oral argument was set for this motion on March 14, 2008. (Record at 147.)
Counsel for Ms. Dahl understandably held off on its factual discovery efforts once Mr.
Harrison filed a motion to disqualify counsel for Ms. Dahl. The doctrine of equitable
estoppel provides that "conduct by one party which leads another party, in reliance
thereon, to adopt a course of action resulting in detriment or damage if the first party is
permitted to repudiate his conduct." Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Inc., 2005 UT App
154, f 12, 111 P.3d 829 (quoting United Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 641
P.2d 158, 161 (Utah 1982)). The delay alone of over 80 days caused by the pending
Motion to Disqualify should have been grounds to extend the already very abbreviated
fact discovery deadlines in this case.
Since fact discovery as scheduled was to close on April 7, 2008, Ms. Dahl had less
than 30 days to propound written discovery after the Motion to Disqualify was resolved
and have it due prior to the discovery cut off date. Ms. Dahl's counsel prepared and
propounded written discovery 60 days after the Motion to Disqualify was resolved. Mr.
Harrison's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on April 28, 2008, after the close of
fact discovery. (Record at 163.) The Motion for Summary Judgment was later denied.
(Record at 717.) On May 15, 2008, Ms. Dahl filed a Motion to Amend the Scheduling
Order to allow additional time for fact and expert discovery. This motion was granted as
to expert discovery and denied as to fact discovery on August 7, 2008.
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Counsel for Ms. Dahl represented that due to Mr. Harrison's Motion to Disqualify,
counsel decided to "wait and see what happens" with the motion. (Record at 1743 13:1614:5.) Counsel also noted that after the Motion to Disqualify was withdrawn on February
6, 2008, there remained only 58 days for fact discovery. (Id. at 15:24-16:7.) Under the
doctrine of equitable estoppel, Ms. Dahl's counsel reasonably determined to wait on
initiating discovery in this case while the Motion to Disqualify counsel was pending.
This coupled with the fact that no trial date had been set in this case and the Motion to
Disqualify was filed less than 30 days after the complaint was answered constituted good
cause to adjust the discovery deadlines.
Under Rule 26, the default discovery timeline for fact discovery is 240 days after
first appearance by the defendant. Rule 26 Advisory Committee Notes. Mr. Harrison
filed his Answer and Affirmative Defenses on November 1, 2007. (Record at 24.) At the
very least, due to the intervening Motion for Disqualification, the trial court should have
implemented the default discovery provision allowing Ms. Dahl 240 days after the Mr.
Harrison answered to complete fact discovery which would have given the parties
approximately 90 additional days for discovery. This would have allowed time for the
discovery Ms. Dahl's counsel propounded to Mr. Harrison to have been answered.
Instead, the trial court refused to permit any fact discovery following April 7, 2008—
even though the first trial date was subsequently set for approximately 18 months from
that date on October 26 and 27, 2009. This case turned on the strength of the claims of
each party as to the events on November 2, 2006. Ms. Dahl was prejudiced at trial
because she was not able to discover the facts surrounding Mr. Harrison's claims.
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This court should remand this case back to the district court for a new trial on the
issue of liability in order to allow Ms. Dahl a fair opportunity to discover the pertinent
facts of this case. The court limited the issues to liability only on June 30, 2009. With
this very limited focus at trial, the parties could have easily accomplished the needed
discovery in the remaining 120 days before trial. However, the court abused its
discretion and refused to reopen discovery, even at that point.
III.

The Trial Court erred by awarding Mr. Harrison $2,400 in attorneys fees for
Ms. DahPs filing her Motion to Allow Expert Testimony.
On January 23, 2009, Ms. Dahl filed a second request for extension of time to file

the expert disclosures and reports, or alternatively, to allow her designated experts to
testify at trial. Ms. Dahl's first motion to extend the time for designation of experts had
been granted by the court on August 7, 2008. As of the date of the second motion to
extend time to amend her designation of experts, trial had not yet been set. The trial
court denied this second motion, and awarded costs and fees to Mr. Harrison for the
reasons Mr. Harrison claimed in his attorney fee motion.2 As a general rule, attorney fees
may be awarded to the prevailing party only when such action is permitted by either
2

Ms. Dahl notes that the trial court put her in an untenable position. As part of its validation for
awarding attorney fees, the trial court says it "strongly hinted" during a pretrial conference on
January 23, 2009, that it would not grant such a motion for extension of time on the expert
designations. (Record 1741 36:20-24). On the one hand, had Ms. Dahl taken the strong hint and
not filed her motion, she would not have preserved the issue for appeal. An issue needs to be
formally presented to the trial court and denied before it can be appealed; otherwise the issue
would be waived. See Arbogast Family Trsut v. River, 2008 UT App 277, f 10, 191 P.3d 39. On
the other hand, since the court had apparently decided the issue before having it briefed, Ms.
Dahl took the risk that presenting the motion would upset the court and be summarily denied. A
strong hint that a motion will be denied should not bar a partyfrombringing such a motion or
expose her to sanction.
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statute or contract. Gilbert Dev. Corp. v. Wardley Corp., 2010 UT App 361, ^ 44, —
p.3d~; Olsen v. Lund, 2010 UT App 353, ^ 6, —P.3d—; Posner v. Equity Title Ins.
Agency, Inc., 2009 P.3d 775, \ 26, 222 P.3d 775; Utahnsfor Better Dental Health-Davis,
Inc. v. Rawlings, 2007 UT 97, ^ 5, 175 P.3d 1036.
Mr. Harrison has not shown that attorney fees were permitted either by statute or
contract. Mr. Harrison, in his Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs, argued that
attorney's fees could be awarded under one of two options: pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78B-5-825 or pursuant to the trial court's "inherent equitable power to award reasonable
fees." The trial court, in awarding attorney fees, stated "I adopt the reasoning found in
the motion for attorney fees and costs." (Record at 1174 39:1-4). Therefore, the trial
court awarded the attorney fees pursuant to § 78B-5-825 and/or the court's "inherent
equitable powers. However, the trial court could not properly award attorney fees under
either approach.
A. The trial court erred when it awarded Mr. Harrison attorney fees and costs
under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825for a motion.
The trial court erred when it awarded attorneys fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78B5-825. Section 78B-5-825 states that "[i]n civil actions, the court shall award reasonable
attorney fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith." UTAH CODE ANN. §
78B-5-825 (1) (emphasis added). "Whether the trial court properly interpreted the legal
prerequisites for awarding attorney fees under section [78B-5-825] is a 'question of law'
that we 'review ... for correctness.'" Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 2005 UT 46, ^ 8,
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122 P.3d 556 (quoting Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36,117, 977P.2d
1201 (holding that statutory interpretation presents a legal question)).
"According to the plain language of section 78-27-56 [renumbered as section 78B5-825], three requirements must be met before the court shall award attorney fees: (1) the
party must prevail, (2) the claim asserted by the opposing party must be without merit,
and (3) the claim must not be brought or asserted in good faith.'5 Gallegos v. Lloyd, 2008
UT App 40, f 9, 178 P.3d 922, certiorari denied 189 P.3d 1276 (citing Hermes Assocs. v.
Park's Sportsman, 813 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah Ct.App.1991)).
1. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825 pertains to causes of action, not motions.
Ms. Dahl filed a motion, not a "claim" or "action." Accordingly, the trial court
could not award attorneys fees under this statute. "Action" is defined as "[a] civil or
criminal judicial proceeding." Black's Law Dictionary 26 (Abridged 8th ed. 2005).
"Claim" is defined as "[t]he aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a right enforceable
by a court" or "(t]he assertion of an existing right" or "[a] demand for money, property,
or a legal remedy to which one asserts a right; esp., the part of a complaint in a civil
action specifying what relief the plaintiff asks for." Black's Law Dictionary 204-05
(Abridged 8th ed. 2005). All of the above definitions of action or claim denotes the filing
of the cause of action or the claim for relief.
The trial court erred as a matter of law when it granted Mr. Harrison's motion for
attorneys fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825. The court expressly found that the
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motion and not the claim itself was frivolous.3 In fact, the court had previously denied
Mr. Harrison's Motion for Summary Judgment on the claim. (Record at 717.)
The extension of § 78B-5-825 to include motions filed without merit obviates the
requirements of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which specifically
designates the prerequisites for sanctions on frivolous filings, including motions. Rule 11
requires that the moving party serve the offending party with a motion and permit the
offending party 21 days to withdraw the paper (motion) prior to filing the motion with the
court. See Utah R. Civ. P. 11. If the paper (motion) is withdrawn, Rule 11 precludes a
sanction from being imposed. In this case, opposing counsel did not notify Ms. Dahl that
they were seeking Rule 11 sanctions, nor did Mr. Harrison claim Rule 11 sanctions in
their motion for attorney's fees filed on February 9, 2009. (Record at 986.) Because the
claim was neither frivolous nor brought in bad faith, the Defendant should be precluded
from seeking a sanction under § 78B-5-825. A vague claim for an attorney fee sanction
alleging a frivolous motion without compliance with Rule 11 should likewise be denied
since it denied Ms. Dahl of due process and the opportunity to withdraw her motion.

Mr. Harrison claimed in his motion for attorney fees that the case of Rohan v. Boseman,
2002 UT App 109, 46 P.3d 753 stands for the proposition that § 78B-5-825 is applicable to the
filing of motions as well as thefilingof claims or causes of action. In Rohan, this court agreed
with the trial court's award of attorneys fees under the statue when the trial court awarded fees
for bringing a renewed motion for continuance or voluntary dismissal under the ADA. Rohan,
2002 UT App 109, *[ 37-38. There is little to no reasoning as to why the attorney fee award was
upheld or what arguments were made against such a result under § 78B-5-825. No other cases
since Rohan have applied § 78B-5-825 to a motion. In addition, the facts are distinguishable.
The plaintiffs motion in the Rohan wasfiledthe day before trial. Id. Here, the motion to allow
Ms. DahPs expert witnesses to testify wasfiledten (10) months before trial and six months
before trial was even set.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
i * may contain errors.

Further, Ms. Dahl denies that her motion was frivolous. As set forth above, the motion
was necessary to the presentation to her case and was brought six months prior to the
pretrial date on which the court gave notice of trial.
2. Ms. Dahl's cause of action was brought in good faith.
Mr. Harrison has also failed to establish that he prevailed on the cause of action,
that the claim asserted by Ms. Dahl was without merit, and that the claim brought by her
was not brought in good faith. First, while Mr. Harrison did prevail on his objection to
allow Ms. Dahl's witnesses the opportunity to testify at trial, he had not prevailed at trial
on the cause of action when the attorney fees were awarded. Second, Mr. Harrison
argued that Ms. Dahl's motion relating to expert witnesses was without merit, not that her
claims of legal malpractice and breach of contract were meritless. Third, there was no
finding by the court that Ms. Dahl's claims were brought in bad faith. Fourth, the court
made no findings that the motion for extension of time to designate experts was brought
in bad faith.
For the reasons outlined above, the trial court erred when it awarded Mr. Harrison
attorney fees and costs under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825. Section 78B-5-825 applies
to claims and actions not motions. Further, Mr. Harrison failed to show, and the court
failed to make findings on, the three factors necessary for an awarded of fees under this
statute. If Mr. Flarrison believed he was entitled to fees for Ms. Dahl's motion, he was
required to comply with Rule 11. Therefore, this court should reverse the award of
attorneys fees under § 78B-5-825.
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B. The court abused its discretion by awarding attorneys fees under its inherent
equitable powers.
To the extent the trial court based its award of attorney fees on its inherent
equitable powers, it has also abused its discretion. A trial court abuses its discretion
when it improperly awards attorney fees under its equitable powers. Hughes v. Cafferty,
2004 UT 22, \ 20, 89 P.3d 148 ("the appropriate standard for reviewing equitable awards
of attorney fees is abuse of discretion").
Utah case law has recognized a small number of specific equitable exceptions to
the general rule that a prevailing party is only entitled to attorney fees when authorized
by contract or statute. These exceptions consist of the following: (1) when a party acts in
bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons; (2) in class action cases
where nonparty class members benefit financially from the successful efforts of only a
few litigants; (3) when a beneficiary sues a trustee for violation of the trust and obtains a
recovery for all other beneficiaries affected by that violation; (4) where a private party's
litigation vindicates a strong or socially important public policy (the so called "private
attorney general" action); (5) where a plaintiffs litigation confers a substantial benefit on
members of an ascertainable class; (6) when a insurer breaches an insurance contract; (7)
where a defendant's breach of contract foreseeably causes a plaintiff to incur attorney
fees in litigation with a third party (the "third-party litigation" exception); and (8) where
an insurer files a complaint against its own absent insured that would adversely affect the
interests of an innocent third party. See Maoris & Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 60
P.3d 1176,1179 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (citations omitted) (identifying exceptions 1Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7); Doctor's Company v. Drezga, 2009 UT 60,218 P.3d 598 (Utah 2009) (developing
exception 8).
This case is not a class action lawsuit nor has it benefitted the members of an
ascertainable class. This case has not vindicated a socially important public policy. This
case is not a lawsuit against a trustee by a beneficiary, nor is it a lawsuit between an
insurance company and an insured. This case does not involve a breach of contract that
has caused a party to incur attorneys fees in litigation with a third party.
The only recognized exception that can be applied to a private dispute that does
not involve insurance companies and does not affect anyone other than the parties
involved would be when a party acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons. This exception is not applicable here. Defendant did not argue and
the court did not find that Ms. Dahl acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons when she filed her second motion to extend time within which to
designate experts and serve their report. The court did find that the filing was frivolous.
However, that appears to be based on the conclusion of the court that the motion was
filed even though the court "strongly hinted" that it would be denied and that the court
considered the motion to be more of a request for reconsideration of the motion to strike
theearlier designation of experts. (Record at 1741 38:17-24.) Because the court had not
previously denied a motion to extend expert discovery, this was not in reality a motion
for reconsideration. Further, even though a court believes that a designation of an expert
does not comply with the rules it does not follow that a party is precluded from seeking
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the opportunity to bring such designations into compliance. In this case, Ms. Dahl did
just that.
After her designations were stricken, and nine Ml months before trial was
convened in this case, she sought leave to amend her designations. The designations of
experts were later determined to be absolutely necessary to prove Ms. Dahl's claim so the
motion for leave to amend such could not be frivolous. Further, since such a request had
not been previously denied, it could not have been vexatious or considered oppressive.
Because the very narrow exception to the need for a statutory basis for an award of
attorneys fees did not apply in this case, the court abused its discretion by awarding
attorneys fees under its inherent equitable powers.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the determinations of the trial court below because the
lower court abused its discretion in denying Ms. Dahl's motion to extend time to
designate expert witnesses, in failing to grant an extension to allow Ms. Dahl to conduct
fact discovery, and in improperly awarding attorneys fees without a statutory basis. Ms.
Dahl respectfully requests that this case be remanded to the trial court for additional
discovery and a new trial on the bifurcated issue of liability.
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Respectfully submitted this 2 6

day of January, 2011

CHRISTENSEN I THORNTON, PLLC
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Benjamin K. Lusty
Attorneys for Appellant
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UtahRXiv.P. 11:
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, affidavits, and other papers; representations
to court; sanctions.
(a) Signature.
(a)(1) Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at least one
attorney of record, or, if the party is not represented, by the party.
(a)(2) A person may sign a paper using any form of signature recognized by law as
binding. Unless required by statute, a paper need not be accompanied by affidavit or have
a notarized, verified or acknowledged signature. If a rule requires an affidavit or a
notarized, verified or acknowledged signature, the person may submit a declaration
pursuant to Utah Code Section 78B-5-705. If a statute requires an affidavit or a notarized,
verified or acknowledged signature and the party electronicallyfilesthe paper, the
signature shall be notarized pursuant to Utah Code Section 46-1-16.
(a)(3) An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected
promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party.
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to
the court (whether by signing,filing,submitting, or advocating), an attorney or
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information,
and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,
(b)(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or
by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or
the establishment of new law;
(b)(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(b)(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically
so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court
determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions
stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, lawfirms,or parties that
have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation.
(c)(1) How initiated.
(c)(1)(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately
from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate
subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not befiledwith or
presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other
period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention,
allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court
may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney
fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. In appropriate circumstances, a law
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firm may be held jointly responsible for violations committed by its partners, members,
and employees.
(c)(1)(B) On court's initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order
describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an
attorney, lawfirm,or party to show cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) with
respect thereto.
(c)(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall
be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct
by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the
sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a
penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an
order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and
other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.
(c)(2)(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a
violation of subdivision (b)(2).
(c)(2)(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless the court
issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims
made by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned.
(c)(3) Order.. When imposing sanctions,tibecourt shall describe the conduct determined
to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed.
(d) Inapplicability to discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule do not apply to
disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions that are subject to
the provisions of Rules 26 through 37.
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KIM DAHL,

[PROPPED] SCHEDULING
ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
BRIAN C. HARRISON; BRIAN C.
HARRISON, P.C. .

Case No. 070403005
Judge Laycock

Defendants.

The parties have met and conferred in accordance with Rule 26(f)(1). The Court hereby enters
the following Scheduling Order based upon the parties' stipulation:
SCHEDULING ORDER
1. INITIAL DISCLOSURES: Initial disclosures required under U.R.C.P. 26(a)(1) shall be
exchanged by the parties by November 19,2007.
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2. DISCOVERY: Discovery is necessary on the following subjects: Plaintiff s claims and
damages; Defendants' claims and defenses to Plaintiffs claims; and other matters as needed
a. FACT DISCOVERY: Fact discovery shall be completed by no later than April 7, 2008.
b. EXPERT DISCOVERY: Expert designations and reports shall be due under Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure 26(a)(3) as follows:
i. Designation of expert witnesses is due by Plaintiff on May 5, 2008, and by
Defendants on June 2,2008.
ii. Rebuttal reportsfromboth parties are due on or before June 16, 2008.
iii. The deadline to depose all experts for both parties shall be July 14,2008.
c. METHODS/LIMITATIONS OF DISCOVERY: The parties may utilize the following
discovery methods:
i. twenty Five (25) interrogatories per party, unless otherwise stipulated by the
parties;
ii. requests for Admissions, as provided by the Rules;
iii. requests for Production of Documents, as provided by the Rules; and
iv. no more thanfifteen(15) oral exam depositions, unless otherwise stipulated by
the parties.
3. SUPPLEMENTATION: Supplementation to discovery under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
26(e) shall be due 30 daysfromthe time the party learns that prior disclosures or responses to discovery
are incomplete or incorrect
4. AMENDMENT OF THE PLEADINGS: The parties shall have until February 4, 2008, to join
additional parties or to amend pleadings.
2
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5. PRETRIAL CONFERENCE: The parties request a pretrial conference in August 2008.
6. ALLOCATION OF FAULT: The cutoff date for filing a notice to allocate fault pursuant to
Rule 9(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is February 4, 2008.
7. DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS: The cutoff date forfilingdispositive, or potentially dispositive
motions is April 28,2008.
8. SETTLMENT: The potential for settlement at this time is unknown.
9. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: The potential for resolution of this matter
through the Court's alternative dispute resolution program is unknown at this time.
10. WITNESS AND EXHBIT LISTS: The final lists of witnesses and exhibits, or objections
thereto, are due in accordance with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(4).
11. TRIAL: The parties will be ready for trial by August 2008.. The estimated length of trial is five
(5) days.
12. SERVICE: So long as a hard-copy is sent within 24 hours via U.S. Mail, the parties may serve
each other through email at the following address: for Plaintiff: ssc@hclawfirm .net;
bmoss@hclawfirm.net; isteele@hclawfirm.net; and for Defendants: bwl@bmgtrial.com.

DATED:

/ / / f/d

Slfeve S. Christensen
Brennan H. Moss
Jeffrey J. Steele
Attorneys for Plaintiff

%

DATED:

K/l/f>1

J&^amin W. Lieberman
Attorney for Defendants
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APPROVED and SO ORDERED this ^

day of
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Fourth Judicial
District Court
APR 2 8 2008
State of Utah
FILED Clerk
Benjamin W. Lieberman (#11456)
BUEBIDGE, MITCHELL & GROSS

215 South State Street, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-6677

ORIGINAL

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION

KMDAHL,
DEFENDANTS' CONSOLIDATED
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
AND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM

Plaintifi;
v.
BRIAN C. HARRISON, an individual; and
BRIAN C. HARRISON, P.C., a Utah
corporation,

Case No. 070403005
Judge Claudia Laycock

Defendants.

Defendants Brian C. Harrison and Brian C. Harrison, P.C., hereby move the Court for a
protective order in this matter. In support therefor, Defendants state:
1.

On or about January 4, 2008, the Court entered the Parties' stipulated scheduling

order in this matter. As stated therein, fact discovery in this matter closed on April 7,2008.
2.

On April 7,2008, the day of the fact discovery cutoff, Plaintiff served her First Set

of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents upon Defendants by postal mail and
e-mail. {See Exhibit A.) Per the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants' responses would be

annlQi
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due on May 12, 2008,fiveweeks after the fact discovery cutoff.
3.

Plaintiffs discovery requests are untimely pursuant to the Court's Scheduling

Order. For Plaintiffs requests to be timely, they had to have been served so that responses were
due before discovery was complete. Erbe Elektromedizin GmbH v. Canady, 2006 WL 3387176,
at *1 (W.D. Pa. November 21,2006) (finding that "all discovery initiatives shall be served within
sufficient time to allow responses to be completed prior to the close of discovery. Based upon the
same, I find Plaintiffs' discovery initiatives served on the last day of discovery to be untimely,
such that Defendants are not required to respond to the same.); Chevola v. Cellco Partnership,
2007 WL 3379779, at * 1 (M.D. Fla. November 14, 2007) ([T]he completion date for discovery
means just that—all discovery must be completed by that date. Hence, interrogatories, as an
example, must be served more than thirty days prior to the completion date to permit the
opposing party to respond before the discovery deadline.")?' Jim Boast Dodge, Inc. v. Daimler
Chrysler Motors Co., LLC, 2007 WL 4409781, at *1 (M.D. Fla. January 16, 2007) (same);
Brodeurv, McNamee, 2005 WL 1774033, at *2-3 (N.D.N.Y. July 27,2005)(same); Eplingv.
UCB Films, Inc., 2001 WL 584355 (D. Kan. April 2, 2001) (same).1
4.

Because Plaintiffs discovery requests were not served to allow ample time for

Defendants to respond within the fact discovery period, Plaintiffs requests are untimely. See id.
As such, the Court should grant Defendants' motion for a protective order and order that
Defendants do not have to respond to Plaintiffs untimely discovery requests.
•

1

"

/

/

Copies of these unpublished federal district court decisions are attached hereto as Exhibit B.
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Respectfully submitted this £ ( day of April, 2008
BURBIDGE, MITCHELL & GROSS

•jamm W. Lieberman
"^Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of DEFENDANTS' CONSOLIDATED
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM was hand
delivered on the 3S day of April, 2008, to the following:
Steve S. Christensen
Brennan H. Moss
Hirschi Christensen, PLLC
136 East South Temple, Suite 850
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

P:\CHents\Harrison, Brian 3010\070i-v. Kim Dahl\Pleadings\Motionand Memo for Protective Order.doc
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Steve S. Christensen (U.S.B. No. 6156)
Brennan H. Moss (U.S.B. No. 10267)
Jeffrey J. Steele (U.S.B. No. 10606)
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff
136 East South Temple, Suite 850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-0593
Facsimile: (801) 322-0594
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION

KMDAHL,
Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

vs.
BRIAN C. HARRISON; BRIAN C.
HARRISON, P.C.

•

Civil No. 070403005
Judge Laycock

Defendants.
Respondent Kim Dahl, by and through her counsel of record, Hirschi Christensen, PLLC, in
accordance with Rules 26 and 34 U.R.C.P., hereby submits her First Request for Production of
Documents to Defendants, and requests that Defendants Brian C. Harrison and Brian C. Harrison, P.C.
produce to the offices of Hirschi Christensen, legible copies of all documents and things requested in the
following Request for Production of Documents within thirty (30) days after service hereof.
. INSTRUCTIONS
For the purposes of this Request, the following definitions shall govern these Requests for
Production of Documents absent clear indication to the contrary:

1.

The terms "you" and "your" refers to Defendant Brian C. Harrison, his employees,

agents, attorneys, accountants, or any one else acting by through or under the Brian C. Harrision
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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direction; it also refers to Defendant Brian C. Harrison, P.C. its employees, agents, attorneys,
accountants, or any one else acting by through or under Brian C. Harrision, P.C's direction.
2.

Other terms pertaining to the parties, documents, events, or occurrences referenced in the

pleadings of the parties shall have the meanings ascribed to them in such pleadings.
3.

The terms "document" or "documents" mean every writing, recording and photograph as

those terms are defined in Utah R. Evid. 1001 and every database that can be used to generate any
writing or recording as defined in the Utah Rules of Evidence, and includes legible copies or
reproductions of any of the foregoing wherever the original is not available or wherever the copy or
reproduction contains any entry or notation not present on the original or otherwise similarly differs
from the original,
4.

The term "identify" or "identity" when used with reference to a document(s) shall mean

to state with respect to each such document:
a)

The title and number of pages of the document;

b)

The date appearing thereon and the date of the document's preparation, if known;

c)

The name(s), address(es), and title(s) of the document's author(s) and signer(s);

• d)

The name(s), address(es), and title(s) of the person(s) to whom the document was

addressed or distributed;
e)

A further general description of the document so it can be distinguished from

other similar documents; and
f)

The physical location of the document and the name(s) and address(es) of the

custodian(s) thereof.

2
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The term "identify" or "identity" when used with reference to a person shall mean to state

with respect to each such person:
a)

The person's name, address, and telephone number;

b)

The present employer, occupation, and business address of the person;

c)

If the person is not a natural person, the type of entity and the state under whose

authority it exists; and
d)

Any other information helpful in ascertaining the location or identity of the

person.
6.

The term "relating to" shall mean pertaining to, referring to, concerning, reflecting,

describing, evidencing, constituting, or in any way logically or factually connected with the matter
discussed.
7".

The phrase "state the factual basis" means to provide a detailed summary of the facts,

information, and matters which you presently believe support or tend to support such claim, allegation
or statement. Such summary should include, when applicable, appropriate references to dates, times,
persons and documents.
8.

The term "person" shall mean any natural person and any firm, corporation, association,

partnership, or other legal, business or government entity, and shall include the plural as well as the
singular.
9.

"All," "every," and "each" shall be construed as all, every, and each.-

10.

The connectives "and" and "or" shall be construed disjunctively or conjunctively as

necessary to bring within the scope of the discovery request all responses that might otherwise be
construed to be outside of its scope.
3

0001S7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11.

The use of the singular form of any word includes the plural and vice-versa.

12.

Singular masculine pronouns have a non-restrictive meaning and are used to refer to a

person, as defined herein, or either or neither gender.
13.

For each and every request for production of documents, please provide true and correct

copies, of which all portions are clear,, concise, and legible.

14.

If you are entitled to and do elect to produce documents pursuant to Rule 33(d) of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, instead of identifying the documents as requested by a particular
Interrogatory, you are required to produce such documents in the manner set forth in Rule 33(d) and are
required to produce every original, every copy of the original where the original is not available, and
every non-identical copy of the document in your possession, custody or control.
15.

To the extent that you object to any interrogatory, set forth the reasons therefore. Should

your objection be made to only part of any interrogatory, you must completely answer the remainder of
that interrogatory. If you claim privilege as grounds for not answering any interrogatory you must make
the claim expressly and describe the nature of the information or communication not disclosed in a
manner that wiU enable other parties to assess the applicability of the privilege. Therefore, as to each
interrogatory or part thereof which you refuse to answer on the basis of a claim of privilege, provide the
following information:
a)

The privilege(s) claimed;

b)

Specific facts upon which each claim of privilege is based;

c)

If a document is involved, identify that document; and

d)

If the privilege concerns an oral communication, identify that communication.
4
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16.

For each and every interrogatory or request, include at the end of each answer the specific

name of each and every person who has direct and personal knowledge of said answer; and provide the
home and business address and telephone number for such person or persons.
INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Identify any communications that you had with Mrs. Dahl while
you acted as her counsel. Include in your answer the date of the communication, the place the
communication took place, the people present, and the subject matter of the communication.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Identify any communications that you had with other persons while
you acted as her legal counsel which related to Mrs. Dahl. Include in your answer the date of the
communication, the place the communication took place, the people present, and the subject matter of the
communication.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Identify any communications that you have had with Rosemond
Blakelock which related to Mrs. Dahl. Include in your answer the date of the communication, the place
the communication took place, the people present, and the subject matter of the communication.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Identify any communications that you have had with Dr. Dahl.
Include in your answer the date of the communication, the place the communication took place, the people
present, and the subject matter of the communication
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Identify all cases in which you have appeared or consulted that
have involved Rosemond Blakelock.

. .

INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Identify all the cases in which you have appeared or consulted in
that relate to Dr„ Charles Dahl.

5
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TNTERROGATORY NO. 7: Identify all facts which support your denial of the allegation that you
entered into the "Stipulation" without Mrs. Dahl5s knowledge or consent.
INTERROGATORY NO, 8: Identify the basis and the reasons that you recommended to Mrs.
Dahl to sign up for anger management and parenting classes. .
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Identify all facts which support your denial of the allegation that you
told Mrs. Dahl that because the November 2,2006 hearing would be continued, she would not need to
appear.
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Identify the evidence that needed to be gathered in order to put
Mrs. Dahl in the best possible position in front of the court at the November 2,2006 hearing, as asserted in
paragraph 40 of your Answer.
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Identify all the facts that support your assertion that Mrs. Dahl
violated the terms of court-ordered supervised visitation and refused to follow Mr. Harrison's counsel..
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl's claims are
barred by the doctrine of in pari delicto or unclean hands.
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl's damages are a
result of her own actions.
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mis. DahTs damages were
caused by intervening causes.
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. DahTs damages were
the product of circumstances over which you had no control.
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. DahTs claims are
barred by waiver, estoppel, or laches.
6
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INTERROGATORY NO. 17: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl has failed to
mitigate her damages.
INTERROGATORY NO. 18; Identify all times in which you have been covered by malpractice
insurance. Include in your answer the dates in which you were covered, and the name of the malpractice
carrier.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
REQUEST NO. 1:

Produce all documents relating to your representation of Kim Dahl.

REQUEST NO. 2:

Produce all documents relating to every agreement, document, or other

writing that was executed by the parties, or either of them, to engage the employment of Brian C.
Harrison or Brian C, Harrison, P.C. for Kim Dahl.
REQUEST NO. 3:

Produce all documents relating to your claim that you had authority to

represent Mrs. Dahl in case number 064402232.

.

REQUEST NO. 4: Produce all documents relating to your claim that Mrs. Dahl consented to your
entry into the "Stipulation" in case number 064402232 on November 2,2006.
REQUEST NO. 5: Produce all documents relating to your claim that Mrs. Dahl authorized you to
your enter into the "Stipulation" in case number 064402232 on November 2,2006.

REQUEST NO. 6: Produce all documents, notes, memoranda, or other writings relating to case
number 064402232.
REQUEST NO. 7; Produce all documents relating to any communications between you and Dr.
Charles Dahl, or her claim.

7
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REQUEST NO. 8: Produce all documents relating to any communications between you and
Rosemond Blakelock, or her agent, which related to Mrs. Dahl.
REQUEST NO. 9: Produce all documents relating to any conversations between you and Mrs.
Dahl.
REQUEST NO. 10: Produce all documents relating to any billing or invoicing charged to Mrs.
Dahl for your legal counsel and representation.
REOUESTNO.il; Produce a list of each case in which you have represented clients against
parties represented by Rosemond Blakelock.
REQUEST NO. 12: Produce all thefilesthat relate to your answer to interrogatory number 6
above.
REQUEST NO. 13: Produce each document relating to any business dealings you have had, you
have, or plan to have, with Dr. Charles Dahl.
REQUEST NO. 14: Produce each document relating to any doctor-patient relationship, or any
other relationship, you have had, you have, or plan to have with Dr. Dahl.
REQUEST NO. 15: Produce all documents relating to your answer of interrogatory number 10.
DATED this

f^ day of April, 2008.
HlRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC

STEVE S. CHEJSTENSEN
BRENNANH.MOSS
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Erbe Elektromedizin GmbH v. Canady
W.D.Pa.,2006.
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court,W.D. Pennsylvania.
ERBE ELEKTROMEDIZIN GMBH, Erbe USA,
Inc., and Conmed Corporation, Plaintiffs,
v.
Dr. Jerome CANADY and Canady Technology,
LLC, Defendants.
Civil Action No. 05-1674.
Nov. 21,2006.
Gabriela I. Coman, Laurence E. Fisher, Philip G.
Hampton, II, Dickstein Shaprio LLP, Washington,
DC, Leland P. Schermer, Leland Schermer & Associates, P.C., Pittsburgh, PA, John G. Powers, Hancock & Estabrook, Syracuse, NY, for Plaintiffs.
Brad R. Newberg, Christopher F. Winters, Newberg
& Winters, Vienna, VA, Timothy R. Dewitt, Alexandria, VA, Daniel M. Darragh, Mark A. Grace,
Cohen & Grigsby P.C., Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER
AMBROSE, Chief District Judge.
*1 Plaintiffs have filed a Motion to Compel Response to its Discovery Requests, or in the Alternative, Extend the Discovery Deadline to Permit the
Response to the Already-Served Requests. (Docket
No. 98). By way of background, on March 9, 2006,
counsel, in compliance with this Courts local patent rules, filed a Rule 26(f) report with a proposed
fact discovery completion date of October 27, 2006.
(Docket No. 25). On October 27, 2006, the last day
of fact discovery, Plaintiffs propounded discovery
upon Defendants. Defendants object to this discovery arguing that it is untimely and requested a telephone conference with this Court. (Docket No.
103). During a telephone conference regarding the
timeliness of said discovery, I granted Plaintiffs
leave to file a Brief supporting their position.

Paget

(Docket No. 96). Thereafter, I called counsel back
and requested that Plaintiffs indicate in their Motion a time line of the discovery that they had taken
in this case.
I first note that Plaintiffs failed to supply this Court
with a time line of the discovery they had taken in
this case. See, Docket No. 98.Defendants, however,
responded to the same indicating that prior to October 27, 2006, Plaintiffs only discovery initiatives
were served on March 10, 2006. (Docket No. 103,
p. 2). In other words, between March 10, 2006, and
the last day of discovery, October 27, 2006,
Plaintiffs propounded no other discovery in this
case. Id.
In support of their Motion to Compel, Plaintiffs cite
to two cases out of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.™1! am not persuaded by the rationale of the cases. Further, I find them to be distinguishable from the within matter. Specifically,
the cases cited by Plaintiffs were out of the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania and not subject to this
court's local patent rules, whereas the within matter
is governed by the Local Patent Rules for the Western District of Pennsylvania.
FN1. The cases cited by Plaintiffs are
Mines v. City of Phil, No. 93-3052, 1994 •
U.S.Dist LEXIS 9776, at *2 (E.D.Pa. July
18, 1994), and Laurenzano v. Lehigh Valley Hospital, Inc., No. 00-02621; 2003
U.S.Dist LEXIS 13258, at *6-7 (E.D.Pa.
July 28,2003).
This Court's Local Patent Rules provide a Model
Scheduling Order, which sets forth the following:
(10) The parties shall complete fact discovery by,
all interrogatories, depositions, requests for admissions, and requests for production shall be served
within sufficient time to allow responses to be completed prior to the close of discovery.
See, United States District Court for the Western
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District of Pennsylvania Local Patent Rules, Appendix C, f 10 (emphasis added). According to
their Rule 26(f) Report, counsel used the above
Model Scheduling Order in preparing their Rule
26(f) Report. See, Docket No. 25.Thus, there can be
no doubt that counsel was aware that "complete"
means just that-that all discovery initiatives shall be
served within sufficient time to allow responses to
be completed prior to the close of discovery. Based
upon the same, I find Plaintiffs' discovery initiatives served on the last day of discovery to be untimely, such that Defendants are not required to respond to me same.
Plaintiffs request, in the alternative, that if such initiatives are determined to be untimely, this Court
extend the discovery deadline to permit the responses to the already served initiatives. (Docket
No. 98). I decline to grant such relief. According to
Defendants, the initiatives propounded upon them
include 71 document requests, 8 interrogatories,
243 requests for admissions, 9 notices of personal
depositions, and a Rule 30(b)(6) notice of deposition listing 62 categories. (Docket No. 103, p. 2).
This
is
an
extensive
amount
of
discovery.^Plaintiffs offer no reason for why
they waited until the last day of discovery to serve
the same. Moreover, I believe that such extensive
initiatives would not be completed within 30 days.
As a result, the discovery period for this case would
be extended well beyond the time period reasonably
contemplated by the local patent rule and this
Court. Consequently, Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel
is denied

Page 2

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2006 WL 3387176
(W.D.P&)
END OF DOCUMENT

*

FN2. According to Defendants, it comprises 98% of Plaintiffs' discovery initiatives. (Docket No. 103, p. 1).
*2 THEREFORE, this 21st day of November, 2006,
after careful consideration and for the reasons set
forth within, it is ordered that Plaintiffs' Motions to
Compel (Docket No. 98) is denied
W.D.Pa.,2006.
Erbe Elektromedizin GmbH v. Canady
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Chevola v. Cellco Partnership
M.D.Fla.,2007.
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, M.D. Florida,
Tampa Division.
Sandra CHEVOLA, Plaintiff,
v.
CELLCO PARTNERSHIP d/b/a Verizon Wireless,
Defendant.
No. 8:06-cv-1312-T-30MAP.
Nov. 14,2007.
James E. Aker, Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen
& Ginsburg, PA, Sarasota, FL, for Plaintiff.
Gregory Alan Hearing, Thompson, Sizemore &
Gonzalez, PA, Tampa, FL, for Defendant
ORDER
MARK A. PIZZO, United States Magistrate Judge.
*1 This cause is before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion to Compel (doc. 31). The motion, filed two and
a half months after the discovery cutoff date, asks
this Court to compel responses to Plaintiffs First
Set of Interrogatories and production of documents
in response to Plaintiffs Second, Third, and Fifth
Request to Produce. This motion is untimely and is
therefore denied.
This district follows the rule that the completion
date for discovery means just that-aZ/ discovery
must be completed by that dateMiddle District Discovery (2001) at § LF.l (emphasis in rule). Hence,
interrogatories, as an example, must be served more
than thirty days prior to the completion date to permit the opposing party to respond before the discovery deadline. Id If the parties agree to conduct
discovery after the Court's discovery deadline^ they
cannot expect the Court to resolve their postdeadline discovery disputes. Id. Moreover, the
Court expects the parties to address discovery disputes promptly-before the discovery deadline

Pagel

passes or soon thereafter. See Pushko v. Klebener,
2007 WL 2671263 (M.D.Fla.2007) ("Motions to
compel must be brought in a timely manner."); AB
Diversified Enterprises, Inc. v. Global Transport
Logistics, Inc., 2007 WL 1362632 *1
(S.D.Fla.2007) ("[A] motion to compel filed more
than two months after the discovery cutoff is
clearly untimely."); see also Suntrust Bank v. Blue
Water Fiber, LP., 210 F.R.D. 196, 200-201
(E.D.Mich.2002) (reviewing cases from various
districts citing general principle); Sales v. State
Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 632 F.Supp. 435
(N.D.Ga.1986) (motion to compel filed after the
close of discovery was untimely).
The Defendant asserts that it timely responded to
Plaintiffs Second Request to Produce (served on
May 24, 2007), her Third Request to Produce
(served on June 14, 2007), and her Fifth Request to
Produce and First Set of Interrogatories (both
served on June 27, 2007).S'ee Defendant's Response
to Plaintiffs Motion to Compel, doc. 51, at 12.
However, the Plaintiff made no objection to the discovery responses until September 11, 2007-nearly a
month and a half after the July 27, 2007, discovery
cutoff. While the delay between September 11,
2007, and the filing of this motion on October 15,
2007, is fairly attributable to negotiations between
the parties and the Defendant's request for additional time to consider the Plaintiffs arguments, there is
no justification for Plaintiffs failure to make any
objection prior to September 11, 2007. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED:
1. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel (doc. 31) is DENIED.
DOISIE and ORDERED.
M.D.Fla.,2007.
Chevola v. Cellco Partnership
Slip Copy, 2007 WL 3379779 (MJD.Fla.)
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c
Jim Boast Dodge, Inc. v. Daimler Chrysler Motors
Co., LLC
M.D.Fla.,2007.
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, M.D. Florida,
Tampa Division.
JIM BOAST DODGE, INC., d/b/a Bob Boast
Dodge, a Florida Corporation, Plaintiff
v.
DAIMLER CHRYSLER MOTORS COMPANY,
LLC f7k/a Chrysler Motors Corporation, a
Delaware corporation, Defendant
No. 8:05-CV-1999-T-30MAP.

the Court to resolve their post-deadline discovery
disputes. Id. Moreover, the Court expects the
parties to address discovery disputes promptly-before the discovery deadline passes or soon thereafter. See Ellison v. Windt, 2001 WL 118617
(M.D.Fla.2001) (motion to strike filed after discovery deadline untimely); see also Suntrust Bank v.
Blue Water Fiber, LP., 210 F.R.D. 196, 200-201
(E.D.Mich.2002) (reviewing cases from various
districts citing general principle); Sales v. State
Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 632 F.Supp. 435
(N.D.Ga.1986) (motion to compel filed after the
close of discovery was untimely).
Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

Jan. 16, 2007.
Named Expert: Joseph F. Roesner

1. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Proper Responses
to Plaintiffs Second Request to Produce (doc. 25)
is DENIED.

William G. Osborne, William G. Osborne, P.A.,
Orlando, FL, for Plaintiff.
C. Everett Boyd, Jr., Dean Bunch, Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, LLP, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendant.

2. Defendant's Motion to Exclude Testimony by
Plaintiffs Proposed Expert (doc. 21) is DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
3. Plaintiffs Expert Report is due January 30, 2007.

ORDER
MARK A. PIZZO, United States Magistrate Judge.
*1 THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiffs
Motion to Compel Proper Responses to Plaintiffs
Second Request to Produce (doc. 25) and Defendant's Motion to Exclude Testimony by Plaintiffs
Proposed Expert (doc. 21). A hearing was held on
the matter on January 16,2007.
This district follows the rule that the completion
date for discovery means just that-a// discovery
must be completed by that dateMiddlz District Discovery (2001) at § I.F.1 (emphasis in rule). Hence,
requests for production, as an example, must be
served more than thirty days prior to the completion
date to permit the opposing party to respond before
the discovery deadline./*/.; see alsoFED. R. CIV. P.
34(b). If the parties agree to conduct discovery after
the Court's discovery deadline, they cannot expect

4. Defendant's Expert Report is due February 13,
2007.
5. No other deadlines set forth in the Court's Case
Management and Scheduling Order (Doc. 12) are
affected by this Order.
DONE AND ORDERED.
M.D.Fla.,2007.
Jim Boast Dodge, Inc. v. Daimler Chrysler Motors
Co., LLC
Slip Copy, 2007 WL 4409781 (M.D.Fla.)
END OF DOCUMENT
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Erbe Elekrromedizin GmbH v. Canady
W.D.Pa.,2006.
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court,W.D. Pennsylvania.
ERBE ELEKTROMEDIZIN GMBH, Erbe USA,
Inc., and Conmed Corporation, Plaintiffs,
v.
Dr. Jerome CANADY and Canady Technology,
LLC, Defendants.
Civil Action No. 05-1674.
Nov. 21,2006.
Gabriela I. Coman, Laurence E. Fisher, Philip G.
Hampton, II, Dickstein Shaprio LLP, Washington,
DC, Leland P. Schermer, Leland Schermer 8c Associates, P.C., Pittsburgh, PA, John G. Powers, Hancock & Estabrook, Syracuse, NY, for Plaintiffs.
Brad R Newberg, Christopher F. Winters, Newberg
& Winters, Vienna, VA, Timothy R Dewitt, Alexandria, VA, Daniel NL Darragh, Mark A. Grace,
Cohen & Grigsby P.C., Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER
AMBROSE, Chief District Judge.
*1 Plaintiffs have filed a Motion to Compel Response to its Discovery Requests, or in the Alternative, Extend the Discovery Deadline to Permit the
Response to the Already-Served Requests. (Docket
No. 98). By way of background, on March 9, 2006,
counsel, in compliance with this Court's local patent rules, filed a Rule 26(f) report with a proposed
fact discovery completion date of October 27, 2006.
(Docket No. 25). On October 27, 2006, the last day
of fact discovery, Plaintiffs propounded discovery
upon Defendants. Defendants object to this discovery arguing that it is untimely and requested a telephone conference with this Court. (Docket No.
103). During a telephone conference regarding the
timeliness of said discovery, I granted Plaintiffs
leave to file a Brief supporting their position.

Page 1

(Docket No. 96). Thereafter, I called counsel back
and requested that Plaintiffs indicate in their Motion a time line of the discovery that they had taken
in this case.
I first note that Plaintiffs failed to supply this Court
with a time line of the discovery they had taken in
this case. See, Docket No. 98.Defendants, however,
responded to the same indicating that prior to October 27, 2006, Plaintiffs only discovery initiatives
were served on March 10, 2006. pocket No. 103,
p. 2). In other words, between March 10, 2006, and
the last day of discovery, October 27, 2006,
Plaintiffs propounded no other discovery in this
case. Id.
In support of their Motion to Compel, Plaintiffs cite
to two cases out of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.^II am not persuaded by the rationale of the cases. Further, I find them to be distinguishable from the within matter. Specifically,
the cases cited by Plaintiffs were out of the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania and not subject to this
court's local patent rules, whereas the within matter
is governed by the Local Patent Rules for the Western District of Pennsylvania.
FN1. The cases cited by Plaintiffs are
Mines v. City of Phil, No. 93-3052, 1994
U.S.Dist. LEXIS 9776, at *2 (EJD.Pa. July
18, 1994), and Laurenzano v. Lehigh Valley Hospital, Ina, No. 00-02621; 2003
U.S.Dist. LEXIS 13258, at *6-7 (E.D.Pa.
July 28,2003).
This Court's Local Patent Rules provide a Model
Scheduling Order, which sets forth the following:
(10) The parries shall complete fact discovery by,
all interrogatories, depositions, requests for admissions, and requests for production shall be served
within sufficient time to allow responses to be completed prior to the close ofdiscovery.
See, United States District Court for the Western
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District of Pennsylvania Local Patent Rules, Appendix C, i[ 10 (emphasis added). According to
their Rule 26(f) Report, counsel used the above
Model Scheduling Order in preparing their Rule
26(f) Report. See, Docket No. 25.Thus, there can be
no doubt that counsel was aware that "complete"
means just that-that all discovery initiatives shall be
served within sufficient time to allow responses to
be completed prior to the close of discovery. Based
upon the same, I find Plaintiffs' discovery initiatives served on the last day of discovery to be untimely, such that Defendants are not required to respond to the same.

Not Reported in RSupp.2d, 2006 WL 3387176
(W.D.Pa.)
END OF DOCUMENT

Plaintiffs request, in the alternative, that if such initiatives are determined to be untimely, this Court
extend the discovery deadline to permit the responses to the already served initiatives. (Docket
No. 98). I decline to grant such relief. According to
Defendants, the initiatives propounded upon them
include 71 document requests, 8 interrogatories,
243 requests for admissions, 9 notices of personal
depositions, and a Rule 30(b)(6) notice of deposition listing 62 categories. (Docket No. 103, p. 2).
This
is
an
extensive
amount
of
discovery.^Plaintiffs offer no reason for why
they waited until the last day of discovery to serve
the same. Moreover, I believe that such extensive
initiatives would not be completed within 30 days.
As a result, the discovery period for this case would
be extended well beyond the time period reasonably
contemplated by the local patent rule and this
Court. Consequently, Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel
is denied.
FN2. According to Defendants, it comprises 98% of Plaintiffs1 discovery initiatives. (Docket No. 103, p. 1).
*2 THEREFORE, this 21st day of November, 2006,
after careful consideration and for the reasons set
forth within, it is ordered that Plaintiffs' Motions to
Compel (Docket No. 98) is denied.
W.D.Pa.,2006.
Erbe Elektromedizin GmbH v. Canady
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Epling v. UCB Films, Inc.
D.Kan.,2001.
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, D. Kansas.
Willard D. EPLING, Plaintiff
v.
UCB FILMS, INC.,fife/aUCB Cello, Inc., Defendant
Paula K. HLADKY, Plaintiff,
v.
UCB FILMS, INC., Defendant
Paula K. HLADKY, Plaintiff,
v.
UCB FILMS, INC., Defendant.
Nos. 98-4226-RDR, 98-4227-RDR, 00-4062-RDR.
April 2,2001.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROGERS.
*1 These cases are presently before the court upon
the following motions: (1) plaintiffs' petitions for
review of magistrate's order dated August 7, 2000
FN1; (2) plaintiffs' petitions for review of magistrate's order dated August 31, 2000; (3) plaintiffs'
petitions for review of magistrate's order dated
September 22, 2000; (4) plaintiffe' petitions for review of magistrate's order dated January 24, 2001;
and (5) plaintiff Hladky's petition for review of magistrate's order elated January 31, 2001. Having
carefully reviewed the arguments of the parties, the
court is now prepared to rule.
FN1. In connection with this motion, the
parties have filed several other motions.
Plaintiffs have filed a motion to strike defendant's amended motion to file surreply.
The defendant has filed a motion for the
court to disregard plaintiffe' response to
defendant's surreply. The court has now
read both the surreply and the response to

Pagel

the surreply. Little purpose would now be
served in granting these motions. Accordingly, the court shall deny both of these
motions. The court, however, certainly
does not wish to encourage the filing of
surreplies and responses to surreplies. In
addition, the court warns plaintiffe' counsel
that leave to file a response to a surreply is
necessary prior to filing such a pleading. In
this instance, the court will waive that requirement, but this requirement should be
complied with in the future.
As the court has explained in the past, these cases
have long and tortured histories. This is indeed remarkable because the cases are actually quite
simple. These cases involve allegations of refusal to
hire. Actions containing such allegations are usually among the quickest and easiest in the area of
employment discrimination. Discovery is generally
simplified. The motions presently under consideration clearly indicate that these cases have not fallen
into the quick and simple category. These cases
have been beset with problems from the outset The
instant motions suggest that the parties, particularly
the plaintiffs, fail to understand how the discovery
process should work* The following comments have
some application here: "Courts have long understood that uie administration of justice will be
gravely jeopardized unless the discovery and disclosure systems are largely self-executing. The resources of the courts would be taxed upon endurance if more than a tiny percentage of discovery or
disclosure proceedings generated disputes that
judges were forced to resolve." 7 Moore's Federal
Practice, § 37.23 (3d ed.2000).
An exhaustive and exhausting review of the record
reveals considerable bickering and acrimony
between counsel. It is clear that the magistrate has
been confronted with unusually contentious counsel, and we commend him on the enormous restraint he has exercised in presiding over these
cases. The court hopes that counsel will make every
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discovery of the defendant's employment records,
while others refer to very specific and sometimes
inconsequential matters.

effort in the future to work together to prepare these
cases for trial or final disposition.
The court shall now provide some background on
these cases. For many years, Dupont, Inc. and
Flexel, Inc. operated a cellophane manufacturing
plant in Tecumseh, Kansas. In 1996, Flexel closed
the plant and terminated all of its employees. UCB
Films, Inc. purchased the plant and began seeking
employees in 1997. Adecco, an employment
agency, acted as agent for UCB in the hiring process by providing administrative testing and employment services. Willard Epling and Paula
Hladky are husband and wife. They had previously
worked at the Tecumseh plant for a number of
years as coating operators. Each applied for the position of coating operator, UCB did not offer a job
to either one.

The court does intend to address the issues raised
by the parties, but in the interests of time, the discussions will be limited.
Defendant's Motions for Protective Orders

The court's standard of review concerning a magistrate judge's determination of a nondispositive issue
is whether the decision has been shown to be
"clearly erroneous or contrary to law."28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(A); FedJELCiv.P. 72(a). The moving
party must show that the magistrate's order is
"clearly erroneous or contrary to tew "Hutchinson
v. Pfeil, 105 F.3d 562, 566 (10th Cir.1997). The
"clearly erroneous" standard requires that the court
affirm me decision of the magistrate unless "on the
entire evidence [the court] is left with the definite
conviction
that
a
mistake
has
been
<x>mxmttQ&" United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948); see also Ocelot Oil
Corp. v. Sparrow Industries, 847 F.2d 1458, 1462
(lOmCix.1988).
PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AUGUST 7, 2000 ORDER
*2 On August 7, 2000, the magistrate issued a fiftyseven page order concerning a number of discovery
disputes. Plaintiffs seek review of almost every adverse ruling contained in that order. Some of the
objections raised by the plaintiffs concern key issues in the discovery process, i.e., the scope of the

© 2008 Thomson/West. No

Plaintiff served a subpoena duces tecum on Shirley
Martin-Smith, the owner of Adecco, requesting that
she produce nine categories of documents relating
to the employment applications of all individuals
who applied for employment with UCB from July
through December 1997. The defendant sought a
protective order under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c) to quash
the subpoena requests. UCB argued that the documents should not be produced because it had ownership and control over them. Plaintiffs responded
that UCB did not have standing to object to a subpoena served on a third party.
The magistrate agreed with the arguments made by
the plaintiffs. The magistrate denied the defendant's
motions for protective orders. The magistrate,
however, failed to address whether plaintiffs were
entitled to sanctions. Plaintiffs contend in this motion that the court should now award fees and expenses to them. The defendant suggests that the
plaintiffs are not entitled to fees and expenses because its position was "substantially justified."
The court finds that this issue should be remanded
to the magistrate for consideration of whether attorney's fees and expenses should be awarded to the
plaintiff. The court believes that the magistrate
simply overlooked this issue. We believe that the
magistrate should have the first opportunity to consider it since he is thoroughly familiar with the
background of the motions for protective order.
Plaintiffs' Motions to Compel Responses to Defendant's Objections to Duces Tecum Deposition Subpoenas and Notices

im to Orig. U.S. Govt Works.
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In April and early June 1999, plaintiffs served deposition notices and subpoenas duces tecum on Jirn
Oldham, Bob Morris, Jeanne Hippe and Larry
Montgomery, four management employees of UCB.
UCB objected to the document requests contained
in the notices/subpoenas on the grounds that they
were unintelligible, overbroad, vague, ambiguous,
unduly burdensome and irrelevant. UCB also objected to the notice/subpoena served on Montgomery
because it did not afford UCB thirty days to respond to the document requests. In response,
plaintiffs filed motions to compel the production of
the requested documents and sought permission
from the court to reopen the four depositions i£ and
when, such documents were produced. Both parties
sought sanctions against the other.
In his order, the magistrate overruled the majority
of UCB's objections and ordered the production of
documents pertaining to the hiring of coating operators from July 1997 to the present In addition, the
magistrate granted plaintiffs' request to reopen the
depositions of Oldham, Morris and Hippe for questioning concerning the forthcoming coating operator documents, but denied the request to reopen
Montgomery's deposition. The magistrate denied
plaintiffs' request to reopen Montgomery's deposition because they had not provided him with the
thirty days necessary to produce documents as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(5) and 34. Finally, the
magistrate denied the parties' cross-motions for
sanctions.
*3 Plaintiffs contend that the magistrate erred in. refusing to reopen Montgomery's deposition and in
refusing to award expenses in connection with the
filing of the motions to compel. Plaintiffs assert
that they should have been allowed to reopen Montgomery's deposition because they would have had
the necessary documents if the defendant had produced those documents for the other depositions.
They further argue that they did not take contrary
positions concerning the scope of their discovery
requests. Thus, they contend mat they were entitled
to fees and expenses in connection with the prepar-

© 2008 Thomson/West. No
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ation of responses to defendant's objections to
duces tecum subpoenas and the retaking of the depositions of Oldham, Morris and Hippe.
In denying the plaintiffs' requests to reopen Montgomery's deposition, the magistrate ruled as follows:
Plaintiffs did not provide Montgomery with the requisite thirty days to provide the documents. While
the Court has ruled that this failure to give the requisite notice relieved Defendant of producing the
requested documents at his deposition, Defendant
still had the obligation to object and/or produce the
documents within the tnirty-day time period. Since
Defendant did timely serve objections to the Montgomery requests and the Court has overruled those
objections, Defendant must still produce the documents (as limited by Plaintiffs to the individuals
hired for the Coating Operator positions). The
Court does not find, however, that Defendant has
the obligation to re-produce Montgomery for his
deposition since Defendant had no obligation in the
first place to produce the documents at his June 14,
1999 deposition. The Court will therefore deny
Plaintiffs' requests to reopen Montgomery's deposition.
In denying sanctions to the plaintiffs, the magistrate
noted that the plaintiffs had taken contrary positions as to the scope of information sought, i.e., at
the time of depositions, plaintiffs claimed they were
requesting information pertaining to all applications
for all open positions, while in their reply briefs to
the motions to compel, they claimed to have sought
information pertaining only to the hiring of coating
operators. The magistrate indicated that he would
have agreed with the defendant that plaintiffs' requests were overbroad if plaintiffs had continued to
insist that they were entitled to all applications for
all positions at the plant. The magistrate found in
plaintiffs' favor on the motions to compel only because he determined that plaintiffs had narrowed
their requests in the reply briefs. In sum, the magistrate found it unjust to impose sanctions against the
defendant because of the contrary positions taken
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by the plaintiffs as to the scope of the document requests.
The court has carefully evaluated the record, the
magistrate's order concerning these issues, and the
arguments of the parties. The court does not find
that the magistrate's decisions were clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
Plaintiffs' Motions to Compel Disclosure and Discovery of Specific Documents
*4 In June 1999, plaintiffs filed motion to compel
disclosure and discovery of specific documents. In
particular, the motions sought production of a
spreadsheet prepared by Gina Berti, former office
manager of Adecco, and a "client file" maintained
at Adecco's office. Plaintiffs also sought to reopen
Berti's deposition if, and when, the court ordered
these documents to be produced.
In his order, the magistrate ordered discovery of
both the spreadsheet and the "client file" upon the
condition that the information in each be limited to
plaintiffs' prospective employing unit, the coating
department. To ensure the limitation on the scope
of discovery, the magistrate permitted UCB to redact or remove any information from these documents that concerned positions outside the coating
department In addition, the magistrate ordered
Bertfs deposition to be reopened for purposes of
questioning her about coating department information contained in these documents. The magistrate
refused to award sanctions to either of the plaintiffs
concerning these motions to compel.
Plaintiffs contend that the magistrate erred in (1)
limiting the scope of discovery; (2) not imposing
judicial oversight over defendant's redaction of documents; and (3) not awarding expenses in connection with thefilingof the motions to compel.
The court shall first consider the scope of discovery
issue. Plaintiffs argue that the magistrate has unduly restricted discovery contrary to established
Tenth Circuit law. Plaintiffs contend that they are

entitled to discovery of all information regarding
individuals who applied for jobs at the Tecumseh
plant. The defendant had originally argued that the
scope of discovery should be limited to include
only the applicants for coating operator positions.
The magistrate rejected the arguments of both sides
and determined that discovery would encompass all
positions within the coating department, not just the
coating operator positions. The issue of the appropriate scope of discovery arises frequently in the
motions for review filed by plaintiffs.
The scope of discovery "is limited only by relevance and burdensomeness.'Wea/ifee v. Norton, 621
F.2d 1080, 1082 (10th Cir.1980). Discovery in employment discrimination cases depends heavily
upon the particular circumstances of the case. A
court may establish appropriate limits in order to
balance the needs and rights of both plaintiff and
defendant The Tenth Circuit has not, as suggested
by plaintiffs, adopted a policy of always allowing
plant-wide discovery in employment discrimination
actions. See Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. EEOC, 483
F.2d 178 (10th Cir.1973) (in disparate impact case,
Tenth Circuit affirms district court's order limiting
discovery to single store where plaintiff employed
rather than permitting broader discovery companyr
wide to all stores). Rather, the Tenth Circuit has recognized that district courts have broad discretion
in discovery matters, and have examined the relevance and the burdensomeness of lii& request In the
context of investigating an individual complaint of
disparate treatment, such as exists in the instant
cases, the Tenth Circuit has recognized that discovery may appropriately be limited to employment
units, departments and sections in which employees
similarly situated to plaintiff are employed. James
v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 591 F.2d 579 (10th
Cir.1979) (Umiting discovery in gender discrimination case to plaintiffs department); see also HaseU
horst v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 163 F.R.D. 10
(D.Kan. 1995) (discovery limited to employing
unit); Earley v. Champion International Corp., 907
F.2d 1077 (11th Cir.1990) (limiting discovery in
Title VII cases to employing unit); Marshall v.
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Westinghouse Electric Corp., 576 F.2d 588, 592
(5th Cir.1978) (where individual case of disparate
treatment is alleged, focus in discovery should be
on employing unit or work unit). To justify the
court's consideration beyond the employing unit or
work unit, the plaintiff must show a more particularized need and TelQvmce.Haselkorst, 163 F.R.D.
at 11.
*5 The court does not find the magistrate's decision
to limit discovery to the coating department clearly
erroneous. The court finds that the magistrate properly concluded that plaintiffs had not shown a particularized need and relevance for the plant-wide
discovery. In sum, the court finds no basis to the
objections offered by the plaintiffs.
The court also does not find that the magistrate's
decision not to impose any judicial oversight over
the defendant's redactions of the spreadsheet and
client file was clearly erroneous. The court is in
agreement with the defendant that this is a matter
that can be managed by the parties.
Finally, we shall address the issue of sanctions.
This presents an interesting question. The facts are
not in dispute. The motion filed by plaintiff Hladky
was entitled "Motion to Compel Disclosure of Specific Documents and for Sanctions."The motion and
accompanying memorandum, however, failed to address the issue of sanctions. The motion filed by
plaintiff Epling did not mention sanctions either in
its title or anywhere hi the motion or accompanying
memorandum. Under these circumstances, the magistrate determined that plaintiffs had not requested
sanctions. In addition, he determined that sanctions
should not be awarded because he did not grant the
motions in their entireties.
Sanctions shall be allowed when a motion to compel discovery is granted or if the requested discovery is provided after the filing of the motion, unless
the court finds that the motion was filed without the
movant making a good faith effort to obtain the discovery, or that the opposing party's nondisclosure
was substantially justified, or that other circum-
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stances make the award of expenses unjust
Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(4)(A). Expenses may be apportioned among the parties in a just manner where the^
motion to compel is grant in part and denied in part.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(4)(C).
Given the language of Rule 37(a)(4)(A), the court
does not agree with the magistrate that a party
needs to request sanctions when filing a motion to
compel under Rule 37. There is a presumption in
favor of expense shifting sanctions under Rule
37(a)(4)(A). Unless an exception applies, the rule
provides that sanctions should be applied. Accordingly* we do not see that the rule requires a request
or argument for sanctions. Nevertheless, the court
does not find the magistrate's decision not to award
sanctions clearly erroneous. If a motion to compel
discovery is granted in part and denied in part, the
court may apportion expense shifting sanctions
among parties "in a just manner." Fed.R.Civ.P.
37(a)(4)(C). The motions filed by the plaintiffs
were granted in part and denied in part. The magistrate declined to enter sanctions. This court does
notfindthat this decision was clearly erroneous.
Plaintiffs' Motions to Compel Disclosure and Discovery andfor Sanctions
In June 1999, plaintiffs filed motions to compel disclosure and discovery of interrogatories and requests for production of documents to defendant.
The majority of the defendant's objections to
plaintiffs' discovery requests focused on the aforementioned dispute over the scope of discovery, i.e.,
whether plaintiffs were entitled to discover information regarding all applicants for all positions at
UCB from July 1997 to the present The defendant
also objected to the number of interrogatories propounded by each plaintiff because they exceeded
the number permitted by Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(a). In
their motions, plaintiffs again requested sanctions
forfilingthe motions.
*6 The magistrate once again held that discovery
was limited to information pertaining to plaintiffs'
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prospective employing unit, the coating department.
He further ruled mat the number of interrogatories
for both plaintiffs exceeded the number permitted
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. He estimated that the number of interrogatories propounded
by Epling, including subparts, ranged from 25 to
168 interrogatories, while the number propounded
by Hladky ranged from 21 to 89 separate interrogatories. He ordered plaintiffs to select twenty-five
from those already propounded to resubmit to the
defendant. In addition to his general rulings, the
magistrate made numerous determinations on the
scope of the individual requests for production of
documents. Finally, he denied plaintiffs' request for
sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(4)(C).
In this motion, plaintiffs contend that the magistrate
erred in (1) limiting plaintiffs' discovery to information pertaining to their prospective employing
unit, the coating department; (2) determining that
the interrogatories exceeded the number allowed by
Rule 33 and requiring them to repropound only
twenty-five interrogatories; (3) denying several of
their requests for production of documents; and (4)
denying their request for sanctions.
The court has carefully considered all of the arguments raised by the plaintiffs. We find no merit to
any of them. The court finds that the magistrate
carefully and properly ruled on each of the aforementioned matters. The court does not find that any
of these rulings were clearly erroneous.

Plaintiffs'Motions to File Amended Complaints
In July 1999, plaintiffs sought to amend their complaints to add retaliation claims and to amend their
age discrimination claims to include allegations that
they both sought "any job" at the Tecumseh plant.
The magistrate denied these motions as untimely.
In December 1999, plaintiffs sought leave to file
second amended complaints to add UCB, Inc. as a
defendant. Epling also sought leave to amend to
add four new plaintiffs. The magistrate also denied
the motions to amend as untimely. He further

denied motions to add UCB, Inc. as a defendant as
futile. In this motion, plaintiffs contend that the magistrate erred in denying their motions to amend.
Plaintiffs argue, inter alia, that the magistrate failed
to consider whether the defendant would suffer any
prejudice as a result of granting either motion to
amend.
While leave to amend "shall be freely given when
justice so requires,"Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), the decision
"is within the discretion of the trial court."Zem7/z
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S.
321, 330 (1971)."[A] district court acts within the
bounds of its discretion when it denies leave to
amend for 'untimeliness' or 'undue delay.' Prejudice to the opposing party need not be shown
2l$o.nFirst City Bank, N.A. v. Air Capitol Aircraft
Sales, Inc., 820F.2d 1127,1133 (10th Cir. 1987).
*7 After considering all of the facts surrounding the
motions to amend filed by both plaintiffs, the court
does not find that the magistrate's decisions to deny
the motions to amend based on untimeliness were
clearly erroneous or contrary to law. The court believes the magistrate thoroughly examined the issues and reached a decision within the bounds of
his discretion. Given this decision, the court finds it
unnecessary to address the rulings made by the magistrate concerning the futility of the proposed
amendments. Moreover, the court notes that recent
events have rendered portions of the motions to
amend moot. The court has denied motions to dismiss in two cases filed by the plaintiffs after these
cases that raised many of the allegations contained
in the motions to amend.

Plaintiffs' Motions to Determine Sufficiency of Responses to Admissions
On June 16, 1999, plaintiffs served requests for admission upon the defendant The deadline for
serving discovery requests was June 1.5, 1999. In
August 1999, plaintiffs sought to determine the sufficiency of the defendant's responses to the requests
for admissions. The defendant objected to the re-
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quests for admissions, arguing that they were untimely served The magistrate agreed. The magistrate denied (he plaintiffs' motion to determine the
sufficiency of" the responses to the requests for admissions. The magistrate determined that the requests for admissions were a form of discovery and
that they were untimely because they had been
served after the discovery deadline. The magistrate
stated that, in order to be timely, the requests
needed to be served on or before May 13, 1999, so
that responses could be filed prior to the discovery
deadline. The magistrate also granted defendant's
request for sanctions.
Plaintiffs contend that the magistrate erred in finding the requests; for admissions untimely and in imposing sanctions. Plaintiffs assert that requests for
admission are not discovery tools and were, therefore, not subject to the discovery deadline established by the magistrate. Plaintiffs further argue
that sanctions should not have been imposed because past practices in this court and precedent
from other jurisdictions supported the position
taken by them before the magistrate.
The question of whether discovery deadlines apply
to requests for admission is the subject of much dispute. Compare Jarvis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 161
F.R.D. 337, 339 (N.DMiss.1995) (requests for admission are a form of discovery and are therefore
subject to the discovery deadline) with O'Neill v.
Medad, 166 F.R.D. 19, 21 (E.D.Mich.1996)
(requests for admissions are not general discovery
device and therefore are not subject to discovery
deadlines) and Hurt v. Coyne Cylinder Co., 124
F.R.D. 614, 615 (W.D.Tenn.1989) (same) and with
Kershner v. Beloit Corp., 106 F.R.D. 498, 499
(D.Maine 1985) (requests for admissions are subject to discovery deadline but should be answered
even if untimely unless opposing party shows some
prejudice).
*8 Having reviewed mis contradictory precedent,
none of which comes from the Tenth Circuit or the
District of Kansas, the court is persuaded that the
decision of the magistrate was not clearly erroneous
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or contrary to law. The court, however, does find
that the magistrate's decision to award sanctions
was clearly erroneous. The magistrate found the arguments of the plaintiffs frivolous and disingenuous. We cannot agree. The state of the law on this
issue is clearly unsettled. The court finds that the
arguments of the plaintiffs were substantially justified. We believe that the imposition of sanctions
under these circumstances was inappropriate. See
Bieganek v. Wilson, 110 F.R.D. 77, 78
(N.D.I11.1986). Accordingly, the court shall vacate
the award of sanctions to the defendant on this issue.
Plaintiffs' Motions for Extension of Expert Disclosure and Discovery Deadline
In June 1999, plaintiffs moved to extend the expert
disclosure deadlines by sixty days. The magistrate
denied the motion. The court does not find that this
decision was clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
PLAINTIFF HLADKY'S PETITION FOR REVIEW OF MAGISTRATE'S ORDER OF AUGUST
31,2000
In response to the magistrate's order of August 7,
2000, the defendant produced approximately
20,000 pages of documents to plaintiffs. The defendant photocopied these documents and provided
them to plaintiffs in eight large boxes. Plaintiffs
complained about the method of the defendant's
production. On August 31, 2000, the magistrate
held a hearing to address plaintiffs' complaints. At
that time, plaintiffs argued that Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(b):
(1) required the defendant to organize and identify
documents to correspond with the categories in
plaintiffs' document requests; and (2) produce original documents rather than copies. The magistrate
denied plaintiffs' complaints, finding that the defendant had adequately complied with the requirements of Rule 34(b). The magistrate found no merit
to the arguments raised by the plaintiffs. Plaintiff
Hladky contends that the magistrate erred in reach-
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ing this decision.
The court does not find the decision of the magistrate clearly erroneous. The court fails to find,
based upon the information presented, that the documents produced by the defendant were not produced as they were kept in the ordinary course of
business. In addition, the court finds nothing in
Rule 34 that requires that a party produce originals
rather than copies. In sum, plaintiffs petition for re
view shall be denied

pLArNTIFFS» p E T I T 1 0 N

F 0 R

REV IEW 0 F

M A

GISTRATE'S ORDER DATED SEPTEMBER 22,
2000
In his order of August 7, 2000, the magistrate ruled
that the appropriate scope of discovery was the
coating department of the Tecumseh plant for the
time period from July 1997 through the present.
The magistrate also ruled that the defendant did not
have standing to object to or quash the subpoena
duces tecum served by plaintiffs on Shirley MartinSmith. Plaintiffs had previously served a subpoena
duces tecum on Martin-Smith requesting all application documents of all individuals who applied for
any positions at the Tecumseh plant during the time
period from July 1997 through December 1997. On
or about September 11, 2000, plaintiffs issued an
amended subpoena duces tecum on Shirley MartinSmith. Plaintiffs requested all application documents for all positions for the time period from M y
1997 through the present The defendant responded
with a motion to enforce the magistrate's August
7th order.
*9 The magistrate granted the defendant's motion to
enforce. The magistrate held that while plaintiffs
were allowed to once again serve their deposition
notice on Martin-Smith, they were not permitted to
obtain documents concerning all positions at the
Tecumseh plant because discovery had been limited
to the coating department, plaintiffs' employing unit.

'In this motion, plaintiffs contend 'that "the magistrate
erred in limiting the subpoena to documents concerning the coating department. Plaintiffs contend
that they should have been allowed to proceed on
the requests of the prior subpoena (with an expansion of the discovery time frame as established in
the magistrate's August 7th order) because the magistrate had ruled that the defendant had no standing to quash the subpoena.
This motion again raises the scope of discovery' issue. Again and again, plaintiffs have suggested that
discovery should be expanded to the entire plant
because "all hiring decisions between M y 1997
and the present have been made by the human resources managers Michael Machell and Jenne
Hippe under the direct supervision of UCB vice
president Joseph Wilbanks."As correctly pointed
out by the defendant, plaintiffs have never cited to
any portion of the record to support the quoted material Moreover, the defendant has repeatedly cited
to evidence suggesting that the quoted material has
no basis in fact.
Once again, the court does not find that the magistrate's decision was clearly erroneous. The magistrate has demonstrated a thorough understanding of
these cases and the issues involved. Accordingly,
this motion shall also be denied.

PLAINTIFFS* .MOTION FOR REVIEW OF MAGISTRATE'S ORDER OF JANUARY 24, 2001
In his order of August 7, 2000, the magistrate held
that the defendant was entitled to expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred in responding to
plaintiffs' motions to determine the sufficiency of
the responses to their requests for admissions. On
January 24, 2001, the magistrate awarded sanctions
to the defendant in the amount of $2,390.48. In this
motion, plaintiffs object to the amount awarded.
With the court's decision reversing the magistrate's
award of sanctions, the court finds that this motion
is moot

) 2008 Thomson/West No Claim to Orig. U.S Govt Works.
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PLAINTIFF HLADKVS PETITIONS FOR REVIEW OF MAGISTRATE'S ORDER OF JANUARY 31, 2001
On January 12, 2001, plaintiff Hladky filed a motion to take the noticed depositions of Joe Gaynor
and Joe Wilbanks telephonically. The defendant opposed the plaintiffs motion and filed a motion for
protective order. On January 31, 2001, the magistrate denied plaintiffs motion and granted defendant's motion. The magistrate determined that (1)
plaintiff had not met her initial burden of demonstrating a legitimate reason for taking the deposition by telephone; and (2) telephonic depositions
were not appropriate due to the complexity of the
case and number of documents requested.
In her petitions for review, plaintiff contends that
the magistrate erred in denying her motion to take
the depositions of Wilbanks and Gaynor by telephone. Plaintiff argues initially that there was no
need for her to state a legitimate reason for the need
to take a deposition by telephone because the need
was obvious, i.e., to save costs. Plaintiff further
contends that the legal and factual bases for denying her motion wisre inaccurate.
*10 Rule 30(b)(7) provides that "the court upon
motion may order mat a deposition be taken by
telephone."As a general rule, this court believes
that telephonic depositions should be broadly permitted. We are not convinced as suggested by the
magistrate that a litigant must affirmatively state a
reason for the taking of a deposition by telephone.
.The
court
notes
that
in
Cressler
v.
Neuenschwander, 170 F.R.D. 20 (D.Kan. 1996), a
case relied upon by the magistrate, Judge Saffels
stated that a "party seeking to depose a witness
telephonically must present a legitimate, reason for
its request "Cressfer, 170 F.RD. at 21. While we
agree in substance with this statement, we are not
persuaded that each case requires the statement of a
reason because the purpose for taking a deposition
by telephone is obvious in most cases, i.e., the savings of time and costs. In this case, where plaintiff
sought to take the depositions of individuals who

© 2008 Thomson/West. No
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. were located in Atlanta, Georgia, we believe that
the purpose was readily evident. Accordingly, the
court finds the magistrate's decision to deny
plaintiffs motion for this reason clearly erroneous.
Once a motion to take a deposition by telephone is
filed, the burden shifts to the other side to show
why the depositions should proceed in the traditional manner. Cressler, 170 F.R.D. at 21. Here, the defendant suggested that these depositions should not
be taken by telephone because of the complexity of
the case and the number of documents requested by
the plaintiff. The magistrate agreed. Based upon information presently before the court, we cannot say
that the magistrate's decision was clearly erroneous..
Accordingly, this motion shall also be denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs' petitions for review of the magistrate's order of August 7, 2000 (poc. # 132 in No. 98-4226 and Doc. #
136 in No. 98-4227) be hereby granted in part and
denied in part On remand, the magistrate shall (1)
consider whether sanctions should be awarded to
plaintiffs in connection with defendant's motions
for protective orders and (2) vacate the award of
sanctions to defendant in connection with plaintiffs'
motions to determine sufficiency of responses to
admissions.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff Hladky's
petition for review of the magistrate's order of August 31, 2000 (Doc. # 155 in No. 98-4226) be
hereby denied
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' petitions for review of the magistrate's order of
September 22, 2000 (Doc. # 165 in No. 98-4226) be
hereby denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' petitions for review of the magistrate's order of January
24, 2001 (Doc. # 228 in No. 98-4226) be hereby
denied as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff Hladky's
petitions for review of the magistrate's order of
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January 31, 2001 (Doc.56 and 57 in No. 00-4062)
be hereby denied.
.
.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion
to strike defendant's amended motion to file surreply (Doc. # 186 in No. 98-4226) by hereby denied
*11 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant's
motion to disregard plaintiffs' response to defendant's surreply (Doc. # 211 in No. 98-4226) be
hereby denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
D.Kan.,2001.
Epling v. UCB Films, Inc.
Not Reported in RSupp,2d, 2001 WL, 584355
(D.Kan.)

.

END OF DOCUMENT
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Steve S. Christensen (U.S.B. No. 6156)
Brennan H. Moss (U.S.B. No. 10267)
Jeffrey J. Steele (U.S.B. No. 10606)
HlRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff
136 East South Temple, Suite 850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-0593
Facsimile: (801) 322-0594
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PRO.VO DIVISION

K M DAHL,

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND
SCHEDULING ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 070403005
BRIAN C. HARRISON; BRIAN C.
HARRISON, P.C.

Judge Laycock

Defendants.
Plaintiff Kim Dahl, by and through her attorneys of record, Hirschi Christensen, PLLC, does hereby
move this Court for an Order amending the Scheduling Order so that all discovery deadlines will be moved
back three months. The grounds for this motion, as morefollyset forth in the in the accompanying
Consolidated Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Further Discovery, Motion to Amend the
Scheduling Order, and in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Protective Order, are that Plaintiff needs
more time to seek responses to her outstanding discovery and to take the deposition of the Defendants.
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DATED this _lJi;r day <H (viav, .'008.
HlRSC "1II CM K1STENSEN, FLI C

r£^&

^

STEVE S. CHRISTENSEN
BRENNAN H. MOSS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND
SCHEDULING ORDEK wx, scut via 11 .S Mail and e-mail on the 12th day of May, 2008, to the
following:

•

Benjamin W. Lieberman (#11456)
BURBIDGE, MITCHELL & GROSS

215 South State Street, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-6677
Email: bwl@bmgtrial.com
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Steve S. Christensen (U.S.B. No. 6156)
Brennan H. Moss (U.S.B. No. 10267)
Jeffrey J. Steele (U.S.B. No. 10606)
Hmscm CHRISTENSEN, PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
136 East South Temple, Suite 850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-0593
Facsimile: (801) 322-0594
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION
gi, i

i.

•"—:—=i
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KIMDAHL,

a s " '

•—

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FURTHER
DISCOVERY

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No, 070403005
BRIAN C. HARRISON; BRIAN C.
HARRISON, P.C.

Judge Laycock

Defendants.
Plaintiff Kim Dahl, by and through her attorneys of record, Hirschi Christensen, PLLC, and
pursuant to Rule 56(f) does hereby move this Court for an Order allowing for further discovery prior to its
detennination of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The grounds for this motion, as more fully
set forth in the accompanying Consolidated Memorandum in Support of tlie Motion for Further Discovery,
Motion to Amend tlie Scheduling Order, and in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Protective Order, are
that further discovery and depositions will expose tlie facts and illuminate the issues presented in
Defendants' Motion for Summaiy Judgment This Motion is also supported by the Declaration of Brennan
H. Moss.

"

. .
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DATED this / £

day of May, 2008.

HlRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC

STEVE S. CHRISTENSEN
BRENNAN H. MOSS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
. Ihereby certify that a trae and accuralt- a>py „i PI .AINTII'F'N MOTION FORFURTHER
DISCOVERY was sent via U.S. Mail and e-mail on thel2th day of May, 2008, to the following:

Benjamin W. Lieberman (#11456)
BURBIDGE, MITCHELL & GROSS

215 South State Street, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-6677
Email: bwl@bmgtrial.com •
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Steve S. Christensen (U.S.B. No. 6156)
Brennan H. Moss (U.S.B. No. 10267)
Jeffrey J. Steele (U.S.B. No. 10606)
HIRSCHICHEISTENSEN, PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff
136 East South Temple, Suite 850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-0593
Facsimile: (801) 322-0594
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION
KMDAHL,

DECLARATION OF BRENNAN H.
MOSS IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR FURTHER DISCOVERY

Plaintiff,
vs.
BRIAN C. HARRISON; BRIAN C.
HARRISON, P.C.
-

Civil No. 070403005
Judge Laycpck

Defendants.
1. I am currently counsel of record for Plaintiff Mrs. Dahl and have personal knowledge of the matters
set forth herein.
2. On April 7,2008, Mrs. Dahl served upon Defendants discovery requests consisting of
interrogatories and request for production of documents.
3. On April 25,2008, Defendants served upon counsel for Mrs. Dahl a Motion for Summary Judgment
and a Motion for a Protective Order protecting themfromhaving to answer discovery.
4. The discovery propounded upon defendants relates to the issues raised in their motion for summary
judgment
5. Mrs. Dahl. propounded the following interrogatories:
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a. IN rERRQGATQRl NO. 1: l.lentily any communications thatyouhad with Mrs. Dahl
while you acted as her counsel. Include in your answer the date o 1 tne communication, the; ..i

i ne

communication tt n >k place, the people present, and the subject matter of the communication
b. INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Identify any commit K <• - .- persons while you acted as her legal counsel which related to Mr;

br

.a

>*•

'viwk u: your answer the date of

the communication, the place the communication took pldu\ flu \n oph piescnt. .md \Uh Mibin't matter of
the communication.
c. ^TERRQGATORY NO. J

^-•i-tv n=

;„

..mcations that you have had with

Rosemond Blakelock which related to Mrs. Dahl. Include in your answer the date of the communication,
the place the eommuiucatiot i it x •!> place,, the pw )ple present, .and the subject matter of the communication.
d. INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Identify any communications that you ha vt had with hi.
• i

• •'

nv:wer the date of the communication, the place the communication took place, the

people present, and the subject matter of the communication
e. INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Identify all cases in which you have appeared or consulted
that have involved Rosemond Blakelock.

•.

•

'

f: INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Identify all the cases in which you have appeared or
OOJlSUlted L- Ulu! ".i-H: =

-..i.U:; D:ihl.

•

""

g. INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Identify all facts which support your denial of the allegation
that you entered into the "Stipulation" without Mrs. Dahl's knowledge or consent.
h. INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Identic UK nasi

..M -

: .-•.••

.„ .

-D

Mrs. Dahl to sign up for anger management and parenting classes.

2
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i. INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Identify all facts which support your denial of the allegation
that you told Mrs. Dahl that because the November 2,2006 hearing would be continued, she would not
need to appear.
j.

INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Identify the evidence that needed to be gathered in order to

put Mrs. Dahl in the best possible position infrontof the court at the November 2,2006 hearing, as asserted
in paragraph 40 of your Answer.
k. INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Identify all the facts that support your assertion that Mrs.
Dahl violated the terms of court-ordered supervised visitation and refused to follow Mr. Harrison's
counsel..
1. INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Identify all the reasons vou claim that Mrs. DahPs claims
are barred by the doctrine of in pari delicto or unclean hands.
m. INTERROGATORY NO. 13; Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl's damages
are a result of her own actions.
n. INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl's damages
were caused by intervening causes.
o. INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl's damages
were the product of circumstances over which you had no control
p. INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl's claims
are barred by waiver, estoppel, or laches.
q. INTERROGATORY NO. 17: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl has failed
to mitigate her damages.

3
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r.

I N T E R R O G A T O R Y N O . 18: Identify all times m which y o u h a v e b e e n covered b y

malpractice insurance. Include in your answer the dates in which, you were covered, and the n a m e of the
malpractice cnrriiT.

m

.

,

6. Mrs. Dahl propounded t h e following request for production of documents upon Defendants
a. R E Q U E S T N O , )

» roduce all documents relating to your representation of K i m Dahl.

b. R E Q U E S T N O . ^ *

i': * >duce all documents relating to ever) .agreement, document, or

other writing that was executed b y the parties, or either of them., to engage t h e employment of Brian C.
Harrison or Jint:

•.•

- i,,l"(

c. R E Q U E S T N O . 3 :

tor Kim Dahl,

• ' ' - . .

Produce all documents relating to your claim that you h a d

authority to t epresent M r s , D a h l in case number 064402232.
d. R E Q U E S T N O . 4 : Produce all documents relating to your CLM;, IUI: MS.,. »:. »:.
ii entry i nt< > the "Stipulation" in case number 064402232 o n N o v e m b e r 2 , 2 0 0 6 ,
e. R E Q U E S T N O . 5: Produce all documents relating to your c l a m 1:1 lat Mi s Dahl authorized
you to your enter into the "Stipulation" in case number 064402232 o n N o v e m b e r 2 , 2 0 0 6 ,
£

R E Q U E S T N O . 6: Product all documents, notes mt'inonindii. oi other w ritings relating

to case number 064402232.

•

g. R E Q U E S T N O , 7: Produce ail documents relating to any communications between you
and Dr. Charles Dahl, or her claim.
11 R E Q U E S T N O . 8: Produce all documents relating to any communications between you
and Rosemond Blakelock, or h e r agent, which related to Mrs. Dahl.
i.

R E Q U E S T N O . 9: Produce all documents relating to any conversations b e t w e e n y o u

and Mrs. Dahl.
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j.

REQUEST NO. 10: Produce all documents relating to any billing or invoicing charged to

Mrs. Dahl for your legal counsel and representation.
k. REQUEST NO. 11: Produce a list of each case in which you have represented clients
against parties represented by Rosemond Blakelock.
1. REQUEST NO. 12: Produce all the files that relate to your answer to interrogatory
number 6 above.
m. REQUEST NO. 13: Produce each document relating to any business dealings you have
had, you have, or plan to have, with Dr. Charles Dahl.
n. REQUEST NO. 14: Produce each document relating to any doctor-patient relationship,
or any other relationship, you have had, you have, or plan to have with Dr. Dahl.
o. REQUEST NO. 15: Produce all documents relating to your answer of interrogatory
number 10.
7. In' addition to the discovery propounded on April 7,2008, Mrs. Dahl would like to take the
testimony of the Defendants to ask questions relating to their conversations with Mr. Dahl, Mr. Dahl's
attorney, and the issues presented in their Motion for Summary Judgment.
8. Answers to the above discovery will facilitate a fair trial by the fiill disclosure of all relevant
testimony and evidence.
9.

I certify under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct.
DATED this / ^ day of May, 2008
HlRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC

Brennan H. Moss
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of DECLARATION OF BRENNAN H. MOSS
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FURTHER DISCOVERY was sent via U.S. Mail
and e-mail on th.j 1 ..'th day of May, 2008, to llw (ol). iwi HJJ

Benjamin W. Lieberman (#11456)
BURBIDGE, MITCHELL & GROSS

215 South State Street, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-6677
Email: bwl@bmgtrial.com

6

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

0UU3b6
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Steve S. Christensen (U.S.B. No. 6156)
Brennan H. Moss (U.S.B. No. 10267)
Jeffrey J. Steele (U.S.B. No. 10606)
HIKSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff
136 East South Temple, Suite 850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-0593
Facsimile: (801) 322-0594
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION
KMDAHL,
.

Plaintiff,

vs.
BRIAN C. HARRISON; BRIAN C.
HARRISON, P.C.

PLAINTIFF'S CONSOLIDATED
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF HER
MOTION FOR FURTHER DISCOVERY,
MOTION TO AMEND THE
SCHEDULING ORDER, AND IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER

Defendants.
Civil No. 070403005
Judge Laycock
PlaintiffKim Dahl, by and through her attorneys of record, Hirschi Christensen, PLLC, does hereby
submit the following Consohdated Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Further Discovery, Motion
to Amend the Scheduling Order, and in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Protective Order,
L THE COURT SHOULD AMEND THE SCHEDULING ORDER TO ALLOW FOR
MORE DISCOVERY
Pursuant to Rule 26(f) (1), the parties met and conferred regarding following scheduling
deadlines. As part of the meeting, the parties agreed that all fact discovery would be completed no later
than April 7, 2008. When Plaintiff entered into the stipulation, it was overly optimistic about the time
frame in which discovery could be completed. However, due to Motions filed.in this case, and the time •
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constraints In otliei uises, ii is apparent that Plaintiff needs more time to complete fact discovery and
therefore has requested the Court to amend the Scheduling Order to move all disco vei y dates bad by
s

- -i -• \ - ^ s .

! he purpose of discovery is to expose the facts and illumi nate the issues. See Hickman v. •
- 1 }JML> -^y U.S. 495, 507 (1947) ("Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties
is essential to proper litigation.,") ( Jtali' s disco vei: y i ales are aimed at "facilitating fai r trials with full
disclosure of all relevant testimony and evidence," Roundvv. Stalev, 984 P.2d 404, 408 (Utah Ct. App.
1999), and are designed so "the court can determi ne the facts and resolve the issues as directly, fairly
and expeditiously as possible." Ellis v. Gilbert, 429 P J A ^K 4I M i Huh 1967). By amending the
Scheduling <Jrdei hy moving all discovery dates back by three months, the Court will allow the parties
to gather all relevant facts for the case, and will benefit the court by UV.IIL \: the r.n> -ni:.
determine the facts and resolve-the issues.

i

*

Therefore, hi the interest of exposing the facts and illuminating Lhe issuer, the Cmul should I'raiit
Mrs. Dahl's request to amend the scheduling order by moving the discovery deadlines back by three
months.

THE COURT SHOULD ORDER DEFENDANTS TO ANSWER OUTST AI t DING
DISCOVERY AND TO SUBMIT TO A DEPOSTION
Pursuant to Ride 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants moved for an
order from the Co art to Order Defendants to answer outstanding discovery and to submit to a
deposition. The outstanding discovery goes to the heart of the issues in Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment and they should |»iovid( answers prior to .my consideration of summary
judgment.
2
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Specifically, Plaintiff propounded discovery to Defendants asking them to (1) identify
any communications that they have had with Mr. Dahl's counsel which related to Mrs. Dahl; (2)
identify any communications that they have had with Dr. Dahl; (3) identify all cases in which they
have appeared or consulted that have involved Mr. Dahl's attorney; (4) identify all the cases in
which they have appeared or consulted in that relate to Dr. Charles Dahl; (5) produce all documents
relating to any communications between them and Dr. Charles Dahl; (6) produce all documents
relating to any communications between them and Mr. Dahl's attorney or her agent, which
related to Mrs. Dahl; (7) produce a list of each case in which they have represented clients against
parties represented by Mr. Dahl's attorney; (8) produce each document relating to any business
dealings they have had, they have, or plan to have, with Dr. Charles Dahl; and (9) produce each
document relating to any doctor-patient relationship, or any other relationship, they have had,
they have, or they plan to have with Dr. Dahl. The response to the outstanding discovery will be
essential to expose the facts and illuminate the issues with respect to Defendants' Motion, the
Court should order them to answer the discovery prior to considering the their Motion for
Summary Judgment
III.

THIS COURT SHOULD DENY DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR A
PROTECTIVE ORDER

For the reasons stated in sections I and II above, the Court should deny Defendants' Motion for a
Protective Order. Plaintiff has propounded discovery upon Defendants that will serve to expose the
facts and illuminate the issues of the case. Specifically, Plaintiff has propounded the following
interrogatories and requests for production of documents upon Defendants:

3
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INTERROGATORS NO. 1 :. Identify an y communications that you had with Mrs. Dahl while
you artod as Lor coim.id Include m your answer the date of the communication,, the place the
comi , , . . J : :

'

••• di

• niesent, and the subject matter of the communicatiorL

INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Identify* m y conununii a boir that you had Willi othei pei sans while
vi )i I ,„» 1 ed a?; 1 icr legal counsel which related to Mrs. Dahl. Include in your answer the date of the
communication, the place the communication look plau:, the people present,, and the sabjcct matter of the
communication.
pfTERROGATORY NO. 3

• - ~>.' ••

w • •l •. * ions that you have had with Rosemond

\

Blakelock which related to Mrs. Dahl. Include in your answer the date of the communication, the place
the communjeatu m look place, the people present,, and the subject matter of the communication.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Identify any communications that you have had with Pi hahl.
Ineltide m your aiiswei the daleoi the communication, the place the communication took place, the people
present, and the subject matter of the communication
I N T E R R O G A T O R Y NO. 5: Identify all cases in which you have appeared or consulted that
have involved Rosemond Blakelock.

.

.

INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Identify all the cases in which you have appeared or consulted in
that relate to l)i. (buries Dahl.

'

.

-

"

•

'

"

•

INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Identify all facts which support your denial ot the allegation thai you
tillered into the "Stipulation11 without Mr-. Dahl's knowledge or consent. •
I N T E R R O G A T O R Y NO. 8: Identify the basis andthereasc msthdi you reeoiiintein.lui to Mrs.
I»at 11 u i si gi i up for anger management and parenting classes.

4
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INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Identify all facts which support your denial of the allegation that you
told Mrs. Dahl that because the November 2,2006 hearing would be continued, she would not need to
appear.
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Identify the evidence that needed to be gathered in order to put
Mrs. Dahl in the best possible position in front of the court at the November 2,2006 hearing, as asserted in
paragraph 40 of your Answer.
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Identify all the facts that support your assertion that Mrs. Dahl
violated the terms of court-ordered supervised visitation and refused to follow Mr. Harrison's counsel..
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl's claims are
barred by the doctrine of in pari delicto or unclean hands.
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl's damages are a
result of her own actions.
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs.Dahl's damages were
caused by intervening causes.
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl's damages were
the product of circumstances over which you had no control.
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl's claims are
barred by waiver, estoppel, or laches.
INTERROGATORY NO. 17: Identify all the reasons you claim that Mrs. Dahl has failed to
mitigate her damages.

•

^

^
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'' I N T E R R O G A T O R Y N O . 18: Identify all tim.es in which you have been covered b y malpractice
insurance. Include in your answer the dates in which you. were covered, and the : name of the iiialpractice
carrier.

•

•

•

•

'.'•..

B E Q U E S T W H I VUi H)l l< Tl< MM O F D O C U M E N T S
R E Q U E S T N O . 1:

Produce all documents relating to youi representation of K i m DaU,

. _ • R E Q U E S T N O . 2:

Produce all documents relating to every agreement, document., or other

writing that w a s executed b y the parties, or either of them, to engage t h e e m p l o y m e n t of Brian C.
Harrison or ,j-r,

-i^niM ,

REQUEST NO. 3:
represent

•

• .<

-ml.

Produce all documents r e l a t i n g t o your claim that you had authority I11

M i s Pali 1 m r i s e number 064402232.

" •.

.

•'

R E Q U E S T N O . 4 : Produce all documents relating to yout chum tluif Mrs, 1 )ahl consented tu your
entry into the "Stipulation" in case n u m b e r 06440223 2 on. "November 2, 2006.
R E Q U E S T N O . 5: Produce all documents relating to yout claim that Mrs. Dahl authorized you to
your enter into the "Stipulation" in case n u m b e r 064402232 on November 2 , 2006.
R E Q U E S T N O . 6: Produce ail documents, notes, memoranda, or o t h e r writings relating to case
n u m b e r 064402232.
R E Q U E S T N O . 7: Produce all d< uruments relating to any communications b e t w e e n you and Dr.
Charles D a h l , or her claim.
R E Q U E S T N O , 8: Produce all documents relating to any communications between you and
R o s e m o n d Blakelock, or her agent, w h i c h related to "Mrs.. Dahl.
R E Q U E S T N O . 9 : Produce all documents relating to any conversations between you and Mrs.
Dahl.

•

• •

"
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REQUEST NO. 10: Produce all documents relating to any billing or invoicing charged to Mrs.
Dahl for your legal counsel and representation.
REQUEST NO. 11: Produce a list of each case in which you have represented clients against
parties represented by Rosemond Blakelock.
REQUEST NO. 12: Produce all thefilesthat relate to your answer to interrogatory number 6
above.
REQUEST NO. 13: Produce each document relating to any business dealings you have had, you
have, or plan to have, with Dr. Charles Dahl.
REQUEST NO. 14: Produce each document relating to any doctor-patient relationship, or any
other relationship, you have had, you have, or plan to have with Dr. Dahl.
REQUEST NO. 15: Produce all documents relating to your answer of interrogatory number 10.
Answers to the above discovery will facilitate a fair trial by the full disclosure of all relevant
testimony and evidence. Therefore, the Court should deny Defendants' Motion for a Protective Order.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant Plaintiffs Motion to Amend the Scheduling .
Order, Motion for Further Discovery, and deny Defendants' Motion for a Protective Order.

DATED this / Z. day of May, 2008. HlRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
' STEVE S. CHRISTENSEN ^
BRENNANH.MOSS

•

*
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify mat a trae and accurate copy n I PI,A INTIKK'S CONSOLIDATED
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION FOR FURTHER DISCOVERY, MOTION
TO AMEND THE SCHED1IUIN<: ORlH>,U, \N

* OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'

MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER was sent vi.i •. .>. Mail and e-mail on the I ,»th day of
May, 200S, to thf t'ollowing'

Benjamin W. Lieberman (#11456)
BURBIDGE, MITCHELL & GROSS

215 South State Street, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-6677
Email: bwl@bmgtrial.com
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FILED IN
„
4 ™ DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH C0UHTY ^

2038 JUN-2 P 3= 3 b
Benjamin W. Lieberman (#11456)
BURBIDGE, MITCHELL & GROSS

215 South State Street, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-6677

U i \ I u h «i

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION

KIM DAHL,

DEFENDANTS' CONSOLIDATED:

Plaintiff,

(1) REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION
FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER;
AND

v.
BRIAN C. HARRISON, an individual; and
BRIAN C. HARRISON, P.C., a Utah
corporation,
Defendants.

(2) MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
RULE 56(F) MOTION FOR
FURTHER DISCOVERY AND TO
AMEND THE SCHEDULING
ORDER
Case No. 070403005
Judge Claudia Laycock

INTRODUCTION
In their Motion for Protective Order, Defendants made & prima face demonstration that
Plaintiffs discovery requests were untimely and that a protective order should be granted. In her
response, Plaintiff does even attempt to dispute this fact. Instead, Plaintiff makes generic
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arguments that the discovery will "facilitate a fair trial," and she fails to support any argument
with anything more than a declaration from her attorney offering the same generic conclusions.
Specifically, she fails to show any good cause for her untimeliness. Likewise, she fails to offer
any adequate explanation as to why she failed to pursue any discovery in this case in a timely
manner. As such, her opposition to Defendants' motion for protective order fails.
Similarly, Plaintiff has moved to extend the fact discovery cutoff and delay the Court's
ruling on Defendants' motion for summary judgment with no showing of good cause, or even a
citation to the good cause standard. This is because Plaintiff cannot show any good cause. She
conducted no discovery in this case during the Jive months of fact discovery in this matter, a
period which was proposed by Plaintiff "and stipulated to by Defendants. During that time,
Plaintiff never noticed or even inquired about taking a single deposition. Other than her untimely
written discovery, she never even attempted to take any discovery whatsoever. She now moves
for additional time five weeks after the close of fact discovery and after her responses to
Defendants' summary judgment motion and motion for protective order were past due.
Accordingly, having exercised no diligence in pursuing discovery, she cannot now, five weeks
after the fact discovery cutoff and on the eve of summary judgment, obtain more time.
Accordingly, her motions to extend discovery and delay resolution of Defendants' summary
judgment motion should be denied.

2
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT SHOULD GRANT DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A
PROTECTIVE ORDER
In opposition to Defendants' Motion for Protective Order, Plaintiff does not dispute that

her discovery requests are untimely, nor does she offer any explanation as to why she waited five
months to serve any discovery in this matter. Her only argument in opposition to entry of a
protective order is that additional discovery will facilitate a fair trial. If this sort of conclusory
argument was adequate, no protective order could ever be entered. Obviously, Plaintiff must
show more; she must demonstrate that the scheduling order should be amended to allow further
time for her to conduct discovery, which in turn requires a "particular and specific demonstration
of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements." Gulf Oil v. Bernard, 452
U.S. 89, 102 n.16 (1981). Plaintiff has not, and cannot, make such a showing. See also infra,
Argument, Part II (addressing Plaintiffs failure to show good cause in more detail). Thus, she
cannot defeat Defendants' motion for protective order.
II.

THE COURT SHOULD DENY DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO AMEND THE
SCHEDULING ORDER AND DELAY RESOLUTION OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
A-

Plaintiff Has Failed to Demonstrate Good Cause or Diligence to Warrant
Further Discovery.

Modification of a scheduling order may only be obtained by a showing of "good cause5'
or "manifest injustice." See Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94, 97 (Utah 1981) (establishing that
pre-trial orders may be modified prior to trial for good cause); Reich v. Christopulos, 256 P.2d
238, 241 (Utah 1953) (amendment of pretrial order may be had if it is necessary to avoid

3
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"manifest injustice.") (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 16). Again, as stated and supported above, "good
cause" contemplates a "particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from
stereotyped and conclusory statements." Gulf Oil, 452 U.S. at 102 n.16. Cf also, e.g., In re
Terra Intern., Inc., 134 F 3 d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1998) (applying Federal law - "stereotyped and
conclusory statements" insufficient to show good cause); Welch v. Welch, 828 A.2d 707, 709
(Conn. Super. Ct 2003) (applying Connecticut law - "Good cause must be based upon a
particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereo typed and conclusory
statements."); Ballard v. Herzke, 924 S.W.2d 652, 659 (Term. 1996) (applying Tennessee law "Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not
amount to a showing of good cause. Mere conclusory allegations are insufficient.")
Further, in deciding whether to amend the Scheduling Order, the appropriate question to
ask is not whether Plaintiff desires additional discovery. Instead, the question properly presented
to the Court is whether Plaintiff has shown that, even with the exercise of diligence, she could
not have completed this discovery. Deghandv. Wal-Mart Stories, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 1218,1221
(D. Kan. 1995). Indeed, even under Utah R. Civ. P. 6, Plaintiff must show "cause" for such an
extension. Plaintiff is wholly unable to show good cause for extension of the discovery cutoff.
Plaintiff merely says that she needs more time to conduct discovery that she should have
conducted months ago. She claims that she was "overly optimistic" about the schedule in this
case and that "other matters" have precluded work on this case. These generic arguments are
precisely the sort that fail to establish "good cause." See id.; Gulf Oil, 452 U.S. at 102 n.16.
In sum, Plaintiffs purported basis for extension and delay in this case falls far short of

4
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even the most liberal interpretation of "cause." Accordingly, her motion to amend the
scheduling order and delay consideration of Defendants' summary judgment motion should be
denied.
B.

Plaintiff s Motion is Untimely

Plaintiff filed the instant motions for amendment of the scheduling order and for further
discovery five weeks after the fact discovery cutoff To the extent Plaintiff perceived that the
scheduling order was "overly optimistic" or that "other matters" were interfering with discovery
in this case, she should not have waited until five weeks after the fact discovery cutoff and after
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. She never raised any of these issues until fact
discovery was complete, Defendants' motion for summary judgment was pending, and her
responses to the summary judgment motion and the motion for protective order were past due.
The Court should not permit her to raise these objections now.
C.

Plaintiffs Request Under Rule 56(f) Fails for the Same Reasons

Rule 56(f) is subject to the same good cause standard:
[T]he prophylaxis of Rule 56(f) is not available merely for the asking. A litigant
who seeks to invoke the rule must act with due diligence to show that his
predicament fits within its confines. To that end, the litigant must submit to the
trial court an affidavit or other authoritative document showing (i) good cause for
his inability to have discovered or marshalled [sic] the necessary facts earlier in
the proceedings; (ii) a plausible basis for believing that additional facts probably
exist and can be retrieved within a reasonable time; and (iii) an explanation of
how those facts, if collected, will suffice to defeat the pending summary judgment
motion.
We add a further caveat: Rule 56(f) is not designed to give relief to those who
sleep upon their rights. Consequently, a party seeking to derive the benefit of
Rule 56(f) must demonstrate due diligence both in conducting discovery before

5
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the emergence of the summary judgment motion and in pursuing an extension of
time once the motion has surfaced.
Rivera-Torres v. Rey-Hernandez, 502 F.3d 7, 10-11 (1st Cir. 2007) (emphasis added, internal
citations omitted); accord Yorkv. Tenn. Crushed Stone Ass'n, 684 F.2d 360, 363 (6th Cir. 1982)
(affirming denial of Rule 56(f) motion); Mason Tenders Dist. Council Pension Fund v. Messera,
958 F. Supp. 869, 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that "party seeking additional discovery must
demonstrate with specificity all of the following: 1) the nature of the uncompleted discovery...;
and 2) how these facts are reasonably expected to create a genuine issue of material fact; and 3)
what efforts the affiant has made to obtain these facts; and 4) why those efforts were
unsuccessful").
Clearly, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate good cause by any stretch of the term. Thus,
her Rule 56(f) request should be denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion for Protective Order should be granted,
and Defendants motions to amend the scheduling order and for additional discovery should be
denied.
Respectfully submitted this && day of May, 2008.
BURBIDGE, MITCHELL & GROSS

Jg^njeimin W. Lieberman
-^^Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of DEFENDANTS' CONSOLIDATED: (1)
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE
ORDER; AND (2) MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S RULE 56(F)
MOTION FOR FURTHER DISCOVERY AND TO AMEND THE SCHEDULING
ORDER was hand delivered on the 24$aday of May, 2008, to the following:
Steve S. Christensen
Brennan H. Moss
Hirschi Christensen, PLLC
136 East South Temple, Suite 850
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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th*Judic|gj District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KIM DAHL,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
MOTIONS FOR S.J., ET AL

vs.

Case No: 070403005 MP

BRIAN C HARRISON PC Et al,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
August 7, 2008

joyc

PRESENT
Defendant(s): BRIAN C HARRISON
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): STEVE S CHRISTENSEN
Defendant's Attorney(s) : BENJAMIN W LIEBERMAN
Audio
Tape Number:
08-201 31
Tape Count: 8:37

HEARING
This matter comes before the Court for various Motions.
The Court addresses all parties stating a minor relationship when
the Court was a Prosecutor for the State of Utah. . The Court
believes there is no conflict and intends to continue handling this
matter. No objection is stated by Mr. Lieberman.
Mr. Christensen states he believes there is no conflict, however, •
would like to advise his client. Court recesses in order for Mr.
Christensen to contact his client.
COUNT: 8:49
Court resumes with all parties present and ready to proceed.
Mr. Christensen advises he was unable to contact his client. Mr.
Christensen request a continuance.
Mr. Lieberman opposes a continuance and requests the hearing move
forward today.
Court denies a continuance, however, reserves any concerns at this
time.
Mr. Lieberman argues the issue of the Amended Scheduling Order.
Response by Mr. Christensen followed by Mr. Lieberman.
Page 1
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Case No: 070403005
Aug 07, 2008
Date:
Augment ensues regarding the issues of defendant's Motion for
Protective Order and Plaintiff's issue regarding Rule 56(f).
Regarding Rule 56(f), the Court states the plaintiff has failed to
take care of discovery issues. Plaintiff's Motion is. denied.
Regarding the issue of defendant's Protective Order, Motion is
granted.
Regarding the issue of an Amended Scheduling Order. The Court
rules for partial amendment. Designation of plaintiff's expert
witnesses is extended to September 8, 2008. Designation of
defendant's expert witnesses is extended to October 20, 2008.
Depositions of all expert witnesses are to be concluded by
November 7, 2008. Request for a Pretrial Conference on this matter
should be submitted as soon as discovery is complete.
Mr. Lieberman to prepare the Amended Scheduling Order.
Mr. Lieberman addresses the issues regarding Motions for Summary
Judgment and Motion to Strike. Response by Mr. Christensen follows
strongly requesting an Evidentiary Hearing be held. Mr. Christensen
requests these Motions be denied by the Court.
Final argument by Mr. Lieberman.
The Court was unable to review the audio conducted at previous
hearings which are germane to findings. Mr. Lieberman does have
transcripts of these two hearings, and per the Court's request,
will provide a copy of the November 2, 2006 and
April 20, 2007 hearings.
Regarding the issue of Motion to Strike, the Court refers to Rules
26(a),(e) and 37(f). Court finds the Plaintiff is not permitted to
use certain exhibits. Motion to Strike in relation to exhibits 5
and 6 is granted by the Court.
Motion for Summary Judgment is under advisement. Mr. Lieberman to
prepare the Order regarding Motion to Strike.
COUNT: 11:01
End time.

Page 2 (last)
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Ben W. Lieberman (#11456)
LAW OFFICE OF BEN W. LIEBERMAN, P.C.

331 South Rio Grande Street, Suite 302
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Tel: (801) 746-0911
Fax:(801)746-4398
E-mail: ben@bwllaw.com
Attorney for Defendants
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KIMDAHL;
Plaintiff,
v.
BRIAN C. HARRISON, an individual;
and BRIAN C. HARRISON, P.C, a Utah
professional corporation;
Defendants.

DEFENDANTS'MOTION TO
STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT
DISCLOSURES AND REPORTS
PURSUANT TO
UTAH R. CIV. P. 37(F)

Civil No. 070403005
Judge Claudia Laycock

Defendants Brian C. Harrison and Brian C. Harrison, P.C. (collectively "Defendants")
hereby move the Court for an order striking Plaintiffs expert disclosures and reports pursuant to
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f).
This motion is based upon the fact that Plaintiffs expert disclosures and reports were
void of any substance and failed to meet the disclosure requirements of Utah R. Civ. P.
26(a)(3)(B), and thus they are automatically stricken pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

This motion is supported by the memorandumfiledcontemporaneously herewith and the
exhibits attached thereto.
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of September, 2008, by:

LAW OFFICE OF BEN W. LIEBERMAN, P.C.

Attorneyfor Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the j]T_ day of September, 2008,1 sent a copy of DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO STRDXE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT DISCLOSURES AND REPORTS
PURSUANT TO UTAH R. CIV. P. 37(F) to the followmg person(s) as indicated below.
Attorneys for Plaintiff:
Steve Christensen
BrennanMoss
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC

136 East South Temple, Suite 850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

.

(El U.S. Mail
Q Overnight Mail
DFax
• Electronic Mail
• Hand Delivery
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Ben W. Lieberman (#11456)
LAW OFFICE OF BEN W. LIEBERMAN, P.C

331 South Rio Grande Street, Suite 302
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Tel: (801) 746-0911
Fax: (801) 746-4398
E-mail: ben@bwllaw.com
Attorney for Defendants

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KIMDAHL,
Plaintiff,
v.
BRIAN C. HARRISON, an individual;
and BRIAN C. HARRISON, P.C, a Utah
professional corporation,

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF THEHt MOTION
TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT
DISCLOSURES AND REPORTS
PURSUANT TO
UTAH R.CIV. P. 37(F)

Defendants.

Civil No. 070403005
Judge Claudia Laycock

INTRODUCTION
On August 7,2008, the Court heard five pending motions; four primarily related to
discovery matters and one for summary judgment.l The central issue with respect to the
discovery motions was that Plaintiff, who had conducted no discovery prior to the fact discovery

1

The Court ruledfromthe bench on the discovery motions and took the motion for summary judgment
under advisement
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deadline and who missed her deadline to disclose experts, requested further time for discovery.
At the August 7 Hearing, the Court ruled against Plaintiff in nearly every respect on the
discovery matters, but it did allow Plaintiff further time to disclose experts.
Despite being given this extra time by the Court to make expert disclosures, Plaintiff
failed to make proper expert disclosures when the time came to do so. Indeed, Plaintiffs expert
disclosures and "reports" listed barely more than the witness's name and failed to state the
proposed opinion or basis of the opinion. As such, her expert disclosures and "reports" fail to
meet requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B), and they should be stricken pursuant to Utah
R. Civ. P. 37(f).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The initial scheduling order in this matter was set by stipulation in early

November, 2007. It provided, inter alia, a deadline of May 5,2008, for Plaintiff to disclose any
experts.
2.

Plaintiffs May 5,2008 expert disclosure deadline came and went, and Plaintiff

failed to disclose any expert.
3.

On May 12, 2008, Plaintiff filed motions with the Court for amendment of the

scheduling order and for a continuance of the summary judgment proceedings pursuant to Utah
R. Civ. P. 56(f).
4.

On August 7, 2008, the Court held oral argument on all pending motions,

including PlaintifPs request to amend the scheduling order. The Court denied Plaintiffs request
for further time for fact discovery, but it did extend the expert discovery deadlines. It gave

2
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Plaintiff until September 8,2008, to serve her expert disclosures and reports.
5.

Despite being granted this extension, Plaintiff failed to make proper expert

disclosures when the time came to do so. The expert disclosures and "reports" that she did serve
were utterly incomplete, providing the purported experts' names and little more. (See Plaintiff's
Expert Reports (Exhibit A).) Not a single report by any of the experts is included, nor is any
specific opinion stated, nor any basis therefor, nor is any curriculum vitae attached. {See id)
6.

For example, Plaintiff purported to disclose two experts, Messrs. Olsen and

Nielsen, regarding the standard of care owed to a client by a lawyer in private family law
practice. {See id.) Yet, Plaintiff never identifies what that opinion is or the grounds for that
opinion. (See id.) Nor does Plaintiff state anything about the qualifications of either witness
other than the number of years each has been in practice. {See id.) Likewise, Plaintiff purports
to offer their testimony for the conclusions that "Plaintiff was damaged, the causation of the
damages, and the extent of the damages," yet she never states the basis of those vague and
conclusory opinions beyond stating that these individuals' opinions will be based on "all
information obtained through discovery ... ." (See id.)
7.

Plaintiff also purports to disclose a damages expert, John Brough. (See id.)

Again, Plaintiff merely states that Mr. Brough will testify as to the amount of damages, but she
never identifies any specific amount or computation, nor any specific basis for the undisclosed
opinion. (See id.) Moreover, disclosure of Mr. Brough's qualifications merely states that he is
"an economic and valuation expert" and has testified as an expert before, without identifying
when and where as required by Rule 26. (See id) Plaintiff never states the basis of the vague

3
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and conclusory opinions beyond stating that these individuals' opinions will be based on "all
information obtained through discovery ... ." (See id.)
8.

Lastly, Plaintiff purports to disclose three doctors as experts who will testify

about "causation of physical injuries suffered by the Plaintiff." (See id.) Nothing therein
identifies any opinion, any specific basis, or any relevant qualifications of any witness beyond
their status as a doctor. (See id.) And again, Plaintiff never states the basis of the vague and
conclusory opinions beyond stating that these individuals' opinions will be based on "all
information obtained through discovery ... ." (See id)
9.

On September 10,2008, counsel for Defendants notified Plaintiff of the

shortcomings of her disclosures and invited her to serve complete reports. (See September 10,
2008 Letter from Ben W. Lieberman to Brennan H. Moss (Exhibit B).) Plaintiff failed to do so
within the proposed timeframe. Indeed, she did not respond at all
ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT DISCLOSURES ARE GROSSLY DEFICIENT.
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3) governs the disclosure of expert testimony in civil cases. With

respect to experts retained specifically for a given matter, which is the case here, Utah R. Civ. P.
26(a)(3)(B) requires a written report also be disclosed, and it outlines what that report must
contain:
The report shall contain the subject matter on which the expert is expected to
testify; the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to
testify; a summary of the grounds for each opinion; the qualifications of the
witness, including a list of all publications authored by the witness within the
preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony; and

4
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a listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial
or by deposition within the preceding four years.
Utah R. Civ P. 26(a)(3)(B).
The purpose of an expert report is to allow the opposing party sufficient information
about the expert's opinion such that the opposing party may adequately prepare for trial.
Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 953 (10th Cir. 2002). The Advisory Notes to Utah
R. Civ. P. 26 indicate that the purpose of the expert report is to "serve in lieu of responses to
standard interrogatories." Utah R. Civ. P. 26, Advisory Notes. The Rule 26 Advisory Notes go
on to state:
The expert should not be permitted to testify at variance with the report,
regardlless whether the expert or the party prepares or signs it. For this reason, the
committee believes the expert should prepare and sign the report whenever
possible and should always review and approve the report.
Id. (emphasis added).
In Jacobsen, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed similarly inconclusive and
incomplete expert reports to those at issue here, and it reversed the district court's refusal to
strike them, stating in part:
"[Expert] reports are intended not only to identify the expert witness, but also to
set forth the substance of the direct examination. Such disclosure is necessary to
allow the opposing party a reasonable opportunity to prepare for effective cross
examination and perhaps arrange for expert testimony from other witnesses."
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Jacobsen court went on to state that,
"[i]f the experts are allowed to testify on the basis of their incomplete reports, [the plaintiff] will
be prejudiced. Absent more complete disclosure by the experts, [the plaintiffs] prejudice cannot
be cured." Id at 954. See also Bowie Mem'l Hosp v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002)
5
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("[T]he expert must explain the basis of his statements to link his conclusions to the facts ").
Here, Plaintiffs expert "reports" are so deficient that they realistically amount to no
disclosure at all She has merely given names and extremely vague and generalized topics upon
which the expert may opine. (See Statement of Facts fl 6-8.) She cites nothing that any expert
actually has reviewed to form the basis of his or her opinion; instead, Plaintiff merely states that
the expert's opinion "will be based" on essentially everything in the ease. (See id.) As a
corollary, the "reports" fail to state any link between fact and conclusion, likely because no
expert has actually reviewed any fact.' Cf Bo me Mem'l Hosp., 79 S.W- 3d at 52 (expert must
identify link between fact and conclusion in report). Plaintiff also fails to state qualifications of
an> of the experts with any meaningful specificity (See id.) This is far from stating a response
to the standard expert interrogatories that Rule 26(a)(3)(b) is intended to replace. See Utah R.
Civ. P. 26, Advisory Notes.

,'

'

•"

Plaintiffs deficient expert reports cause, prejudice to Defendants in a number ways. First,
Defendants cannot prepare for the trial testimony and cross-examination of these experts based
on the "reports" provided. ISecond, Defendants will not be able lo impeach any of these
"experts" at trial with the "reports" because they are so vague and conclusory. Third, the Court
will not he ;ihk In itidpe whether an) of these individuals testifies inconsistently with the
"reports" because they are so vague and conclusory and void of substance. Cf I Itah R, Ci\ P
26, Advisory Notes ("The expert should not be permitted to testify at variance with the report
..."). Fourth, not knowing any actual opinions or the bases therefor, Defendants cannot
determine whether one or more experts of their own are necessary to rebut these vague,
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conclusory, and hypothetical opinions. Fifth, Defendants will be required to depose each of the
experts to learn anything about his or her testimony, leading to significant wasted time and
expense. Sixth, the strong implication of the "reports" is that the "experts" have conducted no
review at this time, but instead that their opinions "will be based" on review of discovery
materials and the like.
In sum, there is nothing in Plaintiffs expert "reports" that is even remotely informative
of opinions of an "expert," bases of any opinion, or qualifications of an "expert" to render any
such opinion.. Plaintiff is required to disclose a presently-held opinion of an expert with
sufficient detail to substitute for responding to standard interrogatories, not one is vague, void of
substance, nor one that is hypothetical in that it may arise after a future review of relevant
materials.
DL

PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT DISCLOSURES AND REPORTS FALL UNDER
RULE 37(F)'S AUTOMATIC EXCLUSIONARY PROVISION.
Where a party fails to make a proper expert disclosure, that party is precluded from using

the evidence at trial:
Failure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other
material as required by Rule 26(a) or Rule 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response
to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall not be permitted to use
the witness, document or other material at any hearing unless the failure to
disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure to disclose. In
addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the court on motion may take any action
authorized by Subdivision (b)(2).
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f) (emphasis added). Because Plaintiffs expert disclosures fail Rule
26(a)(3)(B), they are subject to Rule 37(f)'s automatic exclusionary provision. Moreover,
having already given Plaintiff one extension of the expert discovery deadline, and Defendants

7
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having given her notice and an opportunity to cure the deficient repor ts, ( ^ . M • «,
should not allow Plaintiff any further time to make any further disclosure.

}

the Court

<. the extent this case

sin: vives summary judgment, Defendants are prepared to proceed to trial forthwith. Any such
trial should occur without Plaintiffs proposed expert testimony due to her failure to comply with
E; i lie 26(a)(3)(B).'

'

.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to strike should be granted.
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of September, 2008, "by:
LAW OFFICE OF BEN W. LIEBERMAN, P.C.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the j 5 _ day of September, 2008,1 sent a copy of
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO
STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT DISCLOSURES AND REPORTS PURSUANT
TO UTAH R. CIV. P. 37(F) to the following person(s) as indicated below.
Attorneys for Plaintiff:
Steve Christensen
Brennan Moss

IH U.S. Mail
O Overnight Mail

HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC

• Fax

136 East South Temple, Suite 850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

|~l Electronic Mail
[~1 Hand Delivery
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D1STWCTC0URT

Steve S. Christensen (U.S.B. No. 6156)
BrennanH. Moss (U.S.B. No. 10267)
Jeffrey J. Steele (U.S.B. No. 10606)
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff
136 East South Temple, Suite 850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-0593
Facsimile: (801) 322-0594
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION
KIM DAHL,

AFFIDAVIT OF STEVE S. CHRISTENSEN
IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTJFF'S
EXPERT DISCLOSURES AND REPORTS

Plaintiff,
vs.
BRIAN C. HARRISON; BRIAN C.
HARRISON, P.C.

Civil No. 070403005
Judge Laycock

Defendants.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
STATE OF UTAH.

: ss
)

Affiant, STEVE S. CHRISTENSEN, having been duly sworn, deposes and states under oath as
follows:
1.

I am an attorney for Kim Dahl in the above referenced matter,

2.

I can testify to the facts in this affidavit based on my own personal knowledge.

3.

Based on information and belief, the facts set forth in Defendants' Motion to Strike are

not in dispute and do not relate to substantive issues in this litigation.
»v.&
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4.

On Monday, September 15, 2008, three (3) business days after a request to supplement

our expert report was sent to us, I corresponded with Ben Lieberman, counsel for Mr. Harrison. I
indicated to Mr. Lieberman that we were willing to supplement our expert report as he had requested.
5.

Mr. Lieberman indicated that it was too late; his Motion to Strike had already been filed.

He was not willing to agree to the extension of time requested. A true and correct copy of my
correspondence .with Mr. Lieberman including my email to him and his response is attached to this
affidavit as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference.
6. '

Based on Mr. Lieberman's request, we are in the process of obtaining updated expert

witness reports.
DATED this /

day of October 2008.

SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this / ^ d a y of October 2008.
Notary Public
RACHEL H. BEALL

J
«

136 E. South Temple, Suite 850 '
Sait Lake City, UT 84111
J
<*Vly Commission Expires
e
" November 27, 2010
u

State of Utah

c

otary Public Commissioned in the State of UT
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C E R T 1 F I C A T E O F

S E R V I C E

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF STEVE S.
CHRISTENSEN IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT
DISCLOSURES AND REPORTS was sent via email, and U.S. Mail, postage

prepaid, on this 1st day of

October, 2008, to the following:
Benjamin W. Lieberman (#11456)
LAW OFFICE OF BEN W. LIEBERMAN

331 South Rio Grande Street, Ste. 302
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
E-mail: ben@bwllaw.com
Attorney for Defendants

TiL^L^'[^yiM^ri\
Ah employee of HiRSCHl CHRISTENSEN, PLLC

F:\eHRS-CU\ACTIVE F1LESVDOMESTIC RELAT10NS\DlYORCE\DAHL\LEGAl MALPRACT1CEVPLEADINGS\Opp.Mol.Slrikc.Expcrts - AfT.SSC.doc
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Steve Christensen
From:
Sent:
To:
St ibject:

Ben Lieberman [ben@bwiiaw.com]
Monday, September 15, 2008 4:09 PM
'Steve S. Christensen*
RE: Dahl v, Harrison

Steve,
The motion has already been put in the mail to the Court. In the letter, I made sure to
underline the deadline and give you two and a half days to respond. No one responded to me
on this issue, though Brennan responded to me on other matters regarding this case. To be
frank, the reports were the farthest thing I have ever seen from what the Rules require.
Though I am generally first in line to grant extensions out of courtesy, I have already spent
my client's money to file this motion, and given that Plaintiff has already been granted a fot ir
month extension of this deadline over our objection, I cannot agree to your proposal.

Ben

•

From: Steve S. Christensen [mailto:SSC@HCLawFirm.net]
Sent: Monday, September 15, 2008 3:15 PM
To: ben@bwliaw.com
Subject: Dahl v. Harrison
Ben,

•

I am receipt of your.letter requesting further information regarding our expert witness designation. We are gathering
additional information in order to satisfy your request. 1 see that you gave us until last Friday to respond. It will take us
another 11 days to comply with your request. Please allow us this additional amount of time.
Because of the shortness of time set by the court's scheduling order, we propose that the parties stipulate to extend the
discovery dates by 3 weeks following our designation in order to allow you sufficient time to conduct your review and
depositions.

Steve S. Christensen
Hirschi Christensen, PLLC
136 E. South Temple, Ste. 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Tel. (801) 303-5800
Fax (801) 322-0594

.

CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This electronic message transmission contains information from the law firm of Hirschi Cliristensen,
PLLC, which may be confidential or privileged. The information is intended to be for the vise of the individual or entity named
above. If you are not the intended recipient, be aware that any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of this
information is prohibited. If you have received this electronic transmission in error, please notify me by telephone (801-303-5800) or
by electronic mail fsscCgihclawfinn.net) immediately.
IRS CIRCULAR 230 DISCLOSURE: To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by the IRS, we inform you that, unless
specifically indicated otherwise, any U.S. federal tax advice contained in this communication (including any attachments) is not
intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, for the purpose of (i) avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code or (ii)
promoting, marketing, or recommending to another party any transaction or matter addressed herein.
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2008 OCT - 2
Steve S. Christensen (U.S.B. No. 6156)
Jeffrey J. Steele (U.S.B. No. 10606)
Brennan H. Moss (U.S.B. No. 10267)
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC
136 East South Temple, Suite 850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-0593
Facsimile: (801) 322-0594
Attorneys for PlaintiffKim Dahl
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION
KIM DAHL,
.•

Plaintiff,

.
' •

I

OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S
I EXPERT DISCLOSURES AND REPORTS

vs.
BRIAN C. HARRISON, an individual; and
BRIAN C. HARRISON, P.C., a Utah
corporation,

Civil No. 070403005
Judge Claudia Laycock

Defendants.

COMES NOW Plaintiff Kim Dahl, by and through her attorneys of record, and hereby
submits her Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Expert Disclosures and Reports,
as follows:
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

Trial has not been set in this matter. See Case Docket.

2.

A pretrial has not been requested or scheduled in this matter.

A " '

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•'•" 6

3.

1 ^

^ • l - . . i l . i l l l . i - ! . : ^ ! MM , : i j v

f ! 'JIH^V' ^' .

'

.'li:

J J - ^ i •• S t »p1:*r.I • -

*08.

4.

Plaintiff produced her expert witness report on or about September 8, 2008. See

Exhibit. A to the Motion to Strike.
5.

On or about September 10,2008, counsel for Defendants sent a letter to counsel

for Plaintiff by email stating that he felt the expert reports were deficient under U.R.C.P.
26(a)(3)(B), and Requesting supplementation ol (he report11 by l"nda>, Sepleinbei 12, 200S "wo
(2) days later. See Exhibit B to the Motion to Strike.
(

On Monday, September 15, 2008, three (3) business days after the letter from

counsel for Defendants was sent, Mr. Christensen, counsel for Plaintiff, corresponded with
counsel for Defendants regarding supplementation of the expert reports. See the Affidavit of
Steve S. Christensen in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Strike Expert Disclosures and
Reports (the "Christensen Affidavit"), 14. Mr. Christensen agreed to supplement the expert
reports as requested. Id.
Counsel for Defendants indicated that it was too late and that he had already filed
the instant motion I i at'f 5 Coi insel for Defendants further indicated that he would not grant
Plaintiff any time to supplement the expert reports even though Plaintiff proposed a stipulation to
extend expert discovery in order to give Defendants more time to conduct expert discovery. Id.
Ill
III
III
III

2
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ARGUMENT

1.

Defendant's Motion is Premature As Defendants Failed To Attempt To
Resolve This Matter In Good Faith

As noted by Defendants, Rule 26(a)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs
the disclosure of expert witness reports, and states:
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, this disclosure
shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially employed to provide
expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of the party regularly
involve giving expert testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared and
signed by the witness or party. The report shall contain the subject matter on
which the expert is expected to testify; the substance of the facts and opinions to
• which the expert is expected to testify; a summary of the grounds for each
opinion; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications
authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be
paid for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the
witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding
four years.
U.R.C.P. 26(a)(3)(B).
The Defendants' Motion to Strike purports to be based on U.R.C.P. 37(f). However, the
remedy sought by the pleading derivesfromU.R.C.P. Rule 37(b)(2)(C). Rule 37(f) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court shall not admit witnesses, documents, or other
materials which have not been disclosed in accordance with Rule 26(a). The Rule also permits
the court to impose additional sanctions "upon motion" and as "authorized by Subdivision
(b)(2)," which sanctions include striking of pleadings, dismissal of actions, entry of default,
finding of contempt, and payment of attorneys fees. U.R.C.P. 37(b)(2). Rule 37(f) is primarily
drafted to describe the court's ability to limit evidence. However, no evidence is being offered at

3
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this time. R ule 37(f) also allows for amotion for sanctions through Rule 37(b)(2) However,
Rule 37(b)(2) disclosure sanctions are appropriately reserved for when a party has not complied
with a court order compelling disclosure obtained through Rule 37(a). See id. The court should
require Defendant to comply with Rule 37(b) to the extent that Defendants are seeking to claim
37(b)(2) sanctions through Rule 37(f).
In turn R I lie 3 7(b)(2) incorporates R ule 37(a)(2) which requires that a moving par I:>
certify good faith attempts to resolve the dispute prior to seeking court involvement. Because
plaintiff has foiled to demonstrate that he "has made a good faith c ffort to seci ire fi uther
disclosure without court action in accordance with U.RC.P. Rule 37(a)(2)(A), he should not be
able to seek sanctions by motion.. Thus, Defendants' motion to strike is both premature and
inappropriate.
This approach to the discovery rules would be consistent with the court's policy to
encourage good faith cooperation between the parties uiirh..; -ir<- * • o

••* u:; ^ v i,; n 2 M \.)

mandates that a movant seeking an order to compel discovery "include a certification that the
iiio v ant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the pai tj

in an effort tc secure

the disclosure without court action."
Defendants have not acted in good faith in attempting to resolve this issue without
resorting to judicial intervention. Indeed, Defendants made only a token effort to address their
concern before filing the instant motion. It is undisputed that Defendants gave Plaintiff only two
business days to respond to the request for supplementation. See i• \i • • • • • -

K. iiristensen

Affidavit. When contacted by Plaintiffs counsel, counsel for Defendants indicated that the
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instant motion had already been mailed for filing, suggesting that he had prepared the motion
without even waiting to see if Plaintiff would respond. Moreover, when Plaintiff agreed to
comply with the request for supplementation, counsel for Defendants would not agree and chose
instead to continue pursuing their motion.
2.

The Motion To Strike Fails Due To Plaintiffs Compliance, A Lack Of Fault And A
Lack Of Prejudice
Defendants5 Motion to Strike fails for several reasons. First, Plaintiff's expert

disclosures substantially complied with the Rules. Second, Defendants have not reasonably
attempted to resolve this matter prior to filing their Motion to Strike. Third, Defendants have
suffered absolutely no prejudice as a result of Plaintiff s expert disclosures and reports, and will
not suffer any prejudice if the Court grants Plaintiff more time to revise said reports. For the
foregoing reasons, which are set forth more fully below, the Court should deny Defendants'
Motion to Strike, or in the alternative, provide Plaintiff with additional time to revise her expert
reports.
a.

Plaintiffs Expert Reports Substantially Complied With Rule 26(a)(3)(B)

As noted above, Rule 26(a)(3)(B) requires an expert reports to disclose (i) the subject
matter of the on which the expert is expected to testify; (ii) the substance of the facts and
opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; 9iii) a summary of the grounds for each
opinion; (iv) the qualifications of the witness; (v) the compensation to be paid; and (vi) a listing
of other cases in which the witness has testified. U.R.CJP. 26(a)(3)(B).

5
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elements. Se£ Exhibit A to the Motion to Strike. Indeed, the expert reports specifically address
each of the foregoing categories. Despite Defendants' argument that the reports are "grossly
deficient," at worst the reports provide sufficient information to allow Defendant to determine
the purpose of the experts, whether a deposition will be required, whether rebuttal experts will be
required, etc.
Moreover, Plaintiff readily agreed to supplement the reports but was not given time from
the Defendants to do so See the Christensen Affidavit, 'ffl I -6
b

Plaintiff Has Not Acted With Willfulness, Bad Faith Or Fault

In addition, the case law of this jurisdiction requires that before issuing discovery'
sanctions the Courtfirstfindthat Plaintiff has acted in willful disobedience to an order, acted in
bad faith or fault, or otherwise demonstrated persistent dilatory tactics in the litigation.
Coray, 112 P.3d at 1246.
Trial courts have broad discretion in determining discovery sanctions. Hales v. Oldroyd,
999 P.2d 588, 592 (Utah App. 2000). However, "[b]efbre the court imposes discovery sanctions
under rule 37, it must find on the part of the noncomplying party, willfulness, bad faith, or fault,
or persistent dilatory tactics frustrating the ji idicial process,," Coxeyi

Ff external Order oj the

Eagles, Aerie 2742, 112 P.3d 1244,1246 (Utah 2005); citing Morton v. Continental Baking Co.,
938 P.2d 271,274 (Utah 1997), W. W. & W.B. Gardner, 568 P.2d at 738; see also Hales v. '
Oldroyd, 999 P.2d 588, 592 (Utah App. 2000); Wright v. Wright, 941 P.2d 646 (Utah App.
1997).
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There is no evidence of bad faith, willfulness, fault or persistent dilatory tactics before
the Court. Defendants have not even made allegations as to fault. Accordingly, the Motion to
Strike should be denied.
c.

Defendants Are Not Prejudiced By Allowing Plaintiff To Supplement

Rule 37(f) governs discovery sanctions related to the failure to disclose and states:
If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material as required by
Rule 26(a) or Rule 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to discovery as required
by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall not be permitted to use the witness, document or
other material at any hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party
shows good cause for the failure to disclose. In addition to or in lieu of this
sanction, the court on motion may take any action authorized by Subdivision
(b)(2).
U.R.C.P. 37(f). Rule 37(f) specifically states that failure to disclose is grounds for striking a
witness "unless the failure to disclose is harmless ..." U.RC.P. 37(f). Here, the failure to
disclose is harmless and does not prejudice Defendants in any way.
Notably, there was a disclosure and expert reports were provided. As noted above, the
reports were arguably and demonstrably substantially compliant with Rule 26(a)(3)(B), Even if
they were not sufficient, Defendants have not suffered any harm as a result, and Plaintiff should
be granted the opportunity to supplement.
Indeed, in Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1988) the Utah Supreme Court
reviewed the decision of a trial court to allow an expert witness to testify at trial that was not
disclosed until five days before trial, and no expert report was provided until the day before trial.
The Christenseon Court upheld the trial court's decision to allow the expert testimony because
"the expert was made available to the [opposing party] either for an informal interview or for a
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deposition" and there was therefore no prejudice resulting from the i intimely expert disclosures.
Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d at 1377- 78,
Importantly, no trial has been set in instant case. Nor has the deadline for discovery of
expert witnesses concluded. Accordingly, Defendants are not prejudiced iii the slightest by
Plaintiff s expert disclosures. This is especially true given that Plaintiff has agreed to
supplement to disclosures Accordingly, the Motion to Strike should be denied. •
CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintii' *^r • n- »* -i\i *^n- *"'.*• •
deny the Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Expert Disclosures and Reports. In the alternative, if the
Court grants Defendants' Motion to Strike, Plaintiff hereby requests that she be granted
sufficient time to revise her expert reports.
DATED this 2nd day of October, 2008.
HlRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PI ,1 ,C

'SteveA. Christensen
Jeffrey J. Steele
Brennan H. Moss
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify tliat a true and correct copy of the foregoing

OPPOSITION TO

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT DISCLOSURES AND REPORTS was

sent

via email, and U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on this 2nd day of October, 2008, to the following:
Benjamin W. Lieberman (#11456)
LAW OFFICE OF BEN W. LIEBERMAN

331 South Rio Grande Street, Ste. 302
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
E-mail: ben@bwllaw.com
Attorney for Defendants
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4TH DISTRICT

4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KIM DAHI i

Plaintiff ,

WBrffiHPr.

MINUTES
ORAL ARGUMENTS

vs

Case Nc ): 07040 300 5 MP

BRIAN C HARRISON PC Et al,
Defendant,

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
December 16, 2008

raelenec

PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): STEVE S CHRISTENSEN
Defendant's Attorney(s) : BENJAMIN W LIEBERMAN
Audio
Tape Number:
08-201 49
Tape Count: 10.25

HEARING
TAPE: 08-201 49
COUNT: 10.25
This matter comes before the Court for Oral Arguments. The Court
and both parties discuss the filings of opposition and reply. Mr
Lieberman states Mr. Christensen stated via e-mail that he was
ready to move forward with the Motion to Compel,
The Court takes a brief recess for Mr. Lieberman to pu:.. ;;, his
e-mail and print out the e-mail between both parties.
COUNT: 10.34
Court resumes. The Court reviews the e-mail and states the
parties will move forward with the arguments of Motion to Strike
and Motion to Compel. .
Mr. Lieberman addresses the Court regarding Motion to Strike,
untimely filing of documents, Rule 26(a) (3) (b) and disclosure
rules. Mr. Christensen addresses the Court regarding Motion to
Strike, designation of expert witnesses, requests filing of
reports of expert witnesses be extended until January 2009. Mr.
Lieberman responds. The Court reviews the file and the case
management order.
The Court makes findings and grants the Motion to Strike-4s to the
Page 1
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Case No: 070403005
Date:
Dec 16, 2008
request for attorney!s fees the Court denies the request. Mr.
Lieberman is to prepare the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Order in this matter.
Mr. Lieberman addresses the Court regarding Motion to Compel,
attempt to remove protective order issue and opposition memorandum.
The Court takes a brief recess.
COUNT: 11.43
Mr. Christensen addresses the Court regarding protective order in
case #064402232, copies of documents, motion is defective and
request to deny motion. Mr. Lieberman responds.
The Court makes findings and denies the Motion to Compel. Mr.
Lieberman is allowed to make an appointment to go over and inspect
Mr. Christensen1s file numbers 070403005 and 064402232.
Mr. Christensen is to prepare the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and Order in this matter.
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MISSING DOCUMENT
Motion to Allow Testimony of Expert Witnesses
at Trial
Filed January 21,2009
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4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KIM DAHL,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BRIAN C HARRISON.PC Et-al,
Defendant.
Clerk:

MINUTES
ORAL ARGUMENT

,
hrit

"- * *

L

^

^iMi'fcOF'UTi
UTAH COUNTS

Case N o : 070403005 MP
Judge:
CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
Date:
March 1 2 . 2009

raelenec

PRESENT
Defendant (s) : BRIAN C HARRISON
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): STEVE S CHRISTENSEN
Defendant's Attorney (s) : BENJAMIN W LIEBERMAN
Audio
Tape Number:
09-201 15
Tape Count: 1.36

HEARING
TAPE: 09-201 15
COUNT: 1.36
This matter comes before the Court for Oral Argument. Mr.
Christensen addresses the Court regarding motion for trial by jury
and prejudice issue. Mr. Lieberman addresses the Court regarding
motion for trial by jury. Mr. Christensen responds.
The Court makes findings and adopts the argument of Mr. Lieberman
and denies the motion for trial by jury. Mr. Lieberman is to
prepare the findings of fact and order in this matter.
COUNT: 2.28
Mr. Christensen addresses the Court regarding motion to allow
testimony of expert witness at trial. Mr. Lieberman addresses the
Court regarding motion to allow testimony of expert witness at
trial. Mr. Christensen responds.
The Court makes findings and adopts the argument of Mr. Lieberman
and denies the motion to allow testimony of expert witness at
trial. The defendant is granted attorney fees and costs as to this
matter.
Mr. Lieberman is to prepare the findings of fact and order in this
matter. Both parties are to file a list of witnesses and a brief
paragraph regarding what the witness will testify about by
03/31/09.
Pretrial Conference is scheduled.
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C a s e No: 070403005
Mar 1 2 , 2009
Date:
CONFERENCE i s s c h e d u l e d .
Date: 04/20/2009
Time: 09:00 a.m.
L o c a t i o n : Second F l o o r , Rm 2 01
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
125 N 100 W
PROVO, UT 8 4 6 0 1
B e f o r e J u d g e : CLAUDIA LAYCOCK

PRETRIAIJ
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APR 1 4 2009
STATEOFUTAB/
UTAHCOIMTY

Proposed by:
Ben W. Lieberman (#11456)
LAW OFFICE OF BEN W. LIEBERMAN, PLC

1371 East 2100 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Telephone: (801) 505-0585
Toil-Free Telephone (877) 460-6661
Toll-Free Fax: (800) 886-3653
E-mail: ben@bwllaw.com
Attorney for Defendants

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KIMDAHL;
Plaintiff,
v.
BRIAN C. HARRISON, an individual;
and BRIAN C. HARRISON, P.C., a Utah
professional corporation;
Defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO ALLOW EXPERT
TESTIMONY AT TRIAL AND
GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS'
FEES AND COSTS
Civil No. 070403005
Judge Claudia Laycock

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion to Allow Expert Testimony at
Trial and on Defendants' related Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs. For the reasons set forth
below and those stated at the March 12, 2009 hearing on these motions, the Court denies
Plaintiffs motion and grants Defendants' motion for their attorneys' fees and costs.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The initial scheduling order in this matter was set by stipulation in early

November, 2007. It provided, inter alia, a deadline of May 5,2008, for Plaintiff Kim Dahl
("Plaintiff") to disclose any experts.
2.

Plaintiffs May 5, 2008 expert disclosure deadline came and went, and Plaintiff

failed to disclose any expert.
3.

On May 12,2008, Plaintifffiledmotions with the Court for amendment of the

scheduling order and for a continuance of the summary judgment proceedings pursuant to Utah
R, Civ. P. 56(f).
4.

. On August 7,2008, the Court held oral argument on all pending motions,

including Plaintiff's request to amend the scheduling order. The Court denied Plaintiffs request
for further time for fact discovery, but it did extend the expert discovery deadlines. It gave
Plaintiff until September 8,2008, to serve her expert disclosures and reports.
5.

Despite being granted this extension, Plaintiff failed to make proper expert

disclosures when the time came to do so. The expert disclosures and reports that she did serve
were failed utterly by any standards, providing the purported experts' names and little more.
6.

On September 18, 2008, Defendants Brian C. Harrison and Brian C. Harrison,

P.C. (collectively, "Defendants") moved to strike Plaintiffs Expert Disclosures and Reports
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f) (the "Motion to Strike"). Plaintiff filed her opposition
memorandum to the Motion to Strike on October 2,2008. Defendants filed their reply
memorandum on October 14,2008.
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7.

On December 16, 2008, the Court held oral argument on the Motion to Strike.

The Court granted the motion and found a willful failure on the part of Plaintiff to carry this case
forward and to obey the orders of the Court.
8.

At the December 16,2008 hearing, Plaintiff requested more time to prepare

proper disclosures and reports, which the Court specifically rejected at that time.
9.

The Court ordered Ben W. Lieberman, counsel for Defendants, to prepare a

written order memorializing the Court's order from the bench. Mr. Lieberman did so, and sent
the order to Mr. Christensen. Plaintiff objected to the proposed order, but only as to the
preliminary language regarding how long of an extension Plaintiff had been given by the Court
on August 7,2008. Plaintiff did not object to the proposed order's language indicating that the.
motion to strike was granted and the expert disclosures stricken.
10.

Less than six weeks after her expert disclosures were stricken by the Court,

Plaintiff filed the instant motion, which raises issues materially identical to those already decided
in the context of the Motion to Strike.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court finds Plaintiffs Motion to Allow Expert Testimony at Trial is in

essence a motion for reconsideration of the Court's prior order striking Plaintiff's expert
disclosures. .
2.

. .
Plaintiff's Motion to Allow Expert Testimony at Trial cites no basis that would

warrant reconsideration of the prior order on the Motion to Strike.

3
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3.

The Court finds no basis to grant Plaintiff more time to disclose experts, and thus

declines to do so.
4.

The Court finds no basis to allow Plaintiff to introduce expert testimony at trial, .

given the fact that Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f) clearly and unequivocally requires proper disclosure as a
condition precedent to admission of evidence.
5.

Because these issues had already been specifically decided six weeks prior, the

Court finds that Plaintiff s Motion to Allow Expert Testimony at Trial is frivolous.
6.

In such cases, the Court has statutory power under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825

to award reasonable attorney fees and costs.
7.

Additionally, Court has the inherent equitable power to award reasonable attorney

fees and costs when it deems appropriate in the interest of justice and equity.
8.

Utilizing these statutory and equitable powers, the Court grants Defendants their

reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending against Plaintiffs Motion to Allow
Expert Testimony at Trial and in bringing their own motion for recovery of such fees and costs.
ORDER OF COURT
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated on the record at the March 12,2009
hearing, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff s Motion to Allow Expert Testimony at Trial is
DENIED, and Defendants' Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs is GRANTED.

.

. It is further ORDERED that, within fifteen (15) days of the date of this Order, Plaintiffs .
counsel shall pay to Defendants the sum of $ Q. t H S^. L CL ^
l—

—

, which the Court finds is

^—^

_

101054

the amount of Defendants' reasonable attorneys' fees and costs iipirred in defending against

UUAl,^^^^
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Plaintiff's Motion to Allow Expert Testimony at Trial and in bringing their own motion for
recovery of such fees and costs
SO ORDERED this jv

fK

day of _

,2009, by:
rs&fKL

(JU^uJ^u^
The Honorable Clai
Fourth District Co

if- JA/ r>

&\*%?^£^+
,7
f

.'*'
_—,<*

^f*j.-V -

-* -_ <ris*$Vfl
-T!~ /

V^J.

A3 XZjrmJwtf' ^-

vw

mfi^^msi
^Zf-^^M
Sfw-^Sj^'

Agreed as to form:

Steve Christensen
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

^r
I hereby certify that on the 3__ day of March, 2009,1 sent a copy of the foregoing to
the following person(s) as indicated below.
Attorneys for Plaintiff:
Steve S. Christensen
Matthew B. Anderson
Steven A, Clayton

[X] U.S. Mail
Q Overnight Mail

HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC

Q Electronic Mail
n Hand Delivery

• Fax

136 East South Temple, Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

^
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MR. CHRISTENSEN:
THE COURT:

It doesn't, Your Honor.

Okay.

That helps because I didn't

hink that was anything that was framed by your motion and
our memorandum.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Maybe that's a question the Court

wants to decide later but —
THE COURT: Well, if it's not before me now - right?
JLet's stick with what's before me today.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

We'll raise that late.

On the

issues regarding —
THE COURT:
§is.

And that takes us right back to Pete

Youngblood I believe, but a different issue.

But I don't

§V.'-

fihink that's before me today.
Snemorandum,

I think as I look at your

your first point and your first argument is this

^V-v

i--c
|Bourt should grant an extension of time to file expert
itness disclosures because no prejudice will result.
That's
fjrour first argument and after that it's your conclusions.

So

!p;think that's where we're going.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

I'm prepared to discuss that,

5four Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay, let's discuss that.

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Your Honor, up until this point

^obviously the Court has heard a motion to exclude an expert
fi-jwitness report and the Court granted that motion.

Our

^.•request is that the Court now allow us sufficient time to
29
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designate experts and to have them available to counsel to
depose, to have additional time to prepare an expert witness
report if the Court so requires or to allow them to testify
based on making them available for their depositions.

I

don't know that the Court has made a ruling about witnesses,
expert witnesses not being helpful in this case and so we ask
the Court to determine that expert witness testimony would be
helpful to the Court in resolving this matter since the Court
will be making the decision and make adequate accommodations
so that the parties can have those witnesses available and
give the Court that additional benefit at trial. Again, we
have time, trial has not been set, there's no reason why the
parties cannot conduct expert discovery and expert
disclosures sufficient to have both parties prepared and
ready to go at the time of trial,

I don't think it's

uncommon to have expert discovery done in the last month
before, trial and so because we believe that it is doable,
feasible and we believe it would be helpful to the Court, we
ask the Court to make allowance and to also allow those
witnesses to testify at trial.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. LIEBERMAN:

I don't know that I can distinguish

very well between this motion and our motion for attorney' s
fees because I think this is abuse.
the process.

I think this is abuse of

These are precisely the issues that were before
30
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THE COURT: No, we're fine.
Mr. Christensen.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Your Honor, this could not be a

request for reconsideration because it's our first motion.
THE COURT: Well, it's essentially a reiteration of
your arguments against their Motion to Strike.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:
from the Court.

And we're not trying to hide that

The arguments are parallel but not —

THE COURT: Not parallel, Mr. Christensen, they're
identical, Mr. Christensen.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Okay, I'm not trying to hide that

from the Court —
THE COURT: We've been here and done this.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

I understand that. Your Honor.

It's identical but the request of relief is not identical.
The motion brought by Mr. Harrison, by Mr. Lieberman on Mr.
Harrison's behalf was extremely narrow.

All they asked the

Court to do was to strike the expert reports.
THE COURT: Which as a natural result, disallows
their testimony.

You can't put them on if they haven't had

notice.
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Well, I don't know.
not make that statement at the hearing.

The Court did

The Court has not

ruled on that issue.
THE COURT:

I didn't need to.
33
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MR. CHRISTENSEN:
THE COURT:

Say that again.

I didn't need to.

If you don't provide

them with the reports the rule doesn't allow it to go
anywhere from there.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Your Honor, I think that the

request to allow testimony is a different request than the
request to strike their reports.

If the Court believes that

one leads to the other, then I understand your ruling.

But I

still the question is worth asking, I think it's worth
answering for the Court so that we know whether we can put
expert witnesses on the stand at trial because that question
has not been asked and it has not been answered by the Court
up to this point.
THE COURT:

Well, I think, if I recall you got a

pretty strong reaction.from me when you told me that you were
going to file this motion.
All right.

I think I was pr.etty surprised.

Anything else?

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

No.

I mean, I think it's

procedurally proper and necessary.

The arguments are not

different from the arguments we made before but the relief
requested is different and we ask the Court to instruct us as
to whether the Court will allow expert witnesses who are
hired for the purpose of litigation to testify at trial under
any circumstances, whether it be by deposition, by submitting
reports or for just in the interest of justice.

That's
34
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Anything else, Mr. Christensen?
MR. CHRISTENSEN;

May I?

THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. CHRISTENSEN: .Your.Honor, on the one hand I
understand what the Court is thinking in terms of if I've
stricken expert reports, then something has to happen before
testimony can be given at trial but that's what this request
is all about.

I mean, there is no rule that says once I

grant a motion to grant expert reports, ipso facto, there's
not going to be any expert testimony at trial and our request
today is asking the Court under it's equitable jurisdiction
to allow expert testimony at trial.

That request has not

been made, I think it's appropriate for that request to be
made.

I think it's appropriate for the Court to allow that

testimony.

This Court has equitable jurisdiction and whether

a witness testifies at trial is in the sound discretion of
the Court but I don't think that we can just assume that the
Court has ruled on that when the Court hasn't and there's no
rule that answers that question.
equation.

It's not a mathematical

It's a question of how this Court wants to conduct

trial and manage its calendar and decide who testifies at
trial and had Mr. Lieberman put in his motion we asked the
Court to strike all expert testimony at trial, and the Court
did, then that would have solved the problem.

But we're

asking the Court now to allow that testimony and answer that
36
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question.
That's all I have.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Thank you.

I think this is a Motion for Reconsideration which
motions are frowned upon by the Supreme Court.

I think it

Justice Nehring that said that the proliferation of these
motions was like the proliferation of cheat grass or
something like that.

Although this is not a second motion

for the plaintiff, it is the second go round on the very same
issue.

His responses to the defendant's motion to strike his

expert witness reports are the same as his responses here.
As I look at Rule 37F, it says, "Failure to
disclose.

If a party fails to disclose a witness, document

or other material as required by Rule 26A" which is exactly
what I found at our previous hearing, "or to amend the prior
response" which doesn't apply here, "that party shall not be
permitted to use the witness, document, or other material at
any hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the
party shows good cause for the failure to disclose."
neither of those.

I found

I did not find that the failure to

disclose was harmless and I did not find that the plaintiff
showed good cause for the failure to disclose.
The only wiggle room that's allowed under this rule
is the next sentence, "In addition to or in lieu of this
sanction, the Court may order any other sanction including
37
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Your Honor, I do believe that we have a duty to
supplement.

I do believe he's entitled to that information

and I represent to this Court that we're going to do that
diligently, that we have continued to do it even though he
would not agree with us to do it.
THE COURT:
December.

Well, it's now December, it's now mid-

What have you got for him this far?

Apparently

one.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Got one but I'm trying to - I've

talked at length with the other two experts that need to
submit supplements.

If I could have until the first Monday

in January I will have supplements for the other two experts
to him and so I request the Court to allow us to do that.
THE COURT: .All right.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Anything else?

I don't believe that a sanction

is available because there's been no allegation of bad faith
and that's required under 37F as well.
•And finally, even though I think Christensen/Jewkes
is a case, an extreme, we're not arguing that the Court
should wait until five days before trial and let us
supplement all that time.

It stands for the proposition that

if there is time for them to get the information in order to
prepare for trial, then there's not prejudice and if we can
have until the first Monday in January, there's no way they
could be prejudiced because they will have time to get the
18
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plaintiffs designation of expert witnesses other than
perhaps what they're going to charge per hour and what their
area of opinion might be if and when it is obtained.

I find

that Mr. Lieberman certainly had a reason to object to this
expert witness report.
Now, let's deal with the issue of whether or not he
appropriately dealt with the requirements of 37, Rule 37 in
filing his motion.

37A(2)(a), "If a party fails to make a

disclosure required by Rules 26A, any other party may move to
compel disclosure and for appropriate sanctions.

The motion

must include a certification that the movant has in good
faith conferred or attempted to confer with the party not
making the disclosure in an effort to secure the disclosure
without court action."
Normally I would expect a certification with the
either part of an affidavit or at the very least, part of a
motion attached with, some sort of either an affidavit or in
this case a letter.

What I have in this case is a letter

that was mailed via electronic mail it says on September 10,
2008 and there's apparently no argument with that.
that Mr. Lieberman addresses the various issues.

And in

Quotes Rule

26A(3)(b); notes that the plaintiff never identifies what the
opinion of the experts is with regard to Messrs. Olsen and
Nielsen.

He lists the problems, explains the problems.

is a one and a half page letter.

This

It talks about Mr. Brough

:
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•%tie we get done, we're going to back right where we were a
^ear previous.
In all honesty, I thought I was overly kind in
itmg the motion when we met in July.

This is a case that

now been going for well over a year - well, I can't tell
when the complaint was filed because I've only got the
cond file and I did notice that in the printout of the
:ket that was included on the other motion that the relate
a*ke is moving along.
Wtedly.

There are things being filed

Maybe not repeatedly, not that they're being

eated in their filings but all kinds of matters are bein<
£led, all kinds of hearings are being held at the same tim
"at nothing is happening on the discovery for the plaintiffs
~this case as to their experts.
LS case is my problem.

That's not my problem.

I mean, what I'm saying is, if the

Jaintiff is too busy with the other case, that's not
Seething I can deal with.

Plaintiff chose to file this case

*ct we're going to keep it moving.
So as far as substantial compliance, I find there
^"substantial compliance with the meet and confer rule.

I

~-"nd that at this point in this litigation 'for the plaintiff
^riow in December, have finally filed what the parties are
,-t •*

^ ^ a n 9 a supplement to expert reports that were due on
^ptember 8, that's not satisfactory and I don't find that
defendant in this matter should have to wait until after
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the first of the year to finally get what should have been
filed on September 8 in a timely manner after the Court gave
the plaintiff four more months to do what the Court now wants
to have - or what the plaintiff now wants to have
accomplished by the first of the year.

So, for those reasons

I'm going to grant the motion.
As to attorney's fees, I don't find it's
appropriate under the rules to surprise Mr. Christensen with
a request for attorney's fees at this state and so I'm going
to deny the request for attorney's fees.
And as to prejudice or harm to the defendant, I do
base my decision in this matter on the fact that the
defendant is harmed.

I find that there is a willful failure

on the plaintiff to carry this case forward- and to obey the
orders of the court, with the Court having given the
plaintiff more time over the objection of the defendant.
But, I find that a request for attorney's fees at this point
based on bad faith is ill timed and lately timed and I'm not
going to take an additional motion .on it.

That was the

choice that the defendant made in filing the motion.
Okay, I have another haring at 10:30 that's
starting in five minutes if the gentleman shows up but let's
move on quickly.

If he comes, all we're doing is taking his

agreement on a divorce and we may break.
noon that I have to be at.

I have a meeting at

So let's move to the other issue
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